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Herbert Jacob
James Eisenstein

China and the Superpowers
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From the Managing Editor:

In this issue . . .

HERBERT JACOB and JAMES EISENSTEIN show that most persons accused of felonies in Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit are not convicted, but nevertheless suffer significant punishment. Although convictions and prison sentences are the result of complex patterns, length of sentence seems to be much more the result of the seriousness of the original charge than of the identity of the judge or race of the defendant.

STEVEN I. LEVINE surveys the key domestic and international factors determining China's posture toward the United States and the Soviet Union. While seeking short-term security through rapprochement with the United States, China's leaders look toward the eventual undermining of superpower domination in a transformed international system which will reflect China's enhanced status.

The CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE analyzes long- and short-term causes of New York City's fiscal crisis, discusses the extent to which New York City's problems are unique or shared by other large cities, and concludes that the underlying causes of the crisis cannot be remedied by city action alone, but only with the help of the state and federal government.

CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL analyzes the effect of school desegregation on white flight in eighty-six northern school districts and finds that it has little or no effect on accelerating white flight. The findings of her study thus contradict those of James Coleman's recent papers on school desegregation and white flight.

EARL C. RAVENAL presents a critique of the concept of "collective security." He asserts that a logical analysis of the inherent contradictions that lie at the root of the concept—particularly the contradiction of "concert" and "enforcement"—should lead to pessimism about the establishment or maintenance of this form of international system.

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR., commenting on Ravenal's article, argues that collective security doctrine differs substantially from the theory of world federation. He disputes Ravenal's contention that collective security's requirement of concert is logically incompatible with its scheme for enforcement action against deviant states.

ROBERT S. GILMOUR and JOHN A. McCAULEY analyze the Everglades jetport case as an illustration of natural resource policy making in transition—from traditional "pork barrel" politics by competitive interest groups to the politics of strategic "vetoes."

DEMETRIOS CARALEY

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Sentences and Other Sanctions in the Criminal Courts of Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit

HERBERT JACOB
JAMES EISENSTEIN

The imposition of formal sanctions by government as embodied in our criminal courts arouses the interest of both the general public and social scientists. There is something dramatic and symbolically potent in the stripping of liberty and even life from a fellow human being. The significance attached to the imposition of a long prison term has led both the public and scholars to focus on the length of prison sentences. Most scholarly research has concerned itself with the relationship between sentence length and such variables as the proclivities of the judge, the social and economic characteristics of the defendants, the nature of the crime, and the manner of conviction (plea of guilty versus conviction after trial).[1] But the significant sanctions meted out by crimi-

[1] This research is surprisingly thin and inconclusive. Bullock finds race associated with length of sentence, holding offense and disposition mode constant. He examines only the length of sentences (coding all sentences less than ten years as short!) of convicted defendants imprisoned in the Texas State Prison at Huntsville in 1958, concealing any differences that may exist in the granting of probation by race or disposition mode. He also fails to distinguish between Anglos and Chicanos. Henry Allen Bullock, "Significance of the Racial Factor in the Length of Prison Sentences," *The Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science*, 522 (1961), 411–417. Edward Green,

HERBERT JACOB is professor of political science and chairman of the department at Northwestern University. He is author of *Justice in America, Debtors in Court,* and *Urban Justice* as well as contributor to many edited books and journals. JAMES EISENSTEIN is associate professor of political science at Pennsylvania State University and author of *Politics and the Legal Process.*

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nal courts are not limited to the length of prison sentences. And the sentencing decision cannot be adequately understood unless it is placed in perspective as only one stage in the flow of defendants through the criminal process.

This article presents a comprehensive description of the way in which three large city criminal courts distribute their sanctions on felony defendants. Our data come from Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit in 1972 and early 1973. Our unit of analysis is the individual defendant. We gathered information on felony charges brought against approximately 1500 defendants in each city from court and prosecutor files as well as from observations of courtroom proceedings.[2] Almost as much time was spent in chambers, hallways, and courthouse offices as in the courtrooms themselves.

The Sanctioning of the "Not Convicted"

One premise governing the analysis of sentencing is that most defendants are convicted. Prosecutors often claim "conviction rates" of over 90 percent. But the widespread impression that most felony defendants are convicted which such assertions nourish is simply untrue. The most conviction-prone of the three court systems (Detroit) convicted less than 60 percent of those whom we estimate are arrested by the police and brought to the district attorney for possible prosecution on felony charges.[3] Moreover, about 30 percent of those convicted are not formally

studying Philadelphia sentences in 1956–1957, concluded to the contrary. See Edward Green, *Judicial Attitudes in Sentencing* (London, 1961). Still often cited is a study published in the 1930s; Frederick J. Gaudet, "Individual Differences in Sentencing Tendencies of Judges," *Archives of Psychology*, 32 (1938). For an analysis of sentencing variations for a political crime, see Beverly Blair Cook, "Sentencing Behavior of Federal Judges: Draft Cases–1972," *University of Cincinnati Law Review*, 42 (1973), 597–633. By far the most comprehensive and impressive research on sentencing to date is Hogarth's study of Canadian magistrates. See John Hogarth, *Sentencing as a Human Process* (Toronto, 1971), especially chap. 19. For an excellent summary of twenty recent studies of sentencing, see John Hagen, "Extra-Legal Attributes and Criminal Sentencing: An Assessment of a Sociological Viewpoint," *Law and Society Review*, 8 (1974), 557–583.

[2] Our Baltimore sample was systematically selected from the files of the Clerk's office with every nth case selected. It is weighted to correct for inadvertant oversampling of postindictment cases. Our Chicago analysis rests on an observational sample of preliminary hearing courts that is weighted to correct for differences in observation rates, and a random sample from the indictment files. The Detroit analysis rests on observational samples collected at each stage of the felony disposition process. Further details about the sampling may be obtained from the authors.

[3] This estimate is based on a rather complex set of calculations necessitated by the fact that the prosecutor (and *not* the police) decides whether and what to charge ar-

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charged with a felony at all, but rather are brought to the misdemeanor division of Detroit Recorder's Court for a swift disposition of their case. In the other two cities, fewer defendants are convicted—only 44 percent in Baltimore and 14 percent in Chicago.[4]

Most (80 to 90 percent) of those who are released without conviction are not freed following a formal determination of innocence at trial or a finding of no probable cause at a preliminary hearing.[5] Rather, their cases are dismissed at one of the several screening points in the felony disposition process.[6] The screening points and techniques used at each vary from city to city, and will be described in greater detail in subsequent reports of our findings.[7] A brief sketch of the major characteristics of screening in each city is sufficient to demonstrate the striking differences. The Detroit prosecutor screens cases brought to him by the police *before* formal charges are lodged. We estimate that for every two defendants the prosecutor charges with a felony, another defendant who could have reasonably been charged with a felony either was charged with a misdemeanor or was charged with nothing at all. Significant numbers of additional defendants are screened at the preliminary examination and trial stages (9.2 and 15 percent of all potential felony defendants respectively).[8] In Baltimore, most dismissals occur at District Court probable cause proceedings, although some come after the grand jury has indicted

restees brought to him by the police. The estimate includes dismissals that would have been felonies if prosecuted and misdemeanors that reasonably could have been charged at the felony level had an exercise of prosecutorial discretion not determined otherwise. Conservative assumptions were used in estimating these figures. It is possible that even more potential felony defendants are screened, which would lower the 57.5 percent conviction rate.

[4] A major difference between Detroit on the one hand and Baltimore and Chicago on the other is that the Detroit prosecutor screened cases before they came to court. Baltimore and Chicago courts heard all charges brought by the police. Subsequently, some prosecutor screening has been introduced in Chicago.

[5] Preliminary hearings must find "probable cause" to justify holding the defendant for further proceedings; this requires a judicial finding that a crime has been committed and that it is likely the defendant was the perpetrator.

[6] We recognize the most significant screening in the criminal justice system in terms of numbers is done by the police. The difficulties of studying police screening systematically in the three cities led to our decision to focus on the felony disposition process—the sequence of procedures used to dispose of those defendants the police decide ought to be prosecuted.

[7] See James Eisenstein and Herbert Jacob, *Felony Justice* (Boston, 1976 forthcoming).

[8] Many potential felony defendants in Detroit who are screened from the felony process when they are charged with a misdemeanor are found guilty in misdemeanor court. As such, they occupy the same status as Chicago felony defendants whose charges are reduced to misdemeanors at the preliminary hearing. Hence, these Detroit defendants convicted in misdemeanor court have been included in our estimate of the proportion convicted.

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the defendant. In Chicago, the vast majority of dismissals occur in the branch courts during probable cause proceedings.

The not-convicted-but-punished do not constitute a trivial number of people. In Chicago, where the courts cope with their workload principally by dismissing cases, unconvicted felony defendants numbered 21,000 by our estimate in 1972. At the other extreme, the smaller city of Baltimore with its higher conviction rate had only approximately 2100 nonconvicted defendants one year later. Detroit had an estimated 7700 nonconvicted defendants in 1972. Standardizing these figures by 1970 population, Chicago has the highest proportion of unconvicted defendants—6.24 per 1000. Detroit's rate is 5.09 per 1000, while Baltimore's is 2.32 per 1000.

The large number of defendants who escape conviction suggests the limited utility of focusing exclusively on the sanctions received by those defendants who are convicted and imprisoned. Almost all defendants who are released are punished in some fashion. Not only is the arrest a blot on their record which may follow them for years, but defendants are sanctioned more immediately and directly. We cannot easily measure the psychic costs or the damage to social relationships, but we can indirectly measure other dimensions of their punishment—the amount of time their case lingers in court, the amount of money they are required to post for bail, the proportion who wait in jail while their case is being processed, and for two cities, the length of time not-convicted defendants are imprisoned before being released on bail or having their charges dismissed. Table 1 presents some of these data. For example, in these three cities, between 19 and 38 percent of those not convicted never make

TABLE 1

Sanctions Imposed on Nonconvicted Defendants

	Baltimore[a]	*Chicago*[b]	*Detroit*[c]
Those not released on bail	38.1%	19.0%	37.9%
Those released on bail who spent a week or more in jail	48.2%	22.9%	NA
Those with bond set at $5000 or more	31.6%	19.4%	25.1%
Mean number of days from arrest to disposition	104.5	128.6	102.8
Estimated number of nonconvicted defendants in 1972 or 1973	2100	21,100	7700

[a]Based on weighted file sample. Total number of nonconvicted defendants for 1973 obtained from internal report of the state's attorney's office.

[b]Based on weighted preliminary hearing sample.

[c]Based on Detroit sample adjusted to reflect proportion of dismissals at preliminary examination.

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bail; 23 to 48 percent of those making bail spent at least one week in jail while attempting to raise their bail; and the proceedings which had been initiated against them lasted on the average between three and four months. We are, of course, speaking of proportions and averages; some defendants escaped with lower costs while others suffered considerably more.

We lack direct data on attorneys' fees or bondsmen's fees paid by unconvicted defendants, but those who post bond or hire their own attorney undoubtedly find the costs difficult to bear in most instances. Retained counsel are likely to charge a minimum of several hundred dollars.[9] Our data also reveal a costly choice for a number of unconvicted Baltimore defendants. Over 30 percent of those not convicted were asked to post bail of $5000 or more. This presented them with the choice of raising at least $500 for the bondsman's fee or remaining in the Baltimore city jail. In Chicago and Detroit, the proportion of defendants with a $5000 or higher bond is considerably smaller. Costs in Chicago are reduced further because defendants may post 10 percent of the face value of the bond with the court and receive a rebate of 90 percent of this fee if they appear. In Baltimore and Detroit, bail is typically purchased from a bondsman who charges 10 percent of the required amount and keeps it all. Ironically, what Chicago defendants save in bail fees they often pay in attorneys' fees since many of them agree to assign the bail refund to their attorney as part of his compensation. Consequently, nonconvicted defendants in the three cities who do not suffer pretrial detention very often must bear the considerable financial burden of posting bail, paying an attorney, or both.

The Decision to Convict

A number of circumstances may produce the decision to convict or release. It may simply be the result of insufficient evidence or it may be the consequences of a private settlement of the conflict. Witnesses may refuse to appear because they have become reconciled with the defendant, because they fear to testify, because they have become tired of repeated calls to come to court, or because they may have been paid off by the defendant. The prosecutor may drop a case because he feels it is not important enough to warrant spending the state's time and money on it, because he has an intuitive feeling that the evidence and witnesses are not quite jelling, or because of prejudice or political pressure. All of these

[9] In Detroit, the average fee paid to appointed counsel was $181.94 according to the Court's Annual Report for 1972 (p. 13). Retained attorneys can hardly afford to charge much less, and probably charge substantially more.

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TABLE 2

The Relation of the Decision to Convict with Charge, Defendant Characteristics, Strength of Evidence, and Identity of Judge (Discriminant function analysis)[a]

	Baltimore[b]	*Chicago*[c]	*Detroit*[d]
	Percent of Rao's V Accounted For		
Original charge	19.8	19.7	4.2
Defendant characteristics	18.9	13.7	1.1
Strength of evidence	10.8	3.2	2.0
Disposition stage	42.3	59.8	78.2
Identity of judge	8.2	3.5	14.3
	Canonical Correlation Squared		
	.28	.35	.38
	Percent of Defendants Correctly Classified		
	73.3	92.5	78.3

[a]Discriminant function analysis is analogous to multiple regression but designed for dichotomous or polytomous dependent variables. The "percent of Rao's V accounted for" is analogous to "percent of explained variance accounted for" in regression analysis. The canonical correlation squared is an indicator of the amount of variance in the dependent variable that is accounted for by the sum of all the independent variables. Cf. John E. Overall and C. James Klitt, *Applied Multivariate Analysis* (New York, 1972), pp. 400–412; and Norman H. Nie et al., *Statistical Package for the Social Sciences*, 2d ed. (New York, 1975), pp. 434–448.

[b]Based on weighted file sample.

[c]Based on weighted observational sample of preliminary hearings.

[d]Based on weighted observational sample.

influences sometimes come to bear; they cannot be subsumed in a general statistical explanation of the decision to convict or release. Nevertheless, several general tendencies which apply to some cases can be demonstrated.

We may attempt, for instance, to predict whether a defendant will be convicted or released from our knowledge of the offense with which he was charged, the defendant's race, bail status, and prior criminal record, the type of attorney representing him, the weight of the evidence against him, the stage of the proceedings, and the name of the judge who disposed of his case.[10] We can be moderately successful with such predictions; as Table 2 indicates, we can correctly classify more than 90 per-

[10] The categories used for "original charge" are: murder; armed robbery; assault; heroin dealer or delivery; heroin use; burglary-theft; rape; robbery; weapons (carrying a concealed weapon; unlawful use of a weapon); and "else" (all others). Age is coded young/not-young with all defendants twenty-one or under classified as young. Prior record is an index of the seriousness of the prior record utilizing data on the number of arrests and convictions, whether the defendant has served time in prison, and the recency of his previous arrests and convictions. If there was corroborating physical evidence, or the defendant made an incriminating statement, or there were

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cent of the cases in Chicago and approximately 75 percent in the other two cities. The independent variables, however, explain only 38 and 35 percent of the variance for the decision to convict in Detroit and Chicago and considerably less in Baltimore.

In each of the three cities, the disposition stage is the most powerful predictor of conviction or release. This reflects the fact that most dismissals occur during the preliminary hearing proceedings at which probable cause must be established; conversely, most convictions occur at the trial stage. In Baltimore and Chicago, the original charge and defendant characteristics are the next most powerful predictors; only in Detroit is the identity of the judge a discernible predictor of conviction or release.

When we look at particular subsets of the cases, we are considerably more successful in our explanatory attempts. For instance, when we examine those Baltimore cases in which the racial characteristics of the offender and victim are noted, and when we combine those variables with the defendant's prior record and bail status, we are able to predict almost all convictions instead of only 74 percent. White on white and black on black offenses have approximately the same conviction rates (63.2 and 55.9 percent). White on black offenses have a lower conviction rate (44 percent), while black on white offenses have the highest conviction rate (77.2 percent). If one looks at racial characteristics alone, the racial interaction seems to make a lot of difference. Black offenders in Baltimore are least likely to be convicted if their victim was black; they are the most likely to be convicted if their victim was white. These racial characteristics are much more powerful predictors, however, when combined with prior record and bail status. Bailed defendants, regardless of the racial character of the offense, have approximately a 50 percent chance of avoiding conviction. Jailed defendants face a much higher likelihood of conviction only when they also have a prior record and are involved in incidents with particular racial characteristics. For those with a prior record, 75 percent of jailed blacks accused of victimizing other blacks are convicted, while 90 percent of both blacks and whites in jail accused of victimizing whites are convicted.[11]

---

one or more eye witnesses, or the defendant had been identified in a lineup or from mug shots, these "characteristics of case" variables were coded "yes."

[11] The data are as follows:

Percent of Defendants Convicted with Prior Record by Racial Offense Type and Bail Status

White on White		Black on Black		White on Black		Black on White	
Jail	Bail	Jail	Bail	Jail	Bail	Jail	Bail
91.7	54.2	76.0	45.9	*	*	90.9	36.0

* Insufficient data.

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Such complex interactions abound in our data. They make general explanations of the decision to convict or release tenuous. At best our evidence indicates that idiosyncratic interactions account for much of the variance which we cannot explain by the use of a straightforward statistical analysis.

The Sanctioning of Convicted Defendants

A second premise of many sentencing studies is that most convicted defendants are sent to prison. But not all defendants convicted when originally charged with a felony are imprisoned. As Table 3 shows, only in Chicago are almost all of those convicted sent to prison; in Baltimore a substantial minority and in Detroit a majority are set free. Moreover, there is a considerable difference between Baltimore, on the one hand, and Chicago and Detroit on the other hand, with respect to the kind of nonprison sentence given. In Baltimore, only 20 percent of those not sent to prison are put on probation; most of the remainder draw suspended sentences. Suspended sentences are almost unknown in Chicago, with more than 90 percent of the nonprison sentences being probation. Nonprison sentences meted out by the felony courtrooms in Detroit closely resemble those in Chicago.

The difference between probation and a suspended sentence is an important one. A suspended sentence usually involves little or no super-

TABLE 3

Sentences Imposed on Convicted Defendants

	Baltimore[a]	*Chicago*[b]	*Detroit*[c]	
Convicted defendants sentenced to prison	63.1%	86.1%	34.8%	
Convicted defendants not sentenced to prison	36.9	13.9	65.2	
Those not sentenced to prison given:				
			Felony Div.	Misdmnr Div.[d]
fine/restitution	3.9	1.5	2.6%	39.2%
suspended sentence	83.2	—	5.4	34.2
probation	12.9	98.5	92.0	26.5

[a]Based on weighted file sample.
[b]Based on file and observational samples.
[c]Estimated. Includes potential felony defendants prosecuted, convicted, and sentenced in misdemeanor division.
[d]Misdemeanor sentence distribution calculated from 1972 Annual Report of Detroit Recorder's Court, p. 7.

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vision. A convict with a suspended sentence is likely to have his suspension revoked only after another serious arrest or conviction and it is quite possible that the judge in the new case will not be aware of the earlier suspension. By contrast, probation subjects the convict to continuous supervision by a probation officer. Often that involves little more than periodic reporting to his officer by telephone or in person. But failure to report or failure to abide by any restriction imposed by the probation department (such as leaving the jurisdiction, moving to a proscribed neighborhood, associating with proscribed persons, going into debt, drinking, etc.) may lead to the revocation of probation and a prison sentence. Another arrest or conviction almost certainly leads to probation revocation because a special bureaucracy exists to keep track of probationers and to call their errant ways to the attention of the judge. Consequently, probation is a considerably harsher penalty than a suspended sentence.

The choice between freedom and prison for convicted defendants appears to hinge on the original charge and on the defendant's characteristics more than on the judge's proclivities. In Table 4, we see that charge and defendant characteristics are the most powerful predictors. Strength of evidence and disposition mode (whether the defendant pleaded guilty or was found guilty at a bench or jury trial) have very little effect. The identity of the judge ranks only as third most powerful pre-

TABLE 4

The Relation of the Decision to Sentence a Convicted Defendant to Prison with Charge, Defendant Characteristics, Strength of Evidence, Dispositional Mode, and Identity of Judge (Discriminant function analysis)

	Baltimore[a]	*Chicago*[b]	*Detroit*[c]
	Percent of Rao's V Accounted For		
Original charge	30.4	37.9	23.5
Defendant characteristics	39.1	28.9	28.2
Strength of evidence	2.9	4.2	19.0
Dispositional mode	2.6	8.2	8.8
Identity of judge	24.9	20.4	20.3
	Canonical Correlation Squared		
	.35	.19	.27
	Percent of Defendant's Correctly Classified		
	79.3	89.9	73.3

[a] Based on weighted file sample.
[b] Based on random sample of indictments plus observational sample of trial courtroom proceedings.
[c] Based on unweighted observational sample.

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dictor. The weakness of all of these predictor variables put together is to us very surprising; they explain at best (in Baltimore) 35 percent of the variance and at worst (in Chicago) 19 percent of the variance in the dependent variable.

Even though we cannot yet satisfactorily account for the decision of whether or not to send defendants to prison, our findings indicate that the conviction decision leads to quite different consequences in the three cities. Whereas in Chicago it usually results in a prison sentence, in the other two cities it generally leads to restricted freedom. But taking into account the differential conviction rates Baltimore defendants much more certainly face prison than do Chicago or Detroit defendants. Of those originally charged, 29 percent in Baltimore, 20 percent in Detroit, and 10 percent in Chicago go to prison. Baltimore defendants convicted but not sent to prison generally escape the restrictions of probation that face their Chicago and Detroit counterparts.

Defendants sentenced to prison face widely varying terms. Some felonies draw as little as a year in jail; others may be penalized with life sentences. Moreover, some defendants who originally are charged with a felony may be convicted of a misdemeanor and obtain a prison term of less than a year. The penal codes of the three states in which our cities are located differ considerably in the minimum and maximum penalties they attach to particular crimes. In Illinois, for instance, aggravated assault could be penalized with a penitentiary sentence of one to five years at the time our study began. In Michigan a considerable array of more specifically defined crimes were the parallel of the Illinois offense; they drew from a maximum of one year to a maximum of life.

Table 5 indicates the actual sentences given our samples of convicted defendants by offense. We present both the mean and the median because the distributions are quite skewed due to a few very long sentences. Life sentences have been excluded from the calculations, but they are quite unusual in all three cities.[12] Table 5 shows only sentences meted out at the trial stage. This somewhat inflates the data because those defendants who plead guilty or are convicted at the probable cause stage in Baltimore and Chicago, or who receive a jail term in Detroit's misdemeanor division, generally receive much lighter sentences. For instance, while the median trial court sentence for armed robbery in Baltimore is eighty-four months, at the district court it is only ten months. But most armed robbery sentences are given at the trial court (121 versus 4). One should also note that Table 5 presents the sentences according to the offense originally charged, not according to the offense upon which a con-

[12] There were seven life sentences in our Detroit sample, three in Baltimore, and none in Chicago.

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TABLE 5

Trial Court Sentences Median and Mean Months by Offense Originally Charged

	Baltimore[a]			*Chicago*[b]			*Detroit*[c]		
	Mean	*(N)*	*Median*	*Mean*	*(N)*	*Median*	*Mean*	*(N)*	*Median*
Murder	155.8	(22)	102	129.0	(20)	96.0	95.3	(23)	69.6
Armed robbery	105.1	(121)	84	57.4	(98)	48.6	46.1	(73)	35.3
Assault	77.6	(25)	81	25.0	(25)	15.3	23.6	(22)	14.1
Heroin dealer	79.7	(52)	50	32.1	(17)	28.0	11.4	(8)	8.4
Heroin user	33.1	(12)	26	25.5	(4)	27.0	6.4	(17)	5.4
Burglary-theft	52.6	(70)	46.5	16.1	(57)	16.0	15.6	(83)	12.1
Rape	83.7	(11)	48	56.0	(15)	52.5	91.2	(5)	46.5
Robbery	74.8	(41)	63.4	27.5	(26)	19.0	33.9	(10)	31.0
Else	30.3	(25)	25.5	19.3	(24)	16.9	16.7	(94)	11.8
Weapons				21.1	(20)	17.1	9.3	(26)	7.5

[a]Based on weighted file sample.
[b]Based on indictment sample.
[c]Based on entire sample.
NOTE: Life sentences excluded from calculations.

viction is obtained. We do that because in some instances the conviction offense is more the result of presentence bargaining than an accurate reflection of the circumstances which led to the arrest. If the police overcharge, the sentences shown in Table 5 understate the punishment being meted out for particular crimes.

The data show the expected hierarchy of sentence severity among crimes. Murder, rape, and armed robbery generally draw the heaviest sentences. Property offenses such as robbery and burglary-theft draw much lighter sentences. There are also distinct differences between the three cities. In Baltimore sentences are almost always longer than those in Chicago; and in Chicago sentences are generally somewhat longer than in Detroit. However, the sentences shown in Table 5 principally have symbolic significance; they are not the actual terms which anyone expects convicts to serve. Each of the states has rules setting eligibility for parole at a time short of the sentence set by the judge. About half of the inmates are paroled when they first become eligible, but many more look toward that date as the likely end of their real sentence. Table 6 adjusts the sentences for these parole rules. Although the rules for determining the earliest parole date are different in each of the three states, adjusting the sentences does not alter the relative ranking of the three cities. Baltimore is still the harshest city and Detroit the most lenient. Moreover, the gap between the cities is not reduced substantially by taking parole eligibility into account.

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TABLE 6

Trial Court Sentences Adjusted for Parole Eligibility Mean and Median Months by Offense Originally Charged

	Baltimore[a]			*Chicago*[b]			*Detroit*[c]		
	Mean	*(N)*	*Median*	*Mean*	*(N)*	*Median*	*Mean*	*(N)*	*Median*
Murder	116.9	(22)	76.5	90.3	(20)	78.0	58.9	(23)	48.2
Armed robbery	78.9	(121)	63.0	46.5	(98)	44.4	31.5	(73)	25.9
Assault	58.2	(25)	60.8	21.6	(25)	14.0	16.9	(22)	10.6
Heroin dealer	59.7	(52)	38.0	29.4	(17)	25.7	8.4	(8)	6.3
Heroin user	26.1	(12)	21.5	23.2	(4)	24.5	4.9	(17)	4.1
Burglary-theft	39.4	(70)	38.9	14.6	(57)	14.5	11.6	(83)	9.1
Rape	62.8	(11)	44.3	49.1	(15)	48.1	50.3	(5)	32.8
Robbery	56.5	(41)	47.8	25.1	(26)	17.0	24.3	(10)	22.9
Else	22.7	(25)	19.1	17.5	(24)	15.5	12.3	(94)	8.8
Weapons				19.0	(20)	15.6	6.9	(26)	5.6

[a]Based on weighted file sample.
[b]Based on indictment sample.
[c]Based on entire sample.
NOTE: Life sentences excluded from calculations.

Statistical analysis of the length of sentence with the same variables we used to predict prison is somewhat more successful. Between 46 and 56 percent of the variance is accounted for. What is remarkable in Table 7 is that the original offense charged is the most powerful predictor. While it may not be surprising that characteristics of the case (evidence) are unrelated to sentence length, both conventional wisdom and prior research had suggested that the defendant's age, race, jail-bail status, and particularly the seriousness of prior record would strongly affect sentence length. That is not true.

In addition, when offense charges, characteristics of case, and defendant characteristics are held constant, disposition mode usually has little impact. This nicely illustrates the power of multivariate analysis. When we simply look at the cross-tabulation of sentence with disposition mode, it appears that jury trials command a penalty of sentences which are three to four times longer than bench trial or guilty plea sentences. It turns out, however, that this "penalty" is really related to the kinds of charges which are taken to trial and the characteristics of defendants and evidence. When those are held constant as in the analysis portrayed in Table 7, disposition mode contributes little to the explanation of sentence length.

Likewise, judges appear to have little impact of their own. Despite what appears in the cross-tabulations as discernible idiosyncrasies, the predictive power of the judges' identity in Chicago and Detroit is about

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TABLE 7

Regression on Sentence Length

	Baltimore[a]	*Chicago*[b]	*Detroit*[c]
	Percent Explained Variance Accounted For	*Percent Explained Variance Accounted For*	*Percent Explained Variance Accounted For*
Original offense charged	40.9	52.1	61.2
Characteristics of defendant	6.6	12.3	13.0
Characteristics of case	11.4	7.0	5.4
Disposition mode	3.2	19.6	8.0
Judge at disposition	37.9	9.0	12.4
Total R^2	.528	.555	.461

[a]Based on weighted file sample.
[b]Based on indictment file sample.
[c]Based on entire sample.
NOTE: Regression analysis was stepwise with variables forced in the order listed in the table. Life sentences were excluded. Sentence length (in months) was transformed by taking the natural logarithm.

the same as that of disposition mode and much less than original offense. Intimate knowledge of the courts helps explain this. The Chicago and Detroit courts operate with much more stable sets of personnel than do those in Baltimore. Cases are assigned to particular judges, prosecutors, and public defenders at arraignment on the indictment and changes are rarely made thereafter. These courtroom groups develop norms of their own and tend to constrain each individual participant's range of options. By contrast, in Baltimore, cases are not assigned until much later and last-minute changes in the judge and prosecutor are frequent. Consequently, we hypothesize that fewer constraints impinge on the Baltimore judges and they can more readily vary their sentences. But even in Baltimore, it is worth noting that the original offense accounts for much of the explained variance and disposition mode accounts for even less than in the other two cities.

SUMMARY

The description of sanctioning in Baltimore, Chicago, and Detroit just presented does not exhaust the potential of our data. Further analysis may increase our ability to explain the variance in such crucial outcomes as conviction/release, prison/no-prison, and sentence length. But the underlying structure of our findings is firm

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Our data indicate that defendants are sanctioned whether they are formally convicted or not. Indeed, the sanctions experienced by the nonconvicted deserve further study by scholars if only because nonconviction is the most likely outcome for a felony defendant. For the majority of felony defendants, punishment is assured simply by their arrest. Most of the released are not even vindicated by a verdict of acquittal. Many will not be able to remove the blemish of their arrest from police records despite the lack of a conviction. Some are forced to spend time in pretrial detention. It is likely that the economic costs of these unsuccessful prosecutions are considerable (even if small in absolute terms for each defendant) because most of the defendants in felony cases come from the working poor or welfare families. In addition, there is a considerable psychic cost to having the possibility of a long prison term hang over one's future for several weeks or months.

It is not easy to explain such important outcomes as whether a defendant is convicted or not, or whether he is imprisoned if convicted. Even sentence length, which we are able to explain somewhat better, cannot be predicted as well as we would like. Furthermore, the variables that prior research suggested ought to be most useful in accounting for variance are not, in fact, very powerful. Knowing who the judge is does not allow one to predict sentence length with any accuracy. Nor does disposition mode (plea, jury trial, or bench trial) have the expected effect on whether a convicted defendant goes to prison—and if so, for how long—that the literature on plea bargaining has stated. Similar statements can be made regarding the type of defense counsel and the defendant's characteristics. For instance, being free on bail when convicted and being white exercise only slight independent influence on the length of the sentence.

It is worth noting that the original charge has the greatest impact on the length of the sentence; it is fixed at the beginning of the felony disposition process and serves as a given for all subsequent decisions. It constrains prosecutor, defense counsel, and judge. Moreover, we should not be surprised to find that the judge's discretion has little effect in sentencing when we remember that the judge is only one of the many participants in the processing of felony defendants. He has almost no control over the decision to dismiss charges; nor does he determine whether disposition will be accomplished by a guilty plea, a bench trial, or a jury trial. The charges upon which a defendant is convicted are subject to negotiation between prosecutor and defense counsel; only in Chicago does the judge regularly participate in such negotiations. Consequently, the sentencing decision is largely formulated before the defendant stands in front of the judge to hear his fate. The judge responds with sentences

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which are considered legitimate within the organizational framework in which he works. Our observations suggest that it would not be acceptable for the judge to respond capriciously or to impose sentences which surpass the expectations of the prosecutors, defense counsel, and other members of his courtroom team who must deal with tomorrow's defendants on the basis of the last month's dispositions. Sentencing decisions are part of a pattern of events which the participants in the disposition process must control in a manner that reduces their uncertainty to tolerable levels.

Research and Policy Implications

Our failure to explain more fully why some defendants are convicted and some are sent to prison, as well as differences in the length of their prison sentences, raises the obvious question of why this is so. There are at least four possibilities: our data may simply not be of high enough quality; the police may be arresting large numbers of defendants who are either innocent or should never have been arrested in the first place; the patterns of dispositions may be more complex than we had thought; both police and those responsible for the disposition of cases (particularly judges and prosecutors) may be inefficient.

We are as familiar as anyone with the obstacles to systematic research on urban felony disposition processes. Our three years of effort have forcefully demonstrated the difficulties of obtaining consistently reliable measures. Undoubtedly a perfectly conceived and executed research project would improve predictive capacity. But we doubt that conceptual and methodological shortcomings in the research account for most or even a significant part of the reason. There are inherent and troublesome problems in relying upon court and prosecutor records. Observations of proceedings cannot capture the full significance of courtroom interactions. But we are reasonably confident that the data we have obtained are good enough to explain outcomes if indeed outcomes depend solely on the variables we measured. Since we cannot explain outcomes as well as we would like, other factors not measured in our research must be examined.

Massive misbehavior on the part of the police in arresting defendants and in writing up the alleged evidence against them is another conceivable possibility. But is it really possible given what Reiss, Skolnick, Wilson, Rubenstein,[13] and others have demonstrated about police be-

[13] While much police misbehavior is documented, especially by Reiss, Skolnick, and Rubenstein, we have every indication that arrests take place only in a portion of the incidents where they might be legally justified. We have no evidence of excessive

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havior, that more than half of the felony arrests are completely unwarranted? It is extremely unlikely that arrest behavior approaching randomness is responsible. We are inclined to doubt that police officials, mayors, and other elected officials would or could tolerate such behavior.

This does not mean, however, that the nonconviction rate is wholly independent of police arrest procedures. The process is more complicated than that. Previous research has amply demonstrated the police massively underenforce the law as a matter of necessity, that discretionary decisions both at the command level and on the street shape what statutes will be enforced and what kinds of violators of these statutes will be apprehended. This discretion obviously provides the police with opportunities to arrest individuals who may be guilty of violating a statute but who nevertheless cannot be convicted. And research on the police confirms that they often are motivated to make such arrests. For example, an officer who illegally stops and searches a "suspicious" looking vehicle with "suspicious" occupants and finds illegal weapons concealed under the front seat may press charges even if a conviction is not likely. The defendants are "guilty" of possession of the weapons in a factual sense. But unless the officer is willing and able to lie convincingly (or the defendant's attorney gets the accused to cop a plea), a conviction is unlikely. However, the officer and the prosecutor who handle the case are aware that the very fact of prosecution results in some punishment. We suspect that the courts we observed recognize these facts and condone or perhaps even encourage the punishment of the not-convicted as a means of making certain that most persons arrested by the police receive some punishment. There is some observational evidence that the most serious cases and those with the best evidence go to trial and lead more frequently to conviction. The remaining defendants are implicitly viewed as a "little guilty" and receive punishment short of a conviction or prison sentence. Thus, the reasons for pressing charges may be independent of the desire or expectation of conviction in a number of cases. Prosecution of cases where conviction is known to be unlikely very probably transgresses the spirit of a government of law. But police, prosecutors, and judges typically do not regard it as such. And such prosecutions are not equivalent to charging the wholly innocent on a random basis.

There are other instances in which prosecutions fail not because the defendant is factually innocent or the system has made a mistake. Civil-

arrests. See Albert Reiss, Jr., *The Police and the Public* (New Haven, Conn., 1971); Jonathan Rubenstein, *City Police* (New York, 1973); Jerome Skolnick, *Justice Without Trial* (New York, 1966); and James Q. Wilson, *Varieties of Police Behavior* (Cambridge, Mass., 1968).

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ian complaining witnesses often fail to follow through with their initial intention to press charges, particularly when the defendant is an acquaintance or relative. We cannot reasonably blame prosecutors or court officials for dismissing such cases. In combination with cases brought by the police where conviction is not likely, such cases probably account for a significant proportion of nonconvictions. But it is seldom possible to discern the existence of such factors solely from the information contained in court files or from observations.

Of course, not all cases where conviction is unlikely result in dismissal. Fighting a case to trial is risky and expensive for defendants; their attorneys also incur higher costs and a greater risk to their reputation than if they negotiate a plea. Thus, many defendants choose to plead guilty. In these cases, a suspended sentence or probation may be forthcoming. But again, our inability to detect the presence of such factors reduces our ability to predict whether or not a prison sentence will be imposed.

We cannot entirely dismiss the fourth possibility—sheer incompetence, indifference, and inefficiency. Police are subject to the same weaknesses and shortcomings as any other occupational group. Sloppiness in the investigation of cases, the obtaining and recording of names and addresses of crucial witnesses, and the write-up of the facts were encountered in all three cities. Not all of the blame for inefficiency or indifference can be laid to the police, however. Our observations in many courtrooms for an extended period, as well as some of our hard data, indicate that inefficiency in court procedures and prosecution is partially responsible for dismissals. In Chicago, for instance, many cases are SOL'd (Stricken Off with Leave to Reinstate) because the arresting police officers fail to appear in court when the case finally is heard at the preliminary hearing. The court could compel the police officers' attendance. It could also (with much less strain) improve its scheduling of cases so that each case required fewer appearances by police officers and so that appearances would not occur on their days off or during vacation time. More frequently in both Chicago and Baltimore, witnesses are not interviewed until the trial day. That means that many weeks—and sometimes many months—pass before a responsible person examines the evidence and determines whether a crucial element is missing. If the case were examined immediately after arrest (as was done in Detroit), missing elements could often be retrieved through further investigation. On the trial date no time is left for such investigation and memories have usually faded. Note for instance the following explanation of a Baltimore dismissal found in the prosecutor's file of a narcotics case:

> The defendant was found to have only two tablets of methadone on his

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person. The defendant has been indicted for possession of heroin and also distribution of heroin; however, he was not indicted for possession of methadone. . . .

While it is true that we could probably obtain a conviction for possession of methadone, this would, of course necessitate having the defendant reindicted by the Grand Jury and going through the system again. After discussing this matter with Det. _____, he agreed that because of the small amount involved and the time lapse between the original offense and the time this case would eventually come to trial, the best procedure would be to nolle pros [dismiss] this case and simply drop the matter.

Some dismissals reflect other circumstances. In narcotics cases, dismissals may come after successful completion of a treatment program. In assault cases, dismissal may be the result of a reconciliation among the persons involved; in some theft or burglary cases, dismissals may come after the defendant has reimbursed his victims. We do not have reliable data which indicate the proportion of dismissals resulting from an extralegal solution of the conflict which generated the felony complaint in the first place. However, our conclusion is that there is considerable incompetence and confusion.

The differences in our ability to predict conviction or release, prison sentences or supervision, and length of sentence lend some support to the hypothesis that the slightly lower levels of prediction achieved in the former two are due in part to our inability to measure inefficiency, incompetence, and unconvictability and in part to the more complex nature of those decisions as compared to the sentencing decision. Our ability to predict is lowest precisely where the factors we have not measured are most likely to have an impact—that is, in the decision to convict or release and the decision to sentence to prison. Where there are gross inefficiencies in handling cases, defendants never reach the sentencing stage. In addition, some who are convicted have cases that would be "unconvictable" if they were vigorously contested. Recognition of the weakness of the case sometimes leads to nonprison sentences even when original charges are serious. Since our predictions are based on the original offense charged, our success is diminished by the inclusion of "unconvictable" defendants who are nevertheless convicted by a plea to an offense low enough to ensure that no prison term will be imposed. By contrast, when we analyze sentence length most of the defendants whose outcomes are affected by inefficiency, incompetence, and unconvictability are out of the process. Consequently, we are best able to predict sentence length for those remaining because their sentences depend more heavily on the factors we were able to measure.

Our data raise many questions which we have not yet answered. For

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example, we have not analyzed the differences in procedures in the three cities, particularly with respect to plea bargaining. But perhaps we have shown enough to demonstrate the complexity of the patterns by which punishments are distributed through the felony disposition process in some major American cities. Those patterns should raise doubts about the legitimacy of the distributions as well as their efficacy.*

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China and the Superpowers: Policies toward the United States and the Soviet Union

STEVEN I. LEVINE

The foreign policy of China, a nation which proudly proclaims itself to be a developing socialist country belonging to the Third World, continues to be defined largely by what it perceives as the imperatives of its relationships with the Soviet Union and the United States. The end of the Cultural Revolution which coincided with the beginnings of Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy and a border-war crisis in Sino-Soviet relations introduced a new fluidity into Chinese foreign policy. But the resulting Sino-American rapprochement coupled with continuing Sino-Soviet stalemate is just one of the possible forms of a complex pattern of competition and cooperation among these powers which is likely to persist for some time. Until recently, China has been a country with predominantly regional interests, but now her foreign policy is acquiring a global dimension through her growing foreign trade, her augmented strategic capacity, and her support for the transformation of the international economic and political systems. This development naturally enhances the intrinsic importance of studying Chinese foreign policy, but just as surely increases the uncertainty of any analysis because of the widening range of factors which need to be considered.

Naming the Enemy: The Chinese Use of "Superpower"

Opposition to the superpowers' exercise of hegemony in the international system has become the all-embracing theme of current Chinese commen-

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tary in the field of international politics. The new organic documents of the Chinese Communist party and the Chinese state explicitly adopt the struggle against the superpowers as the guiding principle of China's foreign policy. The constitution adopted at the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973, proclaims that the party:

> firmly unites with the genuine Marxist-Leninist Parties and organizations the world over, unites with the proletariat, the oppressed peoples and nations of the whole world and fights together with them to oppose the hegemonism of the two superpowers—the United States and the Soviet Union—to overthrow imperialism, modern revisionism and all reaction. . . .[1]

The Chinese concept of a "superpower" departs significantly from ordinary academic and journalistic parlance. The United States and the Soviet Union usually are deemed superpowers by virtue of their size, population, industrial-technological capacity and, above all, their strategic power, which enables them to exercise influence throughout the international system, particularly with regard to issues of war and peace.[2] The term indicates aggregate power potential and the global scope within which power is deployed, but it is largely devoid of any implications about how this power is used.

In contrast, the Chinese political lexicon defines superpowers by their boundless ambition and appetite for control rather than by economic and military power per se. Superpower contention for world hegemony defines the boundaries of a potential international united front of developing Third World and developed Second World countries whose common interest (the Chinese assert) is to defend their sovereignty against superpower encroachment. In a world of crumbled empires, the superpowers are the imperialist survivors. As Teng Hsiao-p'ing defined the term in an address to the United Nations General Assembly, "A superpower is an imperialist country which everywhere subjects other countries to its aggression, interference, control, subversion or plunder and strives for world hegemony."[3] Chinese statements regularly link the policies of the superpowers with the practice of imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, racism, Zionism, and hegemonism, all terms with powerful negative emotional connotations for the Third World countries

[1] *Tenth National Congress of the Communist Party of China (Documents)* (Peking, 1973), p. 63.

[2] See, for example, George W. Ball, "The Superpowers in Asia," in *East Asia and the World System: Part I, The Superpowers and the Context*, Adelphi Paper No. 91 (London, 1972), p. 1; Raymond Aron, *Peace and War: A Theory of International Relations* (New York, 1968), pp. 536-572.

[3] *Peking Review* (hereafter cited as *PR*), April 19, 1974, p. 11.

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whose aspirations to the redistribution of political and economic power Peking seeks to harness.

The distinguishing feature of the superpowers is their pursuit of hegemony (*pa ch' üan*), a word indicating not the legitimate leadership of an alliance or association founded on common interest, but the unlawful and tyrannical use of coercive force over the weak and the defenseless.[4]

In sum, this value-laden definition of "superpower" helps to draw a line between the United States and the USSR on the one side and China on the other. The latter, lacking the "malevolent ambition" of the superpowers, is free to pursue its long-term quest for wealth and power while seeking alignment with "black friends," "small friends," and "poor friends" as Chiang Ch'ing asserted.[5]

Relations between the Superpowers: Threat or Opportunity?

During the past four years of Sino-American rapprochement, Sino-Soviet relations have remained frozen in hostility. An analysis of Chinese foreign policy reveals the extent to which their perceptions of the Soviet-American relationship constrains the policy choices of the Peking leadership across a wide spectrum of foreign policy issues. One convenient entry into Chinese thinking is the formula describing the balance between collusion and contention in Soviet-American relations.[6] Variations in this formula between the Ninth Party Congress of April 1969 and the Fourth National People's Congress (NPC) in January 1975 provide an important clue to evolving Chinese views and policies.

Lin Piao's Political Report to the Ninth Party Congress painted a glowing picture of revolutionary prospects in a world where United States imperialism, "the most ferocious enemy of the people of the whole world," and Soviet social imperialism "collude and at the same time contend with each other in a vain attempt to redivide the world."[7] Lin insisted, how-

[4] In the context of the recent campaign to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius, one wonders how many Chinese appreciate the irony of this linguistic moralism which derives from the Confucianist condemnation of the naked power aspirations of the hegemonic powers (pa) of the Warring States period, particularly the state of Ch'in whose founder is now extolled by the Maoists for his progressive role in unifying China by main force.

[5] For the text of Chiang Ch'ing's speech see *Background on China* B75-015, June 12, 1975, pp. 2–7. Some question has been raised about the authenticity of this speech. Similar documents from Taiwan have previously been reliable.

[6] I am indebted to Professor Michel Oksenberg of the University of Michigan for first alerting me to this particular formula.

[7] *PR*, Special Issue, April 28, 1969, p. 26.

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ever, that in regard to China collusion was dominant. The United States and the Soviet Union "act in coordination and work hand in glove in opposing China. . . ."[8] Therefore, Lin supported what has been termed a "dual adversary strategy." China must oppose the United States and the Soviet Union simultaneously through a Cultural Revolution style foreign policy of vocal support for revolution. The common anti-China front of the two major powers foredoomed any Chinese attempt to balance one against the other.

At almost this very time, the USSR was providing some evidence for the Chinese view that it sought collusion with the United States against the People's Republic of China (PRC). In July 1970, a senior Soviet official at the SALT talks, reportedly broached the idea of a Soviet-American agreement to act jointly against unspecified Chinese "provocations."[9] Washington scotched this feeler by refusing to treat it seriously.[10]

By the time the Tenth Party Congress convened in August 1973, the "revolution" in Chinese foreign policy had occurred as Peking sought to employ Washington as a counter against the Soviets. The foreign policy formulas at the Congress registered these changes. In place of the purged Lin Piao's defiant opposition to both superpowers, Premier Chou En-lai, with obvious reference to Sino-American relations, stated that, "necessary compromises between revolutionary countries and imperialist countries must be distinguished from collusion and compromise between Soviet revisionism and U.S. imperialism."[11] By this time, the Chinese leadership no longer considered the United States as the main threat to China. Documents circulated within the Kunming Military Region in April 1973 explained the new thinking very clearly:

> . . . U.S. imperialism's counter-revolutionary global strategy has met with repeated setbacks. Its aggressive power has been weakened. . . . Soviet revisionism, on the other hand, is stretching its arms in all directions. . . . It is the more crazy, adventurist, and deceptive. That is why Soviet revisionism has become our country's most dangerous and important enemy.[12]

Chou's report warned that China should be on guard, "particularly against surprise attack on our country by Soviet revisionist social imperialism."[13] Finally, while Lin Piao had emphasized collusion between

[8] Ibid.

[9] John Newhouse, *Cold Dawn: The Story of SALT* (New York, 1973), p. 189.

[10] *The New York Times* (hereafter cited as *NYT*), May 25, 1974.

[11] *Tenth National Congress*, pp. 27–28.

[12] "Reference Materials Concerning Education on Situation" No. 42, Propaganda Division, Political Department, Kunming Military Region, *Issues and Studies*, 10, no. 9 (June 1974), 98.

[13] *Tenth National Congress*, p. 30. This was inserted, perhaps to persuade those who were skeptical of the Sino-American rapprochement.

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the United States and the USSR in 1969, Chou insisted that contention was now predominant. "Contention is absolute and protracted, whereas collusion is relative and temporary."[14]

In Chou's view, the alleged dominance of contention in the superpowers' relationship signified the end of a unified anti-China policy, a development reinforced by the shift of the center of contention to Europe. Thus, despite Chou's warning of the danger of Soviet "surprise attack," the Chinese leadership appears to have had a much more relaxed view of China's security, one which encouraged further Chinese foreign policy initiatives.

In his Government Work Report to the Fourth NPC in January 1975 Chou went one step further. In referring to Soviet-American relations, Chou significantly omitted any mention of their collusion, and stated only that "Their fierce contention is bound to lead to world war some day."[15] Also omitted was the Tenth Party Congress reference to the danger of a surprise attack by the Soviets. Elimination of these two points is further evidence of the Chinese leaders' confidence that in the absence of imminent threat from one or both of the superpowers, they could pursue the goal of constructing antisuperpower coalitions with relative impunity.

What did the apocalyptic vision of an inevitable world war portend? At one level, the open-ended prediction of world war between the two superpowers simply reiterated the Leninist orthodoxy that imperialist rivalry must culminate in conflict. (Shortly after the NPC session, Mao sounded a general call for renewed attention to Leninism.) Second, despite the usual admonition to maintain vigilance and strengthen defenses, Chou's extremely vague warning did not imply any particular danger for China. One may assume, then, that the premier's words were part of China's overall strategy of denigrating the supposed relaxation of international tension, especially between the superpowers, a development which China views as potentially destructive of the Soviet-American competitive equilibrium which protects Chinese security.

China's view of detente confirms the supposition that her present leadership places a low estimate on the superpowers' current threat to Chinese security. Genuine detente involving something more than symbolic Soviet-American cooperation in international affairs, would be a form of collusion detrimental to China's security. By guaranteeing stability on Russia's western and southern flanks, it would enhance Moscow's already considerable ability to strike eastward at China. But genuine detente is impossible, the Chinese assert, because of the imperialist nature of both

[14] Ibid., pp. 23–24.
[15] *PR*, January 24, 1975, p. 24.

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states. The present period of fraudulent detente is marked by heightened Soviet-American competition and an expansion of the arms race in sophisticated high-technology weapons.

Chinese comments on Soviet-American arms control agreements are illustrative of this view. China dismissed SALT I as merely "a new stage of the arms race between the two superpowers."[16] Similarly the Vladivostok agreement of November 1974 was "an agreement on 'limitation' in name but 'expansion' in fact."[17]

A fraudulent detente, although posing no immediate threat to China, does require that substantial investment be made in acquiring both conventional and nuclear advanced weapons systems. China's defense spending, third highest in the world, consumes a substantial proportion of her total investment, although the most recent estimates are that military expenditures have been curtailed since 1971.[18] To recapitulate, the rivalry between the superpowers is the very guarantor of China's security, and therefore Peking seeks to prevent any change in the present predominantly adversary relationship between the United States and the USSR.

In its intensified contention for world hegemony with the United States, so the Chinese assert, the Soviet Union has taken the strategic initiative while the United States has lapsed into passivity.[19] Under cover of detente, the Soviet Union is perceived to be pressing its diplomatic and strategic offensive in many areas. Recently, Chinese press coverage has focused on the threat of expanding Soviet naval activity.

In order to perpetuate the present competitive equilibrium, Chinese policy seeks to heighten awareness of the Soviet threat, particularly among Europeans. Addressing the Fourth NPC, Premier Chou asserted that "Soviet social-imperialism 'makes a feint in the east while attacking in the west.' "[20] In conducting an extremely active European policy, Pe-

[16] Morton Halperin, "The Perceptions of China and Japan," in Mason Willrich and John B. Rhinehander (eds.), *SALT: The Moscow Agreement and Beyond* (New York, 1974), p. 210.

[17] New China News Agency (NCNA) English, January 3, 1975, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service *Daily Report* People's Republic of China, FBIS–CHI-75-4, January 7, 1975, p. A3.

[18] Sydney James, "The Chinese Defense Burden, 1965–1974," in Joint Economic Committee, *China: A Reassessment of the Economy* (Washington, D.C., 1975), pp. 459–474.

[19] "Due to its aggression and expansion for more than twenty years, after the war, U.S. imperialism has become overinflated and is like an extremely fat person trudging along with difficulty." Radio Peking to Southeast Asia, January 12, 1975 in FBIS-CHI-75-10, January 15, 1975, p. A2.

[20] *PR*, January 24, 1975, p. 24 (*sheng tung chi hsi*).

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king has royally welcomed a steady stream of European statesmen including former British Prime Minister Heath and West German opposition leader Franz Joseph Strauss, and has dispatched Teng Hsiao-p'ing, Ch'iao Kuan-hua, and other top leaders on diplomatic missions to Europe.[21] China has also accredited a representative to EEC headquarters in Brussels. PRC media have expressed satisfaction with the results of Britain's referendum on the Common Market,[22] and pointed to Soviet expansionist designs in Portugal as proof that despite the Helsinki Declaration Moscow is certain to maintain her pressure on Western Europe.[23] Against the Soviet notion of an integrated Europe to be achieved through the withdrawal of American forces from the continent, Chinese statements have supported an Atlantic concept of Europe involving the United States in military though not economic terms and stopping at the western boundaries of the Soviet bloc.[24]

Of course, in the realm of actual rather than declaratory policies, Peking still lacks the capacity to affect developments in many areas where the Soviets have been actively extending their influence. China's propaganda is a poor substitute for more effective instruments of foreign policy, although the growing economic relations between the PRC and the European community increase each one's stake in the other. Still, Chinese leaders are sufficiently realistic to recognize that their Cassandra-like warnings are not going to dissuade the NATO countries from exploring means of improving relations with the USSR. The real hope may be to slow the process of relaxation of military tension sufficiently so that Chinese deterrent power vis-à-vis Moscow can attain greater credibility.

While loudly opposed to Soviet power and its expansionist tendencies, the PRC has been far more ambivalent in its view of the American superpower. On the one hand, the decline of American power is a good thing, especially in Asia where the victories of the Indochinese liberation struggles were interpreted as proof of Mao's 1970 dictum that "A

[21] For a caustic Soviet view of PRC overtures to West Germany see A. I. Stepanov, *FRG i Kitai (k istorii otnoshenii, 1949–1974)* (Moscow, 1974); also *Izvestia*, January 15, 1975, p. 2 in *Current Digest of the Soviet Press* (hereafter cited as CDSP), February 5, 1975, p. 17.

[22] FBIS-CHI-75-114, June 12, 1975, p. A12.

[23] For their part, the Soviets alleged that the Chinese threat to Western as well as Soviet security made the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe imperative. Robert H. Donaldson, "An Analysis of the Warsaw Pact Conference Proposal," in Louis J. Mensonides and James A. Kuhlman (eds.), *The Future of Interbloc Relations in Europe* (New York, 1974), p. 92.

[24] Soviet proposals on Mutual Balanced Force Reduction are viewed as designed to secure Warsaw Pact ground superiority. Radio Peking, May 10, 1975 in FBIS-CHI-75-94, May 14, 1975, pp. A-16-17.

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weak nation can defeat a strong, a small nation can defeat a big."[25] The American defeat was a signal to Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand which hastened to realign their foreign policies in accordance with the altered regional balance of power.[26] In the Mayaguez incident of May 1975, Peking spurned American attempts to use it as an intermediary, and then tartly condemned United States military action as foolish self-glorification from which "The U.S. image has been thoroughly blackened by the smoke of its own gunboats."[27] Peking continues to demand the withdrawal of United States forces from South Korea as part of its support for the peaceful reunification of Korea on Kim Il-sung's terms.[28]

On the other hand, the further weakening of American power threatens to open opportunities for the Soviet Union to exploit. In places which are not presently arenas of superpower military competition, such as Southeast Asia and Latin America, the Chinese favor de facto neutralization as a means of containing Soviet power.[29] Elsewhere, especially in the European theater of superpower confrontation and in the Indian Ocean, the Chinese favor an accelerated American military effort.[30]

Are the Chinese the last of the cold warriors intent upon perpetuating the confrontation of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization and resisting the lessening of international tension as the Soviets repeatedly insist? Such a view radically distorts a more complex reality. A member of neither bloc, China does not share the cold war perspective of bipolar international confrontation eventually culminating in the triumph of one side or the other. China looks with favor on Soviet-American enmity because it diminishes the possibilities of duopolistic international decision making and increases the opportunity for Peking to play a role in settling international disputes and redefining the international political and economic system. Unlike the cold war bipolarism of

[25] *PR*, Special Edition, May 23, 1970, p. 8.

[26] Malaysia established diplomatic relations with the PRC in 1974 and the Philippines and Thailand followed suit in 1975.

[27] *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, no. 1876, June 9, 1975, 754; NCNA English May 21, 1975 in FBIS-CHI-75-100, May 22, 1975, p. A5.

[28] *PR*, May 2, 1975, pp. 8–11.

[29] See the Sino-Philippine and Sino-Thailand communiques following visits of President Ferdinand Marcos and Prime Minister Kukrit Pramoj respectively in *PR*, June 13, 1975, and *PR*, July 4, 1975.

[30] Whereas the Soviet military efforts are vigorously condemned, Chinese reports of United States buildups are invariably neutral in tone, objectively conveying the speeches of Defense Secretary Schlesinger, NATO Commander Haig, and President Ford concerning the need to match Soviet power. This objectivity is tantamount to endorsement in context.

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disciplined opposing alliance systems based on the subordination of smaller states to the alliance leader, the present Soviet-American competition occurs in the context of the progressive weakening of their respective alliance systems. Moreover, Third World cooperation on international resource issues further reduces the possibilities for superpower control and domination.[31]

Peking has enthusiastically supported regional organizations, particularly those aimed at economic integration, whose common denominator is their attempt to change the terms of trade between the developed and the developing world.[32] Peking's newfound support for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) is particularly interesting considering its earlier view that this organization was a stalking horse of United States imperialism working against regional interests.[33] The lone regional economic organization which Peking continues to condemn is the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon) which allegedly operates as a mechanism for legitimizing Soviet economic exploitation of its dependencies.

In sum, the Chinese are far from seeking to perpetuate the classical cold war of the 1940s and 1950s. Rather, they appear to believe that the consolidation of regional power centers, free from superpower domination, in Western Europe, Southeast Asia, Japan, Latin America, and the Middle East, as well as in China herself, is the most effective means of curbing the unnatural concentrations of global power which the superpowers embody. Soviet commentators are not far off the mark, then, when they cite the appositeness of the Chinese proverb, "sit on the mountain and watch the tigers fight" to describe Peking's policy toward the United States and the USSR.[34] In short, Soviet-American competition is being played out in the context of an increasingly multipolar international system. It is likely that China's current leadership shares the long-range expectation that the further revolutionary transformation of the global system will occur in the context of a continuing and mutually debilitating Soviet-American strategic competition from which China

[31] For an interesting discussion of China's role at the Sea Law Conference, see Menno T. Kamminga, "Building 'Railroads on the Sea': China's Attitude towards Maritime Law," *The China Quarterly*, no. 59 (July–September 1974), 544–558.

[32] In the last few months alone China has explicitly endorsed the Andean Pact Organization, Economic Community of West African States, Inter-African Organization of Forestry Economy and Timber Trade, Organization of African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries, OPEC, ASEAN, and EEC.

[33] For a recent overview of Sino-Soviet relations in Southeast Asia see Dick Wilson, "Sino-Soviet Rivalry in Southeast Asia," *Problems of Communism*, XXIII, no. 5 (September–October 1974), 39–51.

[34] *tso shan kuan hu tou.*

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along with Japan, a renascent Europe, and a changing Third World will emerge as victors even without an apocalyptic superpower war.

Sino-American Relations: Obstacles to "Normalization"

Several major external considerations prompted China's initial interest in improving relations with America, including (1) the perception of a direct strategic threat from the Soviet Union; (2) the desire to foreclose the possibility of a Soviet-American entente aimed against China; (3) the belief that no American threat to China existed because of America's military disengagement from the Asian mainland as a result of the unwinnable war in Vietnam; (4) the desire to destabilize relations between the United States and Japan and other pro-American regimes in Asia.[35]

Domestically, rapprochement was made feasible by the restoration to power of a relatively stable coalition led by "moderates" (a tendency reinforced by the purge of Ch'en Po-ta and the death of Lin Piao) who were confident of their ability to manage the domestic political consequences of a radical shift in Chinese foreign policy. By building an American stake in Chinese security, Peking's leaders could diminish the Soviet threat, progress toward the goal of reintegrating Taiwan, establish relations with the many countries (including Japan) whose deference to American policy had precluded normal relations with the PRC, and secure China's seat in the United Nations with its concomitant great power status.[36] These expectations have been largely fulfilled.

A review of Sino-American relations in the past two or three years suggests the persistence of a number of problem areas including the domestic political crises in both countries, the character and pace of "normalization," the issue of Taiwan, and the enormous trade imbalance.

Domestic Political Factors

In the period between the Tenth Party Congress in August 1973 and the convocation of the Fourth National People's Congress in January 1975, both the Chinese and American political systems passed through periods of stress. Leaders in both capitals anxiously observed each other's crises for signs of danger to the fragile detente.

Chinese news media were conspicuously silent about the storm gather-

[35] For a recent summary of United States motives for rapprochement see Ralph N. Clough, *East Asia and US Security* (Washington, D.C., 1974).

[36] "Reference Materials Concerning Education on Situation," *no. 43, 105–106.*

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ing over the Nixon presidency in 1973, but in an interview in October, Chou En-lai expressed the hope that Nixon would weather his present difficulties.[37] By this time the Chinese were sufficiently worried, however, to require assurances on the stability of American policy toward China. These were provided by Secretary Kissinger during his sixth trip to Peking in mid-November. With obvious reference to Watergate, he stated that "the progress that has been made in our relationship will continue in the years ahead whatever happens in the future."[38] Despite the fact that liaison offices had been operating for six months under senior diplomats of both sides, the official communique noted that "in present circumstances it is of particular importance to maintain frequent contacts at authoritative levels."[39]

After taking office in August 1974 President Ford personally gave repeated assurances of his fidelity to Nixon-Kissinger diplomacy, including in his State of the World message to Congress a promise "to accelerate the improvement in our relations" with the PRC.[40] Kissinger himself provided the link of personal continuity in the relationship, although on his latest visit Teng Hsiao-p'ing rather than the ailing Chou was his chief negotiating partner.[41]

The crisis of the Nixon presidency was not directly related to foreign policy issues, nor apparently was the "criticize Lin Piao and Confucius campaign" which dominated Chinese domestic politics from the Tenth Party Congress to the Fourth NPC.[42] Radical critics did concentrate for a time on the ideological dangers posed by the new relationship with the

[37] *NYT*, October 29, 1973, pp. 1, 8.

[38] NCNA English, November 13, 1973 in FBIS-CHI-73-220, November 14, 1973, p. A2.

[39] NCNA English, November 14, 1973 in FBIS-CHI-73-221, November 15, 1973, p. A2.

[40] Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, April 10, 1975, p. 7.

[41] During Kissinger's seventh visit to Peking in November 1974, in a gesture which Mao may well have inspired, Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua toasted the origins of Sino-American rapprochement saying, "Here, we ought to remember the pioneering role Mr. Richard Nixon played in this regard." FBIS-CHI-74-229, November 26, 1974, p. A2. One may suppose that in Mao's view, whatever his faults, the historic accomplishments of Nixon like Stalin demand recognition, not obloquy. Moreover, Mao, ever unhappy in his choice of successors, may admire Mr. Nixon's skill in choosing a designated successor and close-comrade-in-arms who has remained faithful to Nixon's general line after coming to power. If Lin Piao's alleged coup had succeeded, B-52 (as Lin termed Chairman Mao), would hardly have received an unconditional and absolute pardon for his transgressions. See also *NYT*, July 10, 1975, p. 5.

[42] For brief treatments of the campaign see, John B. Starr, "China in 1974: 'Weeding through the Old to Bring Forth the New,'" *Asian Survey*, XV, 1, (January 1975), 1–19; Parris Chang, "The Anti-Lin Piao and Confucius Campaign: Its Meaning and Purposes," *Asian Survey*, XIV, 10 (October 1974), 871–886.

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West. Like the Suslovs and Ponamarevs of the USSR, Chinese critics such as "Chu Lan" worried about the corrosive effects of "decadent bourgeois culture" on the "new-born things" of the Cultural Revolution, especially in a period when old cadres like Teng Hsiao-p'ing were being restored to high authority. But the oblique attacks on Chou En-lai, the primary executor of the new foreign policy line, were rebuffed and Chou's continuing political influence was reflected in the hierarchy of state officials appointed in January 1975. It is worth noting, however, that with the exception of the mercurial Chiang Ch'ing, none of those usually identified as Cultural Revolution "radicals" publicly associated themselves with the American connection.

Normalizing the Relationship

In the period under review, both the United States and the PRC continued to regard the Shanghai Communique (February 27, 1972) as the charter for the normalization of relations between them, but by 1974 there were indications that the very meaning of normalization was in dispute. On numerous occasions, Kissinger and other officials reaffirmed American commitment to continuing the *process* of normalizing relations with the PRC. On his trip to Peking in November 1974 (immediately following the Vladivostok summit), Kissinger stated that the process of normalizing relations with China was "a fixed principle" of American foreign policy.[43]

The question which the Chinese have posed is whether normalization is to be considered as an ongoing, open-ended *process*, as the United States appears to regard it, or a *definite sequence of steps*, which must soon culminate in the severance of American diplomatic and security ties with the Republic of China on Taiwan and the establishment of full diplomatic relations between the United States and the PRC. In other words, how "normal" is it for normalization to stretch out for years? A senior Chinese official told Senator Mansfield, who visited China in December 1974, that, "Generally speaking, our relationship is good and is moving ahead. But are we satisfied? I cannot say so."[44]

Chinese dissatisfaction is evident from a comparison of recent statements emanating from the Sino-American Foreign Ministers meetings as well as Chou's Government Work Report to the Fourth NPC. In November 1973 Foreign Minister Ch'i P'eng-fei asserted that, "so long as we

[43] *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXI, no. 1852 (December 23, 1974), 906–907.

[44] Senator Mike Mansfield, *China: A Quarter Century after the Founding of the People's Republic* (GPO for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, January 1975), p. 21.

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go forward in the direction set by the Shanghai Communique, the goal of normalizing Sino-American relations can be attained."[45] Secretary Kissinger's reply was more positive, stating that "we have made good progress. . . . But we are determined to do much more and *to complete the process* that we started two years ago *as rapidly as possible*."[46] The joint communique said that "The two sides stated that they would continue their efforts to promote the normalization of relations between China and the United States on the basis of the Shanghai Communique."[47]

A year later, new Foreign Minister Ch'iao Kuan-hua was even more reserved, merely noting that "On the whole, Sino-American relations have in these years been moving ahead."[48] This time Kissinger, while pledging support for the Shanghai Communique, omitted any mention of completing normalization as soon as possible. The sixty-eight word communique tersely affirmed commitment to the Shanghai document, but said nothing directly about normalization.[49] When Chou addressed the NPC in January 1975, his words were almost a warning. Acknowledging that "relations between the two countries have improved to some extent in the last three years," he observed that "The relations between the two countries will continue to improve so long as the principles of the Sino-American Shanghai Communique are carried out *in earnest*."[50]

A top-level Chinese view of American foreign policy is provided by Chiang Ch'ing in her speech referred to above. Terming Kissinger "an adventurist and also a defeatist," the chairman's wife said that American policy is marked by irresoluteness. Nixon-Kissinger recognized that they could not restore American global dominance, but were incapable of inventing anything other than transitional formulas which left the United States policy unclarified. Kissinger "used circumvention in regard to the contradictions. This is in fact an ostrich policy, skirting the contradictions in order to conceal their existence."[51] If one applies these rather oracular sayings to the concrete problem of normalizing Sino-American relations the meaning is clear. The United States is temporizing in order to postpone difficult but ultimately unavoidable decisions of which the most important concerns Taiwan.

[45] NCNA English, November 10, 1973, FBIS-CHI-73-218, November 12, 1973, p. A2.

[46] Same. My italics.

[47] NCNA English, November 14, 1973, FBIS-CHI-73-221, November 15, 1973, p. A2.

[48] Reported in FBIS-CHI-74-229, November 26, 1974, p. A2.

[49] Reported in FBIS-CHI-74-232, December 2, 1974, p. A1.

[50] PR, January 24, 1975, p. 24. My italics. Mao's failure to grant Kissinger an audience was widely interpreted as a sign of Chinese annoyance.

[51] See note 5.

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Resolving the Taiwan Problem

The success of the Nixon-Chou summit in 1972 had been founded, among other things, on American willingness to acknowledge the Chinese position that Taiwan was part of one China, and China's acquiescence in a gradual rather than abrupt termination of the United States security presence in Taiwan.[52] However, Peking has neither abandoned its goal of absorbing Taiwan nor, despite the studied ambiguity of the Shanghai Communique, is it prepared to wait indefinitely for the United States to sever its links with Taipei.[53] Taiwan's evident ability to survive and prosper in almost total diplomatic isolation cannot encourage Chinese leaders who advocate a Fabian approach to this problem. Nor has Peking's campaign of people-to-people diplomacy made any visible impact on the latter's determination to retain its separate identity.[54] Although direct evidence is sparse, it is reasonable to assume that disagreement over how much patience to show toward United States procrastination on Taiwan may become an important issue within the Chinese leadership.[55]

American signals to Peking regarding Taiwan have been mixed at best, perhaps reflecting either ambivalence at the top of the Nixon-Ford administration or bureaucratic infighting over China policy. The appointment of Leonard Unger, a distinguished career diplomat as the new ambassador to Taipei in 1974 and permission for the Republic of China to open five new consulates on American territory (Atlanta, Portland, Kansas City, Guam, and American Samoa) were indications that the U.S.-ROC relationship was not withering away.[56]

In the Shanghai Communique, the United States pledged "to progressively reduce its forces and military installations on Taiwan as the tension in the area diminishes," but as late as May 1975, about half of the 1972 figure of 9000 American servicemen still were stationed on the island.[57] In June, the State Department revealed the total number would be reduced to about 2800 by the end of the year.[58] Yet the United

[52] Text of Shanghai Communique in *NYT*, February 28, 1972, p. 16.

[53] Moscow charges that Peking accepts a United States two-China policy and accuses the PRC of using Taiwan merely as a bargaining chip in its relations with Washington. *Pravda*, March 13, 1974, p. 5 in *CDSP*, XXVI, no. 11 (April 10, 1974), 18.

[54] See, for example, William Glenn, "The Blessings of Chiang's Tight Ship," *Far Eastern Economic Review* (hereafter cited as FEER), April 25, 1975, p. 33.

[55] Leo Goodstadt, "The Ever-Present Stumbling Block," *FEER*, December 6, 1974, p. 15.

[56] For comment by a well-known "friend of China" on this point, see Paul T. K. Lin, "The Road Ahead: A Call for a Far-sighted U.S. Policy toward China," *New China*, I, 3, (Fall 1975), 34–35.

[57] "The American Conscience," *FEER*, May 2, 1975, p. 29, and note 52.

[58] *NYT*, June 8, 1975, p. 1.

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States continued to sell arms to Taiwan and allowed the Northrup Corporation to set up production facilities on the island for F5E fighter aircraft.[59]

More important is the question of how committed the United States is to the 1954 Defense Treaty with the ROC which the Chinese demand be terminated as a condition for the establishment of full relations with the United States.[60] In the short run, two factors are likely to restrain American willingness to accede to this demand. Following the defeat of American client regimes in Indochina United States officials hastened to extend blanket assurances that they would honor existing treaty commitments. Although intended primarily for European and Japanese audiences, these pledges made it almost impossible to cut the Taipei regime adrift in the short run. In a major policy speech on Japanese-American relations in June 1975, Secretary Kissinger unequivocally stated, "We will maintain our treaty obligations throughout Asia and the Pacific."[61] Although he pointedly omitted Taiwan from his list of specific commitments, the question of the 1954 Defense Treaty remains unresolved. President Ford's public statements have also confused the issue of where the United States stands on the treaty.[62]

Unilateral termination of the U.S.-ROC Defense Treaty would increase conservative Republican disaffection with Mr. Ford, jeopardizing his reelection. The Chinese, who are increasingly sophisticated and knowledgeable observers of the American political scene, are doubtless aware of this, and may be willing to allow the Ford administration a further period of grace before pressing for the completion of normalization. One can easily imagine the outlines of an arrangement whereby the president agrees to establish full relations with the PRC on Chinese terms *after* election to a full term. By that time, the temporary reversal of America's military disengagement from mainland and littoral Asia is likely to have run its course. There is little likelihood that Congress or the attentive foreign policy public will care more about the fate of Taiwan than about South Vietnam or Cambodia. If, pending the ultimate disposition of

[59] Mansfield, *China*, pp. 22–23. This can also be seen, however, as part of a United States effort to build up Taiwan's own defense forces to enable it to hold off the PRC even in the absence of a United States security commitment.

[60] As they did in the Japanese, Philippines, and Thailand cases.

[61] "The United States and Japan in a Changing World," Department of State, Bureau of Public Affairs, June 18, 1975, p. 3.

[62] In response to a question at a news conference, Ford said, "we have excellent relations with the ROC . . . we consider our relationship, our cooperation with the ROC a matter of very great importance to us." He pointed to his high-level delegation to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek's funeral as a sign of the importance which he ascribed to the relations. *Department of State Bulletin*, LXXII, no. 1871 (May 5, 1971), 570.

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Taiwan, the substantial American-Taiwan trade and investment can be continued through nonofficial commercial channels, there is also not likely to be much effective protest from American commercial or industrial interests.[63]

United States-China Trade

Trade between the PRC and the United States burgeoned following the resumption of relations, but after exceeding by several times the best estimates of its potential growth, it now seems likely to revert to a level more closely approximating the early estimates. Even at its peak 1974 level, however, the trade between the two countries was insufficiently large or essential to exert more than a marginal influence in the political realm.

In the past few years, China's foreign trade has more than trebled in value from approximately $4.29 billion in 1972 to about 13 billion in 1974.[64] The United States share of this trade grew rapidly from a negligible $4.9 million in 1971 to $935.2 million in 1974. (Japan's trade with China in the latter year was $3.29 billion.) The central fact of this trade was the heavy surplus of Chinese imports from the United States over exports in both 1973 and 1974.[65] In 1974 the Chinese deficit of over $700 million in its trade with the United States was more than half of its estimated $1.27 billion deficit overall.[66] This intolerable imbalance could be corrected only by drastically curtailing imports. Even were most-favored-nation status granted to China, the growth potential of Chinese exports to the United States is limited for a variety of reasons.[67]

Disproportionate attention has sometimes been given to American imports such as aircraft and the synthetic urea and ammonia plants which may help to produce structural changes in the Chinese economy.[68] However, in both 1973 and 1974 American agricultural exports—wheat, cotton, corn, and soybeans—accounted for about 80 percent of China's import bill from the United States.[69] In late 1974 and early 1975, China

[63] U.S.-Taiwan trade in 1974 was over $3.7 billion or four times American trade with Peking. There were $428 million of direct United States investment on Taiwan. "United States and Asia," *FEER*, July 4, 1975, p. 30.

[64] *United States China Business Review* (hereafter cited as USCBR), II, no. 3 (May–June, 1975), 14; Japanese estimates vary somewhat.

[65] Ibid., II, no. 2 (March–April, 1975), 19.

[66] *FEER*, June 20, 1975, p. 36.

[67] For an estimate of most favored nation status on U.S.-China trade see Harry Cahill, *The China Trade and U.S. Tariffs* (New York, 1973).

[68] The urea and ammonia plants, worth some $300 million, are due to come on stream in 1976–1977. *USCBR*, I, no. 1 (January–March, 1974), 36–37.

[69] *USCBR*, I, no. 2 (April–June 1974), 11; and *USCBR*, II, no. 2 (March–April 1975), 19.

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canceled orders for most of the grain, cotton, and soybeans ordered for 1975 and 1976 delivery.[70] By mid-year it was predicted that Chinese purchases of United States agricultural commodities would decline from $655 million in 1974 to about $100 million or less in 1975.[71] Barring unexpected agricultural emergencies China's grain importing needs are likely to be supplied for the foreseeable future by her traditional suppliers—Canada, Australia, and Argentina—with whom long-term contracts for multimillion ton imports have already been signed.[72] Although in past years Peking has used its grain purchases for diplomatic rewards and punishments, in this case economic reasons appear sufficient to account for the reduction in trade. If present estimates are valid, the volume of U.S.-China trade is likely to be reduced to perhaps half of its 1974 level in 1975 and an upward trend thereafter may be expected to parallel the slow growth of Chinese exports to the United States.

Placing these various issues in context, we may conclude that none of these problem areas singly or together appears sufficiently weighty to provide another sharp reversal of Chinese policy toward the United States in the foreseeable future, but neither does the evidence support earlier expectations that relations will improve smoothly and steadily. Moreover, to the extent that the improvement of Sino-American relations has become a "fixed principle" of the foreign policies of both countries, it derives from extremely diverse perspectives on international affairs. If recent American diplomacy envisions Chinese participation in the international system as an essential component of long-term equilibrium, Peking sees Washington in the shorter-term perspective of a de facto shield against the perceived Soviet threat. Since this perception may remain in existence for some time, another dramatic reversal of Sino-American relations is not likely to occur very soon.

Sino-Soviet Relations

It is clear that Peking's present leaders consider the Soviet Union not only as the prime external threat to Chinese security in the long run, but also as a danger to the integrity of the Chinese revolutionary process. China's attempts to diminish this potential threat include policies designed to oppose Moscow's campaign for collective security arrangements in Asia,

[70] *NYT*, January 28, 1975; January 29, 1975; *USCBR*, I, no. 6 (November–December 1974), 61, and II, no. 2 (March–April 1975), 16.

[71] *USCBR*, II, No. 2 (March–April 1975), 16; and *NYT*, June 3, 1975. Among the reasons for this precipitous decline are the good Chinese harvest of 1974, the unsatisfactory quality of American grain, Chinese desire to right the trade imbalance with the United States, and a growing shortage of foreign exchange.

[72] The United States is likely to be a residual supplier in case of Chinese short harvests.

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preempt the establishment of a strong Soviet-Japanese relationship, neutralize Soviet expansion into Southeast Asia, maintain the integrity of the Western alliance, and contribute to the long-term weakening of Soviet control in Eastern Europe.

In light of the multiple obstacles to normalization and the unyielding stances of both nations, there seems little likelihood that significant amelioration of their relations will occur in the present circumstances. Neither side appears to hold out much hope any longer that changes in the current leadership of its antagonist is likely to improve relations. A composite Soviet view of contemporary China asserts that the country is ruled by a repressive military-bureaucratic dictatorship in which competing groups of Maoists vie for power. These groups have abolished socialist forms of democratic constitutionalism, excluded the proletariat and the peasantry from power, wreaked havoc on the rational economic planning structures which Soviet advisers helped construct in the 1950s, and wasted China's capital on military expenditures while embarking on a militantly anti-Soviet foreign policy course marked by collusion with the most retrograde of revanchists and imperialists.[73] Chinese views of contemporary Soviet society and government are equally uncompromising in their condemnation of a ruling class which has restored capitalism in Russia and launched all-out efforts to seek global dominion.

While both sides pay lip service to the goal of normalizing relations, their actions belie their claims. The Soviets assert that Chinese insistence on preconditions for negotiation effectively precludes normalization. An authoritative commentator in *Izvestia*, for example, reviewing a decade-long Soviet attempt to patch up relations with the PRC, stated that Moscow's efforts included several offers to hold summit meetings with Chinese leaders (1964, 1965, 1970, 1973), and conclude interim accords leading to the resumption of border trade, long-term trade agreements, renewed cultural cooperation, etc., which the Chinese purportedly rejected or ignored.[74] Brezhnev spelled out Moscow's position when he rejected China's offer of a nonaggression pact in 1974. Terming China's demand that Soviet troops be withdrawn from alleged disputed areas "absolutely unacceptable," Brezhnev offered negotiations without pre-

[73] See, "Kitai posle X S'ezda KPK," in *Opasnyi kurs*, vypusk shestoi (Moscow, 1975), pp. 3–33. (Originally in *Kommunist*, December, 1974.) See also Robert Michael Gates, "Soviet Sinology: An Untapped Source for Kremlin Views and Disputes Relating to Contemporary Events in China," Ph.D. diss., Georgetown University, 1974, and Paul Borsuk, "Calling in the Experts: The Role of Soviet China Experts in Policy-Making," Ph.D. work in progress, Columbia University, Department of Political Science.

[74] O. Borisov, "Who Is Preventing Normalization?" *Izvestia*, May 16, 1974, p. 2, in CDSP, XXVI, no. 20 (June 12, 1974), 1–4.

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conditions and a nonagression treaty including the pledge to refrain from the use of nuclear and conventional force.[75] Chou En-lai responded that the Soviets "talk profusely about empty treaties on the non-use of force against each other and mutual non-aggression."[76] Another sign of the stalemate in relations is the apparent failure of the Sino-Soviet talks on border questions (held periodically since 1969) to register any discernible progress.[77]

The Chinese leadership is unwilling to accept an accord with the Soviets which will freeze the status quo, but the Soviets would be pleased to gain Chinese acceptance of a nonaggression pact which would undercut the clamorous Chinese propaganda about the expansionist and aggressive threats of Soviet social-imperialism. As indicated above, however, Peking's leaders do not feel sufficiently pressured by the USSR at present to respond positively to Soviet offers. A state of carefully managed tension along the border and a hostile but nonincendiary stalemate serves their present purposes.

Peking's confidence that Soviet leaders will not upset the existing equilibrium is indicated further by their handling of the Soviet espionage cases of 1974. In January, the Chinese expelled five members of the Soviet Embassy in Peking including the first secretary, V. I. Marchenko, on charges of espionage, and two months later detained a Soviet helicopter and its three-man crew on charges of intelligence-gathering in northern Sinkiang.[78] A stiff protest note from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs asserted that this incident was part of a consistent pattern of Soviet violations of Chinese territory which they demanded be terminated. China refused to comply with repeated Soviet demands for the return of the detained crew.[79]

What is most interesting about these cases is the great publicity accorded to them. Seen against the backdrop of the most xenophobic phase of the "criticize Lin Piao and Confucius campaign," this publicity suggests that China's "militant fundamentalists"[80] may have seized upon

[75] *Pravda*, November 27, 1974, p. 5, in *CDSP*, XXVI, no. 48 (December 25, 1974).

[76] *PR*, January 24, 1975, p. 25.

[77] Agence France Press report, May 5, 1975, in FBIS-CHI-75-87, May 5, 1975, p. A14. For an earlier report indicating progress was being made see Erik Pierre, "Putting a Feeler Across the Border," *FEER*, November 22, 1974, p. 14.

[78] *PR*, January 25, 1974, p. 3; *PR*, February 1, 1974, pp. 4–5, 14–17. The Soviets expelled a low-ranking Chinese diplomat in retaliation. *NYT*, March 24, 1974, p. 1.

[79] Peking did not reply to veiled Soviet threats that it must "assume full responsibility for the inevitable consequences" if it continued to detain the crew. *Pravda*, May 3, 1974, p. 3, in *CDSP*, XXVI, no. 8 (May 29, 1974), 15.

[80] This phrase is borrowed from the stimulating article by Steven Goldstein and Michel Oksenberg, "The Chinese Political Spectrum," *Problems of Communism*, XXIII, no. 2 (March–April 1974), 1–13.

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these incidents as part of their general effort to dramatize the foreign threat to the Chinese Revolution. This was the same period when the veiled attacks on Chou En-lai were at their height, Western culture was under attack, and the seizure of the Paracel islands from South Vietnam was effected.

A final measure of the stalemate in Sino-Soviet relations is the paucity of economic interchange between the two states. According to Soviet figures, trade between the USSR and China is only slightly more than 200 million rubles a year, making the PRC twenty-second among the USSR's trading partners.[81]

The Maoist leadership's fear of and opposition to the Soviet Union has long been motivated as much by concern for the preservation of their own distinctive path of revolutionary development as by simple state security per se. Soviet hopes that eventually the "internationalist" (i.e., pro-Soviet) tradition of the Chinese Communist party will triumph over the "petty-bourgeois chauvinism" of Mao and his group exactly mirrors Chinese fears. Given the patently transitional character of the present leadership, it is difficult to predict what groups and policies will govern China within the next three to five years. Certainly, among the contenders for power there are those who share Mao's vision that the Soviet Union represents a disease of the heart not just of the skin, requiring continuing thorough indoctrination of the Chinese Communist party and the vigilance of the people in order to preserve China's revolutionary heritage, even if this means temporary cooperation with the United States and other imperialists.

Conclusion

From the birth of the PRC in 1949, the success of the Chinese Communist party in achieving its goals of state security and revolutionary development has depended upon China's relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. Three major demarcation points help us to define the development of this triangular relationship. The Sino-Soviet Alliance of 1950 ushered in a decade of close if not always satisfactory collaboration between the USSR and the PRC, providing a weak China with a Soviet nuclear shield against a hostile American-anchored alliance system. The ideological polemics and the severance of economic cooperation in 1960 began a ten-year period in which Peking, nurturing an independent nuclear force through its first vulnerable years, pursued an ideo-

[81] *Ekonomicheskaiia Gazeta*, no. 15 (April 1975), 20–21, in *CDSP*, XXVIII, no. 14 (April 30, 1975), 6.

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logically militant and revolutionary foreign policy. Both the United States and the Soviet Union were cast as enemies, although not perhaps until the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia was a direct Soviet military threat feared. Finally, post-Cultural Revolution foreign policy, grounded on a small but credible nuclear deterrent, tilted toward the United States, Japan, Western Europe, and the established governments of the Third World to counter the Soviet Union which, in the eyes of Mao and his supporters, now embodied a distinct threat to China's security and its revolutionary development. The Nixon-Chou summit is still the obvious symbol of this new period.

The course of both recent Chinese domestic politics and international relations has been marked by too many sharp changes to permit a confident analysis of what the future holds in Chinese foreign policy. In the regions of East and Southeast Asia where China's major interests now reside, American, Soviet, and Japanese, as well as Chinese, interests encounter those of the smaller powers which are less likely in the future than they were in the past to seek alignment with a single major power. It is certainly plausible to suppose that the present structure of relationships among the major powers in these two regions may be expected to persist for the next few years, but this is by no means the only possibility.

At present Peking is pursuing its goal of containing the perceived threat from Moscow by consolidating its bonds with Washington and Tokyo as well as by building up its national economy and military capacity. It is by no means certain, however, that future Chinese leaders will share the present perception that the Soviet Union represents a mortal threat to the Chinese revolution. As independent observers of these power relationships, we may question whether, despite the war of words, the Soviet Union and China really present a threat to each other's internal stability. The elusive "next generation" of leaders in Moscow and Peking may find a basis for compromise even on the apparently thorny territorial issues which now divide them. In areas such as Southeast Asia, for example, a de facto neutralization leaving the countries of the region equidistant from both Moscow and Peking in their external policies may be the basis for a Sino-Soviet understanding.[82]

Much will depend upon the nature of American and Japanese policies. Acceleration in the decline of American power, influence, and interest in Asia may reduce the utility of Peking's entente with Washington and impress Chinese leaders with the wisdom of normalizing Sino-Soviet relations on Moscow's not unreasonable terms. A continued American "high-profile" in the Western Pacific, coupled with resistance to Soviet

[82] See note 33.

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policy in other areas, may suggest that the present policy of seeking to revise the territorial status quo and curb Soviet power should be continued. Finally, a possibility which cannot be excluded is a new revolution in the world power balance which might marry Chinese and Japanese military and economic power in a combination which could challenge both the residual American and expanding Soviet interests in East Asia and the Pacific. Such a combination would require the rearming of Japan and the growth of the Chinese economy to a position of near strategic-industrial parity with the existing superpowers. The question arises as to whether, should that happen, China would remain a country with predominantly regional interests or whether it would seek to play a global role. Recently, Chou En-lai reviewed the economic goals first set forth at the Third NPC in 1964:

> build an independent and relatively comprehensive industrial and economic system in 15 years, that is before 1980; the second stage is to accomplish the comprehensive modernization of agriculture, industry, national defence and science and technology before the end of the century, so that our national economy will be advancing in the front ranks of the world.[83]

At a reception for visiting Vice-Premier Teng Hsiao-p'ing in May 1975, French Premier Jacques Chirac expansively suggested that; "The end of this century is the century of China which has regained control over her own destiny."[84] If this banquet prophecy is fulfilled, it will indeed be interesting to see whether a powerful China, equipped with the industrial and strategic power which it is just now acquiring, will be able to refrain from massively interfering with the destiny of others on the model of the superpowers which it now so energetically condemns.*

[83] *PR*, January 24, 1975, p. 23.
[84] *PR*, May 16, 1975, p. 4.

* This is a revised version of a paper originally delivered at the 1975 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association.

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The Causes of New York City's Fiscal Crisis

CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE

New York City's current budget problems have been precipitated by its inability to borrow money in the municipal bond market. Since March [1975], when New York was last able to sell notes on its own behalf, a series of stopgap measures have been used. . . . First the city was advanced some $800 million in state aid that it was scheduled to receive after the start of the fiscal year in July. Next on June 10, the state established the Municipal Assistance Corporation (MAC) to serve as an interim borrowing agency for the city, in order to transform much of New York's short-term debt into long-term obligations. Originally, MAC was authorized to borrow $3 billion, an amount sufficient to tide the city over until October. It was hoped that by this time the city would be in a position to reenter the bond market on its own.

While new city securities were unmarketable, it was anticipated that MAC bonds would be viewed differently by investors: first, because they were being issued by an agency of the state and carried with them the "moral obligation" of the state to meet any shortfall in debt

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This article is adapted from a report issued to members of Congress in October by the CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE (CBO). The *Quarterly* has chosen to publish it because it is a compact, authoritative, and nonpartisan analysis of the causes of New York City's fiscal problems. The authors of the report were Robert D. Reischauer, Peter K. Clark, and Peggy L. Cuciti. The CBO was established in February 1975 to provide Congress with independent analysis of policies affecting the budget and the economy and to provide general staff support for the new congressional budget processes mandated by the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974.

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services;[1] second, because the revenues from the city's sales and stock transfer taxes were to be diverted directly to the corporation to cover its debt service costs; and finally, because the city was directed to reform its financial practices and balance its budget under a new, state-approved accounting system.

In spite of these assurances, MAC immediately encountered difficulty borrowing for the city. Although MAC's first issue bore unprecedented tax-exempt interest rates of up to 9.5 percent, it could be marketed only with difficulty, even after a number of banks and insurance companies agreed to buy two-thirds of the total. When these bonds were freed from the sales price restrictions placed on them by the underwriting syndicate, they immediately plummeted in value, confirming a lack of investor interest in MAC bonds. In August MAC was able to borrow less than half of its planned offering, even though the new issue carried interest rates of up to 11 percent.

As August wore on, the New York clearinghouse banks that usually market New York City offerings became more reluctant to underwrite new MAC issues because these institutions were experiencing increasing difficulties reselling the bonds they already held to other investors. They found themselves holding more city obligations than they considered to be prudent banking practice. Thus in September MAC found itself in the situation that had faced the city in April—unable to find a syndicate that would underwrite its borrowing.

The next stopgap measure was the Financial Emergency Act, which was approved by a special session of the state legislature and signed by the governor on September 9. This legislation was part of a plan to provide the city with roughly $2.3 billion—enough to meet its cash requirements through early December, by which time it is hoped the other elements of the plan will allow the city to reenter the bond market on its own. The key element in the plan is the Emergency Financial Control Board which is dominated by state appointees and charged with administering the city's finances. By late October this board must approve a three-year financial plan that includes transition to a truly balanced budget by fiscal year 1978, a reduction in short-term city borrowing, the removal of expense items from the capital budget, and a growth in controllable spending (all but welfare, pensions and debt service) of not more than 2 percent per year. The board is also given the responsibility for estimating the city's revenues and keeping spending within

[1] A "moral obligation" requires the governor to include in his proposed state budget funds sufficient to cover any shortfall in debt service. This does not legally bind the legislature to appropriate these funds as would be the case of shortfalls associated with securities backed by the state's "full faith and credit."

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these revenue limits; reviewing and approving major contracts; approving all city borrowing; extending, if necessary, the pay freeze on city employees through fiscal year 1977; and dispersing city revenues, but only after it is satisfied that the expenditures are consistent with the three-year fiscal plan. The powers of the board extend to the city's semi-independent agencies which provide elementary and secondary education, higher education, hospital, and other services.

As with MAC, the emergency assistance plan ran into difficulties soon after it was put into effect, giving rise to concerns that this stopgap measure might not be sufficient to keep the city solvent even until December. Banks, insurance corporations, and private investors have not agreed to buy the full $406 million in MAC bonds that the plan calls upon them to purchase. Some of the city and state pension funds, which are legislated to supply $755 million of the $2.3 billion total, have balked at investing in MAC bonds. The state pension funds have obtained a New York State Court of Appeals ruling, which states that, despite the provisions of the Financial Emergency Act, they cannot be required by legislation to purchase MAC bonds. Finally, the state, which has agreed to loan the city $750 million, has encountered increasing difficulty in borrowing.

Although these notes were backed by the "full faith and credit" of the state, the state was forced to pay 8.7 percent on the first notes issued to aid the city. Next, Standard and Poor's, which rates the risk associated with various municipal bonds, warned that, if the state extended more assistance to New York City than that called for in the emergency plan, it would be compromising its fiscal integrity and jeopardizing its high credit rating. Finally, Moody's Investors Service, another organization that rates bonds, withdrew its rating from the state's Housing Finance Agency, effectively squeezing this agency out of the municipal bond market and leaving it dependent upon the state for capital.

Moody's also lowered its rating of New York state and city securities. . . .

The City's Need to Borrow

While most state and local governments borrow money, many can postpone issuing bonds or notes for a few months or even for an entire year if conditions in the municipal bond market appear to be adverse. However, New York City's situation makes such a delay impossible. In fiscal year 1976, the city's anticipated borrowing requirements are approximately $8 billion. This borrowing has three different purposes.

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Capital Projects

First, like almost all state and local governments, New York City borrows to finance capital projects. Generally long-term bonds are issued to pay for the construction of schools, public buildings, highways, sewers, and similar projects. The accepted rationale for financing such facilities with long-term debt is that all of the taxpayers who will benefit from such long-lived facilities should pay for them, and such payments should be made in installments during the facility's usable life span. As of June 1, 1975, New York City had $9.4 billion outstanding in long-term debt, the great bulk of which was backed by the city's "full faith and credit" through a first lien on tax revenues. A small portion of the debt was offset by money deposited in sinking funds. This debt represents roughly 6 percent of the nation's total long-term municipal debt.

Short-term bond anticipation notes are used by some states and local governments to support the construction phase of a project or to avoid borrowing in the long-term market when interest rates are abnormally high. New York has depended heavily upon issuing such notes, $1.6 billion of which it had outstanding on June 30, 1975. Frequently the city has made little or no effort to substitute long-term borrowing for such bond anticipation notes, preferring instead to "roll over" or refund these obligations periodically. This has made New York particularly dependent upon continued access to short-term credit markets.

While long- and short-term borrowing for capital projects is accepted practice, there is evidence that in recent years New York has misused such borrowing authority by placing approximately $700 million worth of items, which appropriately belonged in its operating budget, into the capital budget. This was one of the "gimmicks" the city used to present a "balanced" operating budget.

According to the city's budget, it planned to issue roughly $2 billion in new obligations to support capital projects and to "roll over" between $1.2 and $1.8 billion in bond anticipation notes in fiscal year 1976. If the city were unable to borrow for these purposes, its large capital improvement and construction program would eventually grind to a halt, causing a general deterioration of the city's stock of public buildings and facilities and exacerbating unemployment in the construction industry. Possibly of more immediate significance would be the necessary termination of the operating budget items that have been hidden in the capital budget.

Expenditure and Revenue Flows

The second purpose for which New York borrows is to match its income flow to its expenditure pattern. Spending occurs at a fairly regular pace

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throughout the year, driven by payrolls and welfare payments that must be met bimonthly or monthly and by the steady purchase of the goods and services required to keep city programs operating. Revenues, on the other hand, come in at more infrequent intervals. For example, property taxes are collected quarterly, state and federal aid may be paid quarterly or even annually. Lacking large unencumbered cash balances, New York, like some other states and municipalities, issues tax and revenue anticipation notes to tide itself over until the taxes or other revenues are obtained. If it operated in a prudent fashion, New York could be expected to require approximately $1.5 billion in short-term debt in fiscal year 1976 for "legitimate" revenue anticipation purposes ("legitimate" in the sense that these notes could be repaid by revenues collected during the fiscal year). Without access to such borrowing, the city would have to reshape its expenditure pattern to that of its receipts or to build up cash balances sufficient to tide itself over periods of low revenue inflow.

Short-Term Notes for Deficit Financing

The final purpose for which New York City needs to borrow in fiscal year 1976 is to "roll over" or refund $2.6 billion in outstanding short-term notes and to finance this year's $726 million projected current account deficit. The $2.6 billion represents the accumulation of the past decade's operating deficits which have been financed each year primarily by issuing more revenue and tax anticipation notes than could be covered through actual revenue collections. The existence of this large short-term debt and the magnitude of the current deficit mean that New York must borrow every month or so regardless of how unattractive market conditions may be to "roll over" the part of its short-term debt coming due and to finance its monthly shortfall between current revenues and expenditures. The only alternative would be to repay the principal and interest due out of current revenues. The impracticality of this approach can readily be seen by the fact that it would absorb roughly half of the city's annual tax revenues, leaving little to support essential public services.

New York City had $5.3 billion of short-term notes—29 percent of the national total—outstanding on June 1, 1975. Had the market not closed for the city, New York could have been expected to issue between 27 and 33 percent of 1975's total short-term municipal notes.

To summarize, New York's borrowing needs in fiscal year 1976 total some $8 billion. Had a crisis of confidence not emerged, the city would have issued $2 billion in long-term securities and sought an additional $6 billion in the short-term market. Instead, the market effectively closed to New York City in April. MAC, first on its own and then with the

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assistance of the state, has stepped in to borrow for the city. The strategy behind this intervention is to substitute long-term securities for short-term notes, thus providing the city with an opportunity to reform its fiscal practices and accumulate surpluses sufficient to repay its past deficit-related debts.

Causes of the Problem

A variety of factors have contributed to New York's current fiscal problems. It is useful to distinguish the short-term factors that are responsible for precipitating the immediate crisis from those longer-term trends that have contributed to the city's deteriorating fiscal position.

Short-Term Factors

The immediate crisis stems from a loss of investor confidence in the credit worthiness of the city. To some extent the sudden shift in the attitudes of investors toward the city's ability to meet its obligations must be attributed to psychological factors for surely the city's long-run economic outlook, which is what determines its ability to pay off its debts, cannot be much different today than it was one or two years ago.

Any discussion of the factors that affect the psychological attitudes of investors must be speculative. It is possible that investor confidence was eroded by the public debate and confrontation politics that took place between the mayor, the city controller, and the governor over the city's fiscal year 1976 budget. It is also probable that the temporary default of the New York State's Urban Development Corporation and the memories of the Penn Central, Lockheed, and Franklin National Bank collapses have made investors increasingly skittish. Any hint of financial instability may send them scampering away. Investor uncertainty becomes a self-feeding process, for the fewer the number of persons willing to lend the city money, the greater the probability of default and the greater therefore the uncertainty, and indeed, the risk.

However, it would be wrong to attribute all of the loss of investor confidence in New York to psychological factors. Objective market conditions should be considered as well. As Table I indicates, 1975 has proven to be an extremely heavy year for municipal borrowing. Therefore, New York has been forced to compete for funds with many other state and local governments with far sounder fiscal conditions as well as with the large borrowing requirements of the federal government. While the volume of issues has grown, the recession probably has diminished the desire and ability of banks, corporations, and individuals to buy tax-exempt bonds. This has clearly been the case with commercial banks;

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TABLE 1

Volume of Municipal Borrowing (1967–1975)
(Amounts are par values in millions of dollars)

Year	*Long-Term*	*Short-Term*	*Total*
1967	14,300	8,000	22,300
1968	16,300	8,600	24,900
1969	11,700	11,700	23,400
1970	18,888	17,811	35,999
1971	25,006	26,259	51,265
1972	23,748	24,705	49,018
1973	23,957	24,705	48,662
1974	24,317	29,543	53,860
1975[a]	30,124	33,932	64,056

Source: Securities Industry Association, *Municipal Market Developments.*
[a]Annual rate based on January–June volume.

during the first quarter of 1975 they dropped out of the municipal bond market almost entirely (see Table 2).

With respect to individuals, it has been suggested that interest rates on municipal offerings have to be raised significantly to entice new buyers into the market. Such buyers must be drawn primarily from middle-income groups which benefit less from the tax-exempt status of municipal bond interest and are less capable of purchasing municipal bonds because these securities generally are available only in large denominations. Furthermore, the market for New York City securities is concentrated largely in New York State where the interest is exempt from not

TABLE 2

Annual Net Changes in Holdings of Municipal Securities by Major Holder Groups (1970–1975)
(Amounts are par values in billions of dollars)

Holder	*1970*	*1971*	*1972*	*1973*	*1974*	*1975[a]*	
						First Quarter	*Second Quarter*
Commercial banks	10.7	12.6	7.2	5.7	5.5	−2.7	6.9
Households	−.8	−.2	1.0	4.3	10.0	13.9	9.3
All other[b]	1.3	5.2	6.2	3.7	1.9	2.9	4.5
Total	11.2	17.6	14.4	13.7	17.4	14.0	20.7

Source: Unpublished flow of funds data from the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (Processed: August 19, 1975).
[a]Annual rate.
[b]This includes corporate business, state and local general funds, mutual savings banks, insurance companies, state and local government retirement funds, and brokers and dealers.

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only federal but also state and local taxes. This market may be close to saturated by the large quantities of state and city securities outstanding. To broaden the market to nonstate residents would require interest rates sufficiently high to compensate for the fact that non-New York holders would have to pay state income taxes on the interest earned from their New York City securities.

The recession is a second short-term condition that has contributed to New York City's problems. Compared to other local governments, New York's revenue system is highly responsive to economic conditions because it relies heavily on cyclically sensitive sales and income taxes rather than on the more stable property tax. While property taxes accounted for 62 percent of the total revenues raised by the local governments serving metropolitan areas in fiscal year 1972–73, they accounted for only 43 percent of revenues raised by New York.

The recession's impact on New York's sales tax base is illustrated in Table 3. Despite a 9.3 percent increase in consumer prices in the year ending June 30, 1975, the volume of taxable sales in the city rose by only 1.7 percent. In New York even the property tax has proven to be unreliable. Delinquencies have risen rapidly from 4.2 percent of collections in fiscal year 1970 to 7.2 percent currently.

The recession has caused high unemployment and stationary incomes which have increased the city's expenditure requirements as well as undercut its expected revenue growth. Not only have the numbers of families eligible for welfare programs increased (see Table 3), but it is also likely that the demand for other city services, such as hospitals, has been boosted by the recession because fewer city residents are able to afford the costs of the alternative private institutions.

The severe inflation of recent years has also had a negative effect on the fiscal position of New York. While in the long run, inflation may increase the value of the local tax base sufficiently to compensate for the decreased purchasing power of the tax dollar, in the short run, expenditure levels tend to be more responsive to inflationary pressures. This imbalance stems from the nature of property tax administration, for it is very difficult to reassess property rapidly enough to keep pace with the continually inflating market values of real estate.

Moreover, the situation is exacerbated by the long time period that transpires between the date at which the property tax levy is set and the dates on which the tax payments are due. In recent years a considerable amount of unanticipated inflation has occurred during these periods. It should be noted that New York's situation with respect to inflation may be better than that of other large cities, because of New York's heavy reliance on sales and income tax receipts which do respond quickly and automatically to price hikes and inflation-induced salary increases.

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TABLE 3

Measures of the Recession's Impact on New York City

Year		*Unemployment Rate*[1]	*Welfare*[a] *Recipients*[2]	*Sales Tax*[a] *Base*[3]
1970		4.8	101.5	78.1
1971		6.7	109.5	81.5
1972		7.0	112.9	NA
1973		6.0	106.4	91.9
1974		7.2	101.4	96.7
1974	June	6.9	100.0	100.0
	July	7.3	100.2	100.4
	Aug.	6.8	99.3	100.2
	Sept.	7.3	100.5	99.1
	Oct.	7.2	101.3	99.8
	Nov.	7.4	101.3	99.6
	Dec.	8.5	102.4	100.4
1975	Jan.	10.3	102.8	101.0
	Feb.	10.2	102.5	101.0
	Mar.	11.0	103.1	101.7
	April	10.8	104.3	102.0
	May	10.9	104.3	101.9
	June	11.7	105.0	101.7
	July	12.0		
	Aug.	11.0		

Sources: 1. New York State, Department of Labor.
2. New York State Department of Social Services.
3. Annual figures from New York State Department of Taxation and Finance. Monthly figures from Municipal Assistance Corporation.

[a]Indexes use June 1974 as the base period (Sales Tax Base 100 = $1.6 billion; Welfare Recipients 100 = 949,000). Sales Tax Base is equal to the total value of sales subject to taxation. Index is based on a twelve-month moving average to eliminate seasonal effects.

The Welfare index includes recipients under the AFDC and home relief programs.

Long-Term Factors

The longer-term roots of New York's fiscal problem are both complex and difficult for the city to change. In part they represent the same forces that have buffeted the other large central cities of the northeast and north-central states. These cities have been called upon to assimilate a new wave of rural migrants into the industrial economy just when the industries offering employment opportunities are shifting their bases of operation out of the cities.

As a result of the immigration from the South, the out-migration to the suburbs, and the natural aging of the existing population, those more heavily dependent on city services—the poor, the uneducated, the aged, the non-English speaking—comprise an ever-increasing segment of the

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TABLE 4

Change in Jobs and Population in New York City

Year	Total Jobs[1] (in Thous.)	Index[a]	Private Sector[2] Jobs (in Thous.)	Index[a]	Population[3] (in Thous.)	Index[a]
1960	3,538.4	94.5	3,130.2	98.4	7,782.0	98.6
1970	3,744.8	100.0	3,182.0	100.0	7,895.6	100.0
1971	3,609.4	96.4	3,040.2	95.5	7,886.6	99.9
1972	3,563.1	95.1	2,998.6	94.2	7,847.1	99.4
1973	3,538.4	94.5	2,964.0	93.1	7,664.4	97.1
1974	3,458.4	92.4	2,877.7	90.4	7,567.1	95.8
1975[b]	3,375.8	90.1	2,802.6	88.1	NA	NA

Sources: 1. 2. Bureau of Labor Statistics.
3. Bureau of the Census.

[a]Data indexed using 1970 as base year.
[b]January–June 1975.

city's population. For example, between 1950 and 1970 the fraction of the city's population over sixty-five years of age has gone from 8.0 to 12.1 percent while the proportion of the city's families with incomes below the nation's median income level has risen from 36 to 49 percent.

The city's tax base has failed to grow as rapidly as its revenue requirements. This situation can be attributed to shifts in the location of economic activity as well as to the continued suburbanization of middle- and upper-income groups. Many industries are leaving the Northeast altogether while others find it more profitable to operate in the suburbs

TABLE 5

The New York City Tax Burden

Fiscal Year	Personal Income ($ Billions)	Taxes[a] ($ Billions)	Taxes as Percent of Personal Income
1963–64	27	2.013	7.6
1964–65	28	2.193	7.9
1965–66	29	2.152	7.3
1966–67	31	2.410	7.7
1967–68	34	2.626	7.8
1968–69	37	2.802	7.6
1969–70	39	2.958	7.5
1970–71	41	3.178	7.7
1971–72	43	3.736	8.7
1972–73	45	4.017	8.9
1973–74	48	4.506	9.4
1974–75	50	5.111	10.2

Source: New York City Finance Administration.

[a]Excludes fees and charges, stock transfer taxes and nonresident income taxes.

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or on the fringes of the metropolitan area. While its population has remained relatively constant, New York has lost jobs at a rapid rate over the last five years (see Table 4).

The city can exert little influence over either the population shifts or the tax base trends. Together they have produced a steady increase in city tax levels which has, in turn, probably affected the types of persons and businesses willing to remain in or move into the city (see Table 5).

An additional factor that has contributed materially to the city's fiscal problems is the manner in which the responsibility for providing welfare and health-care services has been divided in New York State. New York is one of only twenty-one states that requires its local governments (e.g., counties) to contribute to the support of cash assistance for the aid to families with dependent children program (AFDC) or to Medicaid payments. Of these twenty-one states, the local share is the highest in New York, where it amounts to almost one quarter of the total or half of the nonfederal share (see Table 6).

TABLE 6

Fraction of AFDC Cash Assistance and Medicaid Payments Borne by Local Governments (Fiscal Year 1974)

State[a]	*Percent*
New York	23.0
Minnesota	21.8
Wyoming	18.5
California	14.5
Kansas	11.3
Colorado	9.4
Nebraska	8.8
Nevada	8.3
N. Carolina	8.3
Indiana	6.9
New Jersey	6.5
Iowa	4.8
N. Dakota	4.6
Maryland	4.2
Montana	2.8
Virginia	0.6
Utah	0.6
Louisiana	0.2
Oregon	0.1
New Hampshire	b
Mississippi	b

Source: Department of Health, Education and Welfare, "State Expenditures for Public Assistance Programs."

[a]States not listed do not require any local contribution.
[b]Less than 0.1 percent.

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While county governments in New York also must bear half of the cost of the Home Relief Program, New York State's relatively generous general assistance program, this division of responsibility does not differ from the pattern that prevails in the rest of the nation. All told, New York City's welfare-related expenditures amount to some $3.5 billion, or approximately one-third of its current spending. One billion dollars of this must be raised by the city. If the city constituted just part of a large county—as is true of Los Angeles, Newark, and all but a handful of the large cities located in the twenty-one states requiring local welfare contributions—the costs of supporting the city's income-security programs would be shared by some suburban jurisdictions. However, being a city-county, New York must bear the cost alone.

New York's long tradition of providing enriched levels of public services also has contributed to its current fiscal difficulties. The more obvious services in which New York far outdistances most other local governments include the city university system, the municipal hospital system, the low- and middle-income housing programs, and the extensive public transportation network. For many years there seemed little doubt that the city's wealth was sufficient to support its chosen level of services. However, in recent years it has proved difficult politically to reduce services in line with the city's declining relative fiscal ability to afford them or to raise taxes and fees.

Finally, one cannot ignore the city's questionable accounting procedures and loose fiscal management in relation to the current crisis. These procedures masked the fact the New York officials were failing to make the difficult choices that were required if the city's expense budget was to be truly balanced as required by law.[2] The fault does not rest with the city alone. Many of the "gimmicks" which allowed the budget to appear balanced were tolerated or even suggested by state officials and were certainly not secrets to the banking community. These "gimmicks" produced small deficits which were allowed to accumulate and grow, producing a problem of large and unmanageable proportions.

Is New York Unique?

Are New York's problems simply of a larger magnitude or are they qualitatively different from those of other major cities? Much of the public discussion suggests that New York is very different from other

[2] "Annual budget and financial reports are filed with the Division of Municipal Affairs in the office of the State Comptroller. Budgets are reviewed in substance and legality. . . . Deficit financing is not recognized in the operation of units of Local Government in New York State and can only be legally validated by legisltive en-

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cities, that it has an abnormally large welfare population, an unusually large and well-paid public labor force and has expenditure patterns that are significantly higher than other cities. At the same time, there is the belief that the fiscal crisis being visited upon New York soon will afflict other cities. Generally neither of those contradictory sets of impressions is valid.

In recent decades New York has been buffeted by the same socioeconomic forces that have affected other large, older urban centers and has responded to these pressures in a fashion similar to that of other cities. According to most measures, New York's situation is far from the worst in the nation. One composite index of central city disadvantages shows New York in better shape than Newark, Baltimore, and Chicago as well as eight other large urban centers not included in Table 7 (see column 1). A smaller fraction of New York's population receives welfare than is the case in Philadelphia, Baltimore, Newark, or Boston (see Table 7, column 2).

Comparisons of the expenditure and employment patterns of New York City with those of other large municipal governments indicate that New York is far out of line with other jurisdictions (see Table 7, columns 3a and 4a). Yet this is a misleading conclusion which stems from the fact that New York City provides services that in other areas may be supplied by a county government, a school district, or another specialized government. If one compares the New York employment and spending patterns with those of *all* of the local governments providing services to the residents of other large cities, New York appears to be less extraordinary (see Table 7, columns 3b and 4b). While its per capita expenditure and public employment levels are above those of any other major city area, some of the differences with respect to such cities as Boston and Philadelphia can be explained by the fact that welfare is a state function in Massachusetts and Pennsylvania. While New York also spends a great deal more than other cities on higher education, hospitals, and mass transportation, its expenditure on the services commonly provided by municipalities is not out of line with those of other large cities (see Table 7, columns 3c and 4c). With respect to the salaries paid public employees, New York is generous but not the most generous of large cities (see Table 7, column 5). Considering that New York's cost of living—as measured by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) intermediate family budget—is higher than all but that of Boston, its wages are not particularly out of line (see Table 7, column 6).

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actment." Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations, *City Financial Emergency*, Washington, D. C., 1973, p. 168.

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TABLE 7

New York City Compared to Other Large Central Cities

City	(1) Index of Central City Disadvantage	(2) Fraction of Population Receiving Welfare Payments*	(3) Per Capita Expenditures 1972–1973			(4) Local Government Employment Per 10,000 Population 1974		
			(a) City Government	(b) All Local Governments* Serving Central County	(c)	(a) City Government	(b) All Local Governments* Serving Central County	(c)
				Total	CMF‡		Total	CMF‡
New York City†	211	12.4	$1,224	$1,286	$435	517.1	528.2	263.7
Boston	198	16.9	858	756	441	378.0	465.0	249.2
Chicago	245	11.1	267	600	383	140.0	352.5	250.1
Newark	422	14.4	692	827	449	391.1	421.5	304.6
Los Angeles	105	8.0	242	759	408	162.2	401.1	256.0
Philadelphia†	205	16.2	415	653	395	163.8	414.5	301.5
San Francisco†	105	9.1	751	1,073	488	312.5	488.3	244.4
New Orleans†	168	11.4	241	431	260	177.3	357.7	271.3
St. Louis†	231	15.8	310	610	360	241.9	424.6	227.8
Denver†	143	7.2	473	721	375	237.0	410.5	280.9
Baltimore†	256	16.3	806	814	470	434.1	434.1	312.5
Detroit	210	11.1	357	650	396	194.8	354.3	258.6

*Central county.

†Boundaries of the city are coterminous with those of the central county.

‡Common Municipal Functions (CMF) include elementary and secondary education, highways, police, fire, sanitation, parks, general control and financial administration.

Sources:

1. Richard Nathan "The Record of the New Federalism: What It Means for the Nation's Cities" (Washington, D.C., 1974).
2. Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Recipients of Public Assistance Money Payments and Amounts of Such Payments by Program, State, and County. February 1975 DHEW Pub. No. (SRS) 76-03105 NCSS Report A-8 (2/75). Includes AFDC and general assistance recipients.

However, it should be noted that what little reliable evidence there is seems to indicate that New York City provides its employees with considerably more in the way of fringe benefits—pensions, health insurance, etc.—than is offered the employees of other large cities.

While New York's situation in many ways does not differ markedly from that of other large central cities, some of its problems are clearly not shared with other cities. First there is New York's debt situation. On a per capita basis the city has far more debt outstanding than do the local

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New York City Compared to Other Large Central Cities (Cont'd.)

(5) Public Employee Average Salaries 1974**				(6) Cost of BLS's Intermediate Family Budget (Index 1974)	(7) Debt Outstanding Per Capita 1972–73*	
(a) Teacher	(b) Police	(c) Fire	(d) Sanitation		(a) Total	(b) Short-Term
$17,018	$14,666	$16,964	$15,924	116	$1,676	$352
13,938	14,352	13,844	10,666	117	1,385	334
17,409	14,146	15,525	11,956	103	733	169
13,720	13,282	13,282	8,473	116	616	112
13,058	15,833	21,180	13,168	98	650	14
12,800	14,354	13,869	13,337	103	1,015	101
14,855	15,529	17,765	13,023	106	1,225	151
8,715	10,746	10,645	4,170	NA	770	39
14,894	11,748	13,185	9,593	97	731	49
13,505	12,907	14,198	10,258	95	786	52
10,488	10,098	10,980	8,126	100	609	45
18,836	15,636	16,107	13,814	100	658	63

**Estimated from October 1974 payroll per full-time equivalent worker per function. To the extent possible, census estimates for teachers have been adjusted to reflect whether payment is on a ten- or twelve-month basis.

Sources: (Cont'd.)

3a. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "City Government Finances in 1972–73," GF73, No. 4.

3b., d., 7. U. S. Bureau of the Census, "Local Government Finances in Selected Metropolitan Areas and Large Counties 1972–73," No. 6.

4., 5. U.S. Bureau of the Census, "Local Government Employment in Selected Metropolitan Areas and Large Counties 1974," GE74, No. 3.

6. Bureau of Labor Statistics, "Autumn 1974 Urban Family Budgets and Comparative Indexes for Selected Urban Areas" (4-9-75).

governments providing services in the other central city areas (see Table 7, column 7). This is particularly true of short-term debt in which New York stands alone in its needs continually to enter the market to "roll over" large quantities of notes. Second, New York, as far as can be told, has been the only major city that has chronically run a large current operating deficit in both good and bad economic years. Finally, as was mentioned previously, New York revenues and expenditures are much more sensitive to the ups and downs of the business cycle. . . .

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Conclusion

The focus of this paper has been largely on the immediate crisis facing New York City. . . . However, the crisis will only be delayed temporarily unless the underlying causes of the city's fiscal difficulties are addressed. While it may be comforting to believe that these problems can be handled by the city alone, this probably is not the case. Certainly efficient management, strict accounting procedures, and the introduction of new technology can help, but such measures alone will not balance New York's budget and pay off a substantial portion of its accumulated short-term debt. Substantial service cutbacks and tax increases will be required to accomplish these objectives. Yet such actions will make the city a less attractive place in which to live and probably will hasten the exodus of middle- and upper-income families and commercial and industrial establishments. This, in turn, will undercut the city's ability to support even a reduced level of services.

Given these forces, it is probable that the underlying problems facing New York, as well as a number of other large, aging cities, can be dealt with effectively only by the states or by the federal government. Unless one is willing to consider policies that would redistribute the low-income populations among other jurisdictions, or would redraw city boundaries so as to encompass suburban areas, or that would radically equalize income, the main alternative left for addressing the city's problems is to relieve the city of some major portions of its current fiscal responsibility. As has been mentioned previously, New York City's situation would be aided immensely if the state or the federal government assumed the burden now borne by the city for welfare and related services to the poor.

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School Desegregation and White Flight

CHRISTINE H. ROSSELL

White flight from cities has been a much discussed phenomenon in the last decade. Despite widespread speculation over which policies aggravate this trend and which slow it down, there has been little systematic research as to its causes and consequences. Nevertheless, administrators and politicians often claim that school desegregation, perhaps one of the most controversial policies of the last decade, is counterproductive because it acclerates white flight. The most recent proponent of this theory is James Coleman, best known for *Equal Educational Opportunity*, often called the "Coleman Report."[1] He has stated that "The extremely strong reactions of individual whites in moving their children out of large districts engaged in massive and rapid desegregation suggests that in the long run the policies that have been pursued will defeat the purpose of increasing overall contact among races

[1] The earlier work on which Coleman built his reputation is a massive study showing that school desegregation raises the achievement scores of black students: James S. Coleman et al., *Equality of Educational Opportunity*, (Washington, D.C., 1966). The latest work in which he claims school desegregation increases white flight is James S. Coleman, Sara D. Kelly, and John Moore, "Recent Trends in School Integration," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Educational Research Association, Washington, D.C., April 2, 1975; James S. Coleman, Sara D. Kelly, and John Moore, "Trends in School Segregation, 1968–73," Urban Institute Working Paper, August 1975.

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in schools."[2] The mass media has tended to disseminate statements such as these with little attempt to ascertain their accuracy, despite the mounting criticism within academic circles of Coleman's methods and findings.

The data in this article show that school desegregation has little or no effect on white flight. Even in the two high desegregation school districts that had significant white flight, it is minimal (about a 3 percent increase over the previous trend) and temporary. By the third year after desegregation, white flight stabilizes to a rate lower than the predesegregation period in these districts. For all "high desegregation" school districts the rate of decline is lower by the third year after desegregation than any year prior to desegregation. Furthermore, if a school district does have any negligible white flight it typically comes before the opening of school in the first year of the major plan, and rarely after that. Desegregation under court order does not increase white flight, nor does massive desegregation in large school districts. In short, this study contradicts Coleman's recent assertions regarding the deleterious effect of school desegregation on white flight, and demonstrates the fundamental error in his measurement of that phenomenon.

Methodology and Prior Research

In conducting public policy research, it is important that one's methodology be appropriate to the phenomenon being studied. While on the face of it, a longitudinal design seems the most appropriate method of determining the impact of a policy, certain kinds of longitudinal designs can be extremely misleading. For example, just looking at the white enrollment before and after school desegregation—a technique often used by newspapers, local school officials, and desegregation opponents—obscures the fact that while there may be a loss of whites incurred after school desegregation, it is usually no greater than losses incurred in previous years. Thus, this type of design does not uncover patterns of white out-migration that developed long before the school issue was litigated. Longer longitudinal designs of the type used by Coleman can be misleading if there is no attempt to fix the point of school desegregation policy implementation, and changes in school racial mixtures are simply compared to changes in percentage white enrollment. This technique, while seemingly more sophisticated than a before and after design, also errs in confusing the covariation of two secular demographic

[2] Coleman, Kelly, and Moore, "Recent Trends in School Integration," pp. 21–22.

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trends (white flight from cities and ghetto expansion into white school attendance zones) with a causal relationship between white flight and governmentally or court-imposed desegregation policy.

Probably the most appropriate methodology for analyzing public policy impact is a time series quasi-experimental design. None of the previous analysts of school desegregation and white flight has used this design. This may be due to unfamiliarity with it, or to an unwillingness or inability to spend the necessary time and money collecting data over time. The particular quasi-experimental design used here is the interrupted multiple times series quasi-experiment with a nonequivalent control group, developed by Campbell and Stanley.[3] It is characterized by (1) periodic measurement on some variable (e.g., percentage white enrollment) obtained at equally spaced points in time; (2) the "introduction" of a quasi-experimental variable (e.g., school desegregation) somewhere into the series; and (3) a control group, which has not received the quasi-experimental variable against which the experimental groups can be compared. In this article, then, the effect of school desegregation on white flight will be analyzed as a time series quasi-experiment. (A more detailed explanation of the methodology is presented in Appendix 1.)

The small amount of academic research on school desegregation and white flight has, with the exception of Coleman's work, tended to show no relationship between the two phenomena. Clotfelter found no statistically significant relationship between school desegregation and white flight when a number of demographic and economic variables were controlled for, although his measures of school desegregation is a dichotomous variable not easily generalizable, and his longitudinal analysis only involves two points in time. Reynolds Farley, using a measure of school integration similar to Coleman's in that it does not measure actual policy, but using more sophisticated statistical controls, found integration has no discernible effect, on the average, on the rate of white flight.[4]

A research design prepared by the Rand Corporation for the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights analyzes the change in the percentage white students in the Washington, D.C., public schools over a twenty-three-

[3] Donald T. Campbell and Julian Stanley, *Experimental and Quasi-Experimental Designs for Research* (Chicago, 1963), pp. 47–48.

[4] Charles Clotfelter, "The Detroit Decision and White Flight," *Journal of Legal Studies*, forthcoming; Reynolds Farley, "School Integration and White Flight," paper presented at the Brookings Symposium on School Desegregation and White Flight, Washington, D.C., August 15, 1975.

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year period. The analysis shows school desegregation (open enrollment after the 1954 Supreme Court decision) to have had a minimal effect in increasing the flight of whites to the suburbs. However, since open enrollment typically involves very few students, it is difficult to generalize from this finding to that of mandatory busing.[5]

One of the most promising studies of school desegregation and white flight is summarized in a recent issue of *Integrated Education*. The study was conducted in eight desegregated school districts in Florida in 1973. Only 3.6 percent of the parents interviewed rejected school desegregation by withdrawing their children from their assigned schools. The authors conclude that if a low annual rate of aggregate white flight is a prime criterion for evaluating progress, then school desegregation in these districts should be rated at least a qualified success.[6] The findings of most studies then, despite differing methodologies, is that the effect of school desegregation on white flight is negligible when compared to other factors that cause relocation of whites.

Conduct of the Study

Sample and Data Collection

In this analysis aggregate data are used to describe a sample of eighty-six northern cities and their school districts. This represents the northern sample of a larger study of both northern and southern school districts (yet to be analyzed) and is biased in favor of medium and large cities/school districts.[7]

Defining School Desegregation

Most research, including Coleman's, defines "school desegregation" as any situation where there happens to be a significant number of black

[5] Robert L. Crain et al., *Design for a National Longitudinal Study of School Desegregation*, Vol. II., *Research Design and Procedures* (Santa Monica, Calif., September 1974), p. 79.

[6] Everett Cataldo, Micheal Giles, Deborah Athos, and Douglas Gatlin, "Desegregation and White Flight," *Integrated Education* (January 1975), pp. 3–5. The compliance/rejection status of their respondents was determined from official school records. Compliers were defined as those parents who had a child attending public school in both 1971–1972 and 1972–1973. Rejecters were those who has a child in public school in 1971–1972, but transferred the child to private school in 1972–1973. The eight county school districts were Dade, Palm Beach, Duval, Leon, Jefferson, Escambia, Manatee, and Lee.

[7] All but two of the eighty-six school districts in this study have the same name

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and white children in the same school at the same point in time.[8] The problem with this definition is that it obscures the reason for the integrated situation. For a good many schools in the United States, integration is, thus, unstable and temporary. Actual governmental or court implemented school desegregation, on the other hand, is not the result of ghetto expansion into an attendance zone (also called "ecological succession") and is, not surprisingly, characterized by different patterns.

This study attempts to overcome the limitations of measures of school desegregation commonly used in the past, by defining "school desegregation" as the reassignment of black or white students by a local governmental body or court for the purposes of school integration.[9] Data were collected by means of a mail questionnaire that listed the biracial schools (defined as a minimum of 10 percent black and 10 percent white)[10] in a

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and virtually the same boundaries as the city. The decision to desegregate in every case involves interaction between the city and school officials and citizens of both legal entities. The result is that for most practical purposes the distinction between city and school district is almost nonexistent.

[8] Coleman, et al., "Recent Trends in School Integration"; U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, *Racial Isolation in the Public Schools*, 2 vols. (Washington, D.C., 1967); Thomas Dye, "Urban School Segregation, A Comparative Analysis," *Urban Affairs Quarterly*, 4 (December 1968), 141–165, the last two using a measure of the percentage of black students in predominantly black schools. Reynolds Farley and Alma F. Taeuber, "Racial Segregation in the Public Schools," *American Journal of Sociology*, 79 (January 1974), 888–890, and Farley, "School Integration and White Flight," both using an index of dissimilarity adapted from the Taeuber Index of residential segregation. Another recent study uses a measure of the change in the proportion of minority students attending "ethnically balanced" schools from 1966 to 1971: Eldon L. Wegner and Jane R. Mercer, "Dynamics of the Desegregation Process: Politics, Policies, and Community Characteristics as Factors in Change," in Frederick M. Wirt (ed.), *The Polity of the School* (Lexington, Mass., 1975), pp. 123–143.

[9] Studies using other measures have been: Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro, "Stateways versus Folkways: Critical Factors in Southern Reactions to *Brown* v. *Board of Education*," in Gottfried Dietze (ed.), *Essays on the American Constitution* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J., 1964); James W. Prothro, "Stateways versus Folkways Revisited: An Error in Prediction," *Journal of Politics*, 34 (May 1972), 352–364; Robert L. Crain, Morton Inger, Gerald McWhorter, and James J. Vanecko, *The Politics of School Desegregation* (New York, 1969), all using a dichotomous variable: did desegregate —or did not desegregate. David J. Kirby, T. Robert Harris, and Robert L. Crain, *Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation* (Lexington, Mass., 1973) used a qualitative measure of the characteristics of the desegregation plan.

[10] Other minorities, such as Asian-Americans, Spanish surname, and Indian have been excluded from the computation of this measure because the concern of this study is with the political pressures and responses to the segregation of blacks from whites. Nonblack minorities simply do not exert the same kinds of pressures nor arouse the same fears as blacks. Indeed, even in many western school districts where their proportions are larger than in other regions, nonblack minorities have often sided

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district and asked administrators to indicate the reason for their biracialness and the approximate date of any action taken to adjust racial balance.[11] The measures of school desegregation policy were computed as follows: the number of black and white students in a school in the year in which an action was taken was subtracted from the number in the same school during the preceding year. The difference was attributed to administrative action if it increased racial integration. The number of black and white students reassigned in this way in each school was totaled for the school district. This was then standardized by converting the raw number of blacks and whites reassigned into the percentage of the total school district black population that was reassigned and the percentage of the total school district white population "reverse integrated" (sent to predominantly black or formerly black schools). These figures, (percentage blacks and percentage whites reassigned) were added together to comprise an index measuring school desegregation for each year from 1963–1964 through 1972–1973.[12]

Further policy classification was unnecessary because the percentage of black and white students reassigned proved to be highly related to the type of action. Mandatory busing results in the highest percentage of students reassigned, while voluntary busing never amounts to more than a small percentage of students reassigned.[13] Furthermore, a straightforward quantitative measure avoids the problems of semantics encountered with inflammatory policy issues.

The effect of school desegregation on white flight is measured by the percentage white enrolled in public schools for as many years before

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with the white majority against desegregation. Therefore, desegregation plans have tended to be overwhelmingly focused on integrating blacks into white schools.

[11] Racial composition data were obtained from the U. S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, *Directory of Public Elementary and Secondary Schools in Selected Districts*, Fall 1970, Enrollment and Staff by Racial/Ethnic Groups (Washington, D.C., 1971). There are also volumes for Fall 1967, Fall 1968, and unpublished data for the odd years since 1967. Data for desegregation claimed in earlier years was obtained from published records of the school districts themselves. A more detailed explanation of this measure can be found in Christine H. Rossell and Robert L. Crain, *Evaluating School Desegregation Plans Statistically* (Baltimore, Md., 1973), pp. 4–11; or Kirby, Harris, and Crain, "Measuring School Desegregation," *Political Strategies in Northern School Desegregation*, chap. 12.

[12] The two measures were combined because they are highly correlated (.80) and there is so little reassignment of whites to black or formerly black schools.

[13] The relationship between the percentage of a plan which is mandatory and the percentage of students reassigned is .94 for white students and .77 for black students using gamma.

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and after the major school desegregation plan as data are available, with 1972–1973 being the last year of the study. Data of percentage white were obtained from HEW statistics from fall 1967 to fall 1972. For periods earlier than that, data were collected by writing to each school district in the sample. Only about 61 percent had such data (in a few school districts it was illegal to keep it).

Findings

The change in percentage white students in each of the eighty-six northern school districts before and after their major desegregation plan is presented in Appendix 2.[14] The index of the percentage of black students reassigned added to the percentage of white students reassigned in the largest desegregation action is presented in column 1. The change in the percentage white in each year before the major desegregation plan is given in columns 3 through 9. The change in the percentage in each year beginning with the major plan is presented in columns 11 through 18. School desegregation actions taken in addition to the major action are indicated by asterisks next to the change in the percentage white for that school year. For example, Pasadena's major desegregation plan reassigned 98.48 percent of the black and white students in 1970. The opening of school in the first year of the plan saw an increase in the average annual decline in percentage white of about 2 percent. In the fall of 1972, as indicated by the asterisk in column 13, Pasadena implemented more school desegregation. By this time, however, the decline in the percentage white is close to the trend exhibited prior to the major desegregation plan. The additional action brought their total desegregation, presented in column 22, up to 100.8.[15]

The first figure in column 17 is the result of the single-Mood test, while

[14] Data on the actual percentage white in each school district for these years can be obtained by writing the author.

[15] Since the index represents the percentage of black students reassigned to white schools, and the percentage of white students reassigned to black or formerly black schools, the index could go as high as 200 percent. However, reassigning 100 percent of each race is not efficient. The most efficient reassignment in a perfectly segregated system is 50 percent of each race which equals an index of 100. Because school districts also have political and social considerations, they tend to avoid reassigning whites to black or formerly black schools, and thus the index usually reflects the percentage of black students reassigned to white schools. Pasadena is one of the few school districts that reassigned a large proportion of white students to black or formerly black schools. Either they did more reassignment than was efficient, or there is some measurement error in the index.

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the second figure is the result of the double-Mood test, both explained in Appendix 1. (When N.S.—not significant—is reported, it means that the change in percentage white after desegregation is probably no greater than fluctuations that occurred before desegregation.) The figures reported for Pasadena indicate that a decline of 4.2 in 1970 (column 11) is large enough to be the result of school desegregation, rather than simply being random fluctuation. The second figure indicates that the change in percentage white when the whole postdesegregation period is examined is again large enough to be the result of school desegregation.

Column 20 shows the average change in percentage white from year to year in the predesegregation period, and column 21 shows the average change in percentage white from year to year in the postdesegregation period. While in general there is greater white flight after desegregation than before, it stabilizes by the third year after school desegregation (column 13) to a rate similar to that of the predesegregation period.

Pontiac, the second school district shown in Appendix 2, also has a significant increase in white flight after their major school desegregation plan. However, the decline stabilizes by the second year so that the rate is lower than any year before the desegregation. Both Pontiac and Pasadena desegregation plans were court ordered, but as we shall see, of the eleven court-ordered school districts, they are the only two that had a significant increase in white flight.

The remarkable characteristic of these data is that, of the top ten school districts that implemented a high degree of school desegregation, only two showed any significant increase in white flight. Furthermore, there is some indication that other factors probably contributed to white flight in Pasadena.[16] Further research on Pontiac may turn up additional factors here as well. These ten "high desegregation" school districts include one of the few school districts in the entire sample to ever have an increase in their percentage white. By the third and fourth year after their 1968 desegregation plan, the percentage white in the Berkeley school district actually increased by .2 percent and .9 percent respectively.

The next group of school districts, those implementing an intermediate degree of school desegregation, have not a single case of any school

[16] Wirt points out that although Pasadena's white (Anglo) student population declined after school desegregation, two districts in the San Gabriel Valley (the hot, smoggy valley in which Pasadena is located) that did not desegregate lost even more whites than Pasadena. Frederick M. Wirt, "Understanding the Reality of Desegregation," (unpublished paper, Berkeley, Calif., June 21, 1972).

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district exhibiting significant white flight after their major desegregation plan. In the third group of school districts, those that reassigned less than 5 percent of their black and white students in their major plan, one had less decline than would have been expected from the previous trend (South Bend, Indiana), and three others had a significant increase in white flight. However, the three exhibiting white flight implemented so little desegregation that the relationship to school desegregation should be treated with suspicion. As indicated in Appendix 1, the control group (those implementing no school desegregation) was assigned a "treatment point" of 1968. In other words, changes in percentage white before 1968 are compared to changes after 1968. This point comes after the 1968 summer riots and is also when a good number of school districts desegregated. In this way, it was hoped that possible secular trends could be isolated. Unfortunately, the control group suffers from poor record keeping (in some cases because it was illegal to keep such data). However, of those school districts that had pre-1967 data, two show a significant increase in white flight after the summer of 1968. Other school districts show a large increase from the previous year, but without the pre-1967 data it is impossible to tell if this is a change in the trend. At the very least, it is useful to compare these data to those of the desegregating school districts.

In order to summarize the data, the school districts are divided into five groups: court ordered; high desegregation (greater than 20 percent); medium desegregation (5–20 percent); low desegregation (less than 5 percent); and the control group. The average for each group for four years before and four years after their major plan is presented in Table 1 and represented graphically in Figure 1. As Table 1 indicates, none of the various desegregating groups shows any significant white flight, although the highest desegregation group shows a negligible increase of *about 1 percent from the previous trend.*[17] The *important phenomenon* here is that any loss of whites occurs *before* school opens in the first year of the plan. After that, white flight stabilizes to a rate slightly better than the predesegregation period. Therefore, white flight, if it occurs at all, occurs not from the problems experienced during the first year of desegregation, but from the fear of problems. In other words, if whites leave, it is typically not because they participated in the plan and did not

[17] The school districts were also grouped according to their total desegregation, rather than their largest action. This made little difference in the trend for each group, although the highest desegregating group showed even less change in white flight, after school desegregation.

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FIGURE 1

Change in Percentage White for Four Desegregation Groups and a Control Group (0 Desegregation)



like it, but because they refused to participate at all. Apparently, whites who did participate in the first year of the plan did not leave after that. This has enormous policy implications because it means administrators should concentrate their efforts on eliminating fear and controversy *before* the plan is implemented.

The findings of this study thus support the proposition that school desegregation does not cause significant white flight, and tend to disprove Coleman's thesis. Furthermore, although Coleman has maintained that "in an area such as school desegregation . . . the courts are probably the worst instrument of social policy,"[18] Figure 1 and Table 1 show no significant increase in white flight in northern school districts that desegregated under court order.

Table 2 shows the change in percentage white before and after school desegregation, controlling for degree of desegregation and city size. Within each desegregating group and the control group, the larger cities show no greater white flight than the medium and small cities, and none is significant. Although Coleman has maintained that the greatest white

[18] Coleman et al., "Recent Trends in School Integration," p. 21.

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TABLE 1: *Change in Percentage White for Four Desegregation Groups and a Control Group*

Group	Change in % White: −4 Years	−3 Years	−2 Years	−1 Years	0 Years	1 Years	2 Years	3 Years	Signif. Level	Average Pre-series	Average Post-series
Court ordered	−1.1	−1.8	−2.2	−1.0	−1.8	−2.1	−1.4		N.S.	−1.5	−1.8
High desegregation (> 20%)	−1.5	−1.8	−1.8	− 1.2	−2.4	−1.8	− .8		N.S.	−1.5	−1.7
Medium desegregation (5–20%)	−1.1	− .7	− .9	− .9	−1.0	−1.0	−1.0		N.S.	− .9	−1.0
Low desegregation (< 5%)	−1.8	−1.8	−1.4	−1.5	−1.6	−1.6	−1.5	−1.7	N.S.	−1.6	−1.6
Control group (0)		−1.5	−1.5	−1.9	−2.2	−1.8	−1.3	− 1.2	N.S.	−1.2	−1.6

TABLE 2: *Change in Percentage White for Four Desegregation Groups and a Control Group Controlling for City Size*

Group	−4 Years	−3 Years	−2 Years	−1 Years	0 Years	1 Years	2 Years	3 Years	Signif. Level	Average Pre-series	Average Post-series
Large cities (> 500,000)											
High desg.	−1.3	− .7	−2.8	− .4	−2.3	−2.3	−1.4		N.S.	−1.0	−2.0
Med. desg.	−4.0	−1.0	−1.1	−.9	−1.1	−1.1			a	− 1.8	−1.1
Low desg.		−1.5	−1.7	−3.6	− .8	− .9	− .4		N.S.	−2.3	− .7
Control	−2.1	−1.3	−1.3	−1.9	−1.7	−1.6			N.S.	−1.6	−1.7
Med. cities (100,000–500,000)											
High desg.	−1.3	−1.6	− .3	−1.3	−2.0	−1.8	−2.2	− .8	N.S.	−1.1	−1.7
Med. desg.	− .8	−1.3	− .6	−1.2	−1.2	−2.1	−1.1	− 1.1	N.S.	−1.0	−1.4
Low desg.	−1.3	−2.5	−1.8	−1.3	−1.3	−1.6	−1.4	−1.3	N.S.	−1.7	−1.4
Control		−1.0	−2.0	−2.1	−2.4	−1.8	−1.3	−1.3	N.S.	−1.7	−1.7
Small cities (< 100,000)											
High desg.	−2.2	−3.3	−4.8	−1.8	−3.6	−1.2	−1.1		N.S.	−3.0	−1.9
Med. desg.	− .2	− .7	−1.2	− .2	− .9	− .3	− .9		N.S.	− .6	− .7
Low desg.			− .6	− .5	− .7	−1.5	−1.5		a	− .6	−1.2
Control					−2.2	−1.9	−1.6	−1.2	a	a	−1.7

[a]Unable to compute.

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flight is in "large districts engaged in massive and rapid desegregation,"[19] the two large school districts, San Francisco and Denver, that engaged in such massive and rapid desegregation show no significant white flight. Nor do most of the other large school districts that implemented lesser degrees of school desegregation (Seattle; Milwaukee; Kansas City, Mo.; Indianapolis; Baltimore; Philadelphia; Los Angeles; and Chicago). Thus the data of the present study contradict almost every claim Coleman has made regarding school desegregation and white flight.[20]

Implications

It appears that, although Coleman has claimed in television appearances and newspaper interviews that he is conducting research on school desegregation policy, this is not precisely what he is doing. Indeed, there is no evidence that he knows what school desegregation policy has been implemented in the school districts he is studying. A *New York Times* research study of Coleman's twenty cities—in which key officials in each were questioned by telephone—could find no court-ordered desegregation in any of the cities during the 1968–1970 period he studied, despite Coleman's assertion that such desegregation was causing massive white flight. Court suits were pending in many cities, but desegregation was limited to a few modest open-enrollment plans, used mainly by blacks. If there was "massive and rapid" desegregation as Coleman said, it could not have been due to court-ordered remedies.[21] Since there has been no massive and rapid desegregation in the South without a court order, there is not much evidence of any kind of rapid and massive desegregation in his sample. In fact, in the same *New York Times* article, Coleman conceded he was "quite wrong" to have called the change in segregation "massive."[22]

The fact is that Coleman is studying changes in school racial mixtures, not school desegregation policy, and while he briefly acknowl-

[19] Ibid.

[20] In the later paper, "Trends in School Segregation, 1968–73," Coleman acknowledges that the estimated loss in northern cities which have undergone desegregation is less than in the southern ones, but this did not stop him from filing another court affidavit on September 2, 1975, in Boston on behalf of antibusing groups, predicting that school desegregation will increase white flight in Boston. In general, while the second paper is much more reasonable in the conclusions it draws, Coleman's public statements have not reflected this.

[21] Robert Reinhold, "Report of Failure of Busing Conceded by Author to Exceed Scientific Data," *The New York Times*, July 11, 1975.

[22] Ibid.

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edges the difference in his later paper, "Trends in School Segregation, 1968–73," he continues to draw conclusions and policy recommendations that use the term, "school desegregation."[23] The clearest indication that he does not understand the difference can be seen in Coleman's affadavit in *Morgan et al.* v. *Kerrigan et al.* Nos. 75–1184; 75–1194; 75–1197; 75–1212, filed in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 1st Circuit (September 3, 1975) on behalf of the Boston Home and School Association, an antibusing group in Boston. In this affadavit, he predicts that full-scale desegregation will increase the number of whites leaving the city, and that the exodus will be caused by the citywide scope of the desegregation plan and its impact at the elementary school level.[24] However, his prediction is based on his prior research in which he only measures changes in racial mixtures through a statistical measure of the proportion of blacks and whites attending school with the opposite race, and therefore does not distinguish between ghetto expansion into a white attendance zone (ecological succession) and an actual governmental policy resulting in the same thing—integration. As mentioned earlier, in the case of ecological succession, the integration will be temporary and the eventual resegregation will look like white flight resulting from "school desegregation policy." This confusion of two different phenomena means that, in most cases, Coleman's prediction is invalid for governmental or court-ordered school desegregation policy.[25]

Furthermore, in a careful review of the issues and policy implications of white-flight research, Orfield points out that even if one were to accept both the validity of Coleman's method of analysis and the maxi-

[23] Coleman et al., "Trends in School Integration, 1968–73."

[24] In an analysis of Boston's Phase I and Phase II desegregation plans (fall 1974 and fall 1975) recently completed by the author and included in Appendix 3, the percentage white in Boston public schools declined by five percentage points after Phase I. This represents an increase of only 3 percentage points from the average rate of white flight prior to Phase I. Furthermore, even with many white students still boycotting, the rate of white flight has declined during Phase II to a rate lower than that experienced after Phase I.

[25] Coleman also measures loss in white enrollment in a way that may tend to exaggerate white flight in some cities. He compares the raw figures on white enrollment in one year to the raw figures on white enrollment in the previous year and then claims white flight if the latter is lower than the former. Yet one can easily predict cases where due to job layoffs, factory closings, etc., both whites and blacks leave a city at a faster rate than before, but blacks leave at a higher rate. Although this would result in the percentage black decreasing and the percentage white increasing, Coleman would still call this white flight, even though it might more properly be called "black flight." In the final analysis, the most important variable for policy purposes is the percentage white, not the number white.

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mum force of his results, his study suggests only that the initiation of desegregation in a city with a 50 percent black enrollment will produce an additional loss of 5.5 percent of the white students. This "flight" is significantly less than the same school system can expect to lose for other reasons in a normal year. In short, it seems that Coleman himself has not followed his research to its logical conclusion—that at worst, his model predicts desegregation of a 50 percent black school system would bring the schools to their ultimate ghetto status only about a year sooner than otherwise projected.[26] Therefore, an even greater problem than the inappropriate methodology used by Coleman is his apparent unwillingness to accept the policy implications of his own research.

Conclusions

This study has demonstrated that school desegregation causes little or no significant white flight, even when it is court ordered and implemented in large cities. Despite the popularity of the claim, researchers and analysts familiar with the white-flight phenomenon in cities should have been able to predict that the effect of school desegregation would be minimal compared to other, more important, forces such as increasing crime and public fears of violence, rapid movement of jobs to suburban facilities, much greater housing construction in the suburbs than in the cities, decline in the actual level of some central city services, major urban riots, and deteriorating city schools and declining achievement scores. These and other factors have contributed to the suburbanization of middle-class families who tend to be predominantly, although not exclusively, white.[27]

While almost all school districts (with the exception of Berkeley, California) are still experiencing white flight, it is quite encouraging that by the second and third year after desegregation, the school districts engaging in massive and rapid desegregation have a rate of white flight that is lower than their rate in the predesegregation period and lower than that of any other group, including those that did not implement

[26] Gary Orfield, "White Flight Research: Its Importance, Perplexities, and Possible Policy Implication," Brookings Institution paper, September 1975.

[27] Orfield points out that middle-class black families are also fleeing cities whenever they are allowed to buy suburban housing. Moreover, among black families who retain central city residence, there are substantial numbers who have fled to private schools. In Washington, D.C., for example, the suburbs experienced a 61 percent increase in black population in the first four years of the 1970s, and among the blacks who remained in the city, about 10,000 are using private schools. Ibid., pp. 8–9.

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any desegregation at all. This is a heartening phenomenon and may mean that school desegregation, and the educational innovation that typically accompanies it when it is city wide, could impede the increasing ghettoization of American cities. While a good number of researchers and citizens maintain that the only way to avoid the problem of white flight and accomplish stable integration is to integrate housing, the findings of this study suggest that the process could in fact be the reverse. As Orfield points out, it would be extremely difficult to implement stable housing integration involving a large number of blacks, without a framework of area-wide integrated schools.[28] Once blacks begin to move into a particular area, that area tends to become increasingly more black unless new white families move in to replace those who leave in the normal process of residential mobility. Under the existing laissez-faire system, however, there is absolutely no incentive for a white family to move into a neighborhood with a substantial number of black neighbors because, based on past experience, the neighborhood school will in all probability become predominantly black in the future. Even those who would accept integration will very seldom allow their child to be in an all-black school. Therefore, without a desegregation plan, the white family often does not perceive a choice between an integrated and an all-white school, but only between an all-white school and one that is almost certain to become virtually all black. The only way to break this cycle of expectations is to assure families that the schools will be integrated wherever they move in the city, and they will not become overwhelmingly black anywhere. This assurance, which can only be supported by a city-wide school desegregation plan, could stem the flight of whites to the suburbs in search of schools that will not become all black in the near future.

Serious recommendations about school desegregation policy should be based on an analysis of policy alternatives that might lessen the incentives for the departure of the middle class in all cities, and even provide some encouragement for their return. It is not enough to simply say white flight is not increased by school desegregation. We need to know how to stop flight altogether. Perhaps the most important step to be taken next in the research described here is to determine how Berkeley was able to increase its white percentage, and why Pasadena and Pontiac experienced a brief significant white flight after school desegregation and other school districts did not. In addition, it is necessary to understand the mechanisms operating in school desegregation that account for the fact that, if any white flight occurs, it typically occurs

[28] Ibid., pp. 15–18.

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before school opens in the first year of the plan, and rarely after, and why there is a decline in the rate of white flight by the second and third year after the major plan is implemented. Closer study of the best and worst cases, and of the intricacies of the patterns observed, might well suggest procedures and policies that can help avoid any initial loss of enrollment, and perhaps stop the loss of whites altogether from central cities.*

Appendix 1: Methodology

Because this study is comparative and school desegregation occurs at different times for different school districts, a modification had to be made in the interrupted multiple times series quasi-experimental design. The treatment point is usually a fixed point or year for all cases in quasi-experimental designs. Unfortunately for the neatness of the design, some school districts take two and occasionally three years to complete their desegregation plans. However, one action is usually much larger than any of the others and that was the point chosen for those taking multiple actions. Change is then analyzed for as many years before and after the major desegregation plan as data are available (ending in 1972–1973), although for some school districts this will mean the first point in the series is 1963 and for others it is 1967. However, most school districts desegregated in 1968, with the next largest groups desegregating in 1969 and 1970 respectively. For the control group—those that did not desegregate at all—1968 is used as the "treatment" point because it is the year in which the largest number of districts desegregated, and it is a year in which a good deal of disruption and change occurred in this country. Therefore, 1968 marks a turning point used to isolate possible short- or long-term systematic trends.

Measuring Discontinuity: Tests of Significance

The question of whether the occurrence of an event under study had an effect on the variables being measured cannot be solved simply by visual

* This is a revision of a paper, "The Political and Social Impact of School Desegregation," presented at the American Political Science Convention, September 1975. The APSA paper was a preliminary report of a study of the social and political impact of school desegregation in 113 northern and southern school districts from 1963–1973. The study analyzes the effect of school desegregation on voting patterns, racial composition of school boards, white flight, residential integration, community organizational participation, attendance, suspensions, expulsions, racial composition and integration of teaching staff, student organizations, and athletic teams. Steve Cohen

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inspection of plots of data. A test of significance must be applied to estimate whether or not an observed change exceeds the limits of what is expected on the basis of chance fluctuations.

Two tests of significance, the single-Mood and double-Mood tests, are used in the interrupted time series. Each of these tests is based on a calculation of the difference between expected and observed values of points or distributions (or expected and expected values in the case of the double-Mood test), where expected values are based on an extrapolation of the regression line. The two tests, plus an additional one, are described in Joyce Sween and Donald T. Campbell, "The Interrupted Time Series as Quasi-Experiment: Three Tests of Significance" (Evanston, Ill., 1965, mimeographed). (The computer program that utilizes these tests is distributed by the Northwestern University Computing Center as NUC 0049 Timex.)

The first test, the single-Mood test (Alexander Mood, *Introduction to the Theory of Statistics*, New York, 1950, pp. 297–298), is a t-test using a simple least-squares line-fitting technique where the slope of the line is used to "predict" the first value occurring after the quasi-experiment. The standard error is based on pretest variance only. The single-Mood test is appropriate for testing hypotheses regarding the immediate effect of an event.

The double-Mood test extends the logic of the single-Mood test to include both a prechange linear fit as well as a postchange linear fit (see Mood, *Introduction to the Theory of Statistics*, pp. 350–358; and Walker and J. Lev, *Statistical Inference*, New York, 1953, pp. 390–400). The comparison is between two predictions by these two estimates of a hypothetical value lying midway between the last prechange and the first postchange point. The standard error is based on the entire series variance.

An underlying assumption of these tests is that there is no autocorrelation (correlation of errors). Since it rarely happens that errors are uncorrelated in longitudinal studies, Sween and Campbell have determined through Montecarlo simulation the degree of adjustment necessary in the significance level at which one should reject the null hypothesis for various levels of autocorrelation (Sween and Campbell, "The Interrupted Time Series," pp. 11–17).

adapted the quasi-experimental computer program to the IBM 360 at Boston University and completed all the computer runs.

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APPENDIX 2: CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE WHITE FROM THE PREVIOUS SCHOOL YEAR COMPUTED FOR EACH YEAR BEFORE AND AFTER SCHOOL DESEGREGATION

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)
	% Students Reassigned	Court Ordered	Change in % White Students							Major Plan Date	Change in % White Students								Signif. Level	Average Pre-series	Average Post-series	Total Deseg.
School District			−7 Years	−6 Years	−5 Years	−4 Years	−3 Years	−2 Years	−1 Year		+0 Years	+1 Year	+2 Years	+3 Years	+4 Years	+5 Years	+6 Years	+7 Years				
Pasadena, Calif.	98.48	yes		−2.7	−1.5	−1.9	−2.1	−2.0	−2.4	1970	−4.2	−4.5	−2.5*						.01, .05	−1.2	−3.7	100.80
Pontiac, Mich.	83.47	yes		−1.3	−1.0	−3.0	−3.1*	−1.7	−2.4*	1971	−5.4	−.4							.02, .02	−2.1	−2.9	87.09
Berkeley, Calif.	57.72					−2.2*	−2.2	.7	−1.6	1968	−2.2	−.6	−.8	.2	.9				N.S.	−.9	−.3	66.32
Wichita, Kans.	44.36			*	−.8*	−.4	−.4*	−1.0*	−1.0*	1971	−1.3	−1.4							N.S.	−.7	−1.4	56.63
San Francisco, Calif.	42.49	yes			−2.9	−1.2	0	−4.1	−.2	1971	−3.0	−2.1*							N.S.	−1.7	−2.6	46.58
Ft. Wayne, Ind.	34.60				−.4	−.5	−1.6	.2	−1.1	1971	−.8	−1.0							N.S.	−.7	−.9	34.00
Waukegan, Ill. (el.Schl's)	31.72	yes				−1.3	−3.5	−7.8	−1.1	1968	−1.8	−1.9	−1.1	−1.0	−1.9				N.S.	−3.4	−1.5	31.72
Denver, Colo.	24.64	yes				−1.3	−1.4	−1.5	−.6	1969	−1.5	−2.4*	−1.4	−2.0*					N.S.	−1.2	−1.8	29.77
Providence, R.I.	24.10									1967		−2.0	.2	−.2*	−1.7*	−1.0			a	a	−.9	36.00
Riverside, Calif.	21.40							.7	−.6*	1966	−1.5	−1.2*	.9	−2.2*	−1.0	−1.4	−1.5		N.S.	−.1	−1.1	38.20
Las Vegas, Nev.	19.24	yes					.3	−.6*	−.6*	0	1972	−.8							a	−.2	−.8	30.05
Evansville, Ind.	15.77	yes		−.1*	−2.2		−.3	−.1	1.2*	−.3*	1972	−.7							a	−.8	−.7	29.57
Muncie, Ind.	15.10						.3	−.9	−2.6	1.9	1972	−.3							a	−.1	−.3	15.10
Stamford, Conn.	13.20				−2.6		−1.3*	−.8	−1.8*	−1.8	1970	−1.5	−.9	−1.5					N.S.	−1.7	−1.3	21.42
Niagara Falls, N.Y.	11.76							*	−.4*	−.6	1970	−1.3	−.5	−.7					N.S.	−.5	−.8	30.26
Sacramento, Calif.	11.10	yes							*	−1.3	1966	−.2	1.2	−.3*	−1.0	−1.1	−1.1	−1.0	a	−1.3	−.5	19.98
Oklahoma City, Okla.	10.82	yes							−2.2	−1.1	1968	−1.6	−4.9	−1.2*	−.4	−1.6			N.S.	−1.7	−1.9	11.50
Saginaw, Mich.	9.60						−2.6	−.5	−.6	−2.3	1972	−2.2							a	−1.5	−2.2	9.60
Grand Rapids, Mich.	9.40										1968	−3.1	−.8	−.3	−1.8	−2.2*			a	a	−1.6	10.16
Springfield, Mass.	9.10						−1.8	−1.8	.9*	−3.7*	1968	−1.3	−1.9	−2.7	−2.2	−2.0*			N.S.	−1.6	−2.0	23.05
Ann Arbor, Mich.	9.00								−.5		1965	−.1	−.1	−.9	−2.3	−.6	−.8	−1.1	−1.2*	a	−.5	−.9	15.48
Lexington, Ky.	8.91										1967		.2	0	−.4*	−.3	−.4			a	a	−.2	9.66
Baltimore, Md.	7.92			−6.2	−1.5	−4.0	−1.0	−1.1	−.9		1971	−1.1	−1.1						N.S.	−2.5	−1.1	7.92
Tulsa, Okla.	7.83	yes		−.1	−.2	−.4	−4.8	−.1	−.6*		1971	−.5*	−1.9*						N.S.	−1.0	−1.2	14.36
Peoria, Ill.	7.83										1968	−.8	−.9*	−1.0*	−1.1*	−1.4*			a	a	−1.0	15.86
Cambridge, Mass.	7.30		−.6	0	−.1	−1.8	0	−1.2	−.9		1972	−.9	2.0						N.S.	−.7	.6	7.30
Lansing, Mich.	7.18					−.2	−.6	−1.1	−2.2*		1969	−.7	−1.8*	−1.4	−2.1*				N.S.	−1.0	−1.5	22.54

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APPENDIX 2: CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE WHITE FROM THE PREVIOUS SCHOOL YEAR COMPUTED FOR EACH YEAR BEFORE AND AFTER SCHOOL DESEGRATION (CONT.)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)
			Change in % White Students							Major	Change in % White Students									Average	Average	
School District	% Students Reassigned	Court Ordered	−7 Years	−6 Years	−5 Years	−4 Years	−3 Years	−2 Years	−1 Year	Plan Date	+0 Years	+1 Year	+2 Years	+3 Years	+4 Years	+5 Years	+6 Years	+7 Years	Signif. Level	Pre-series	Post-series	Total Deseg.
Racine, Wisc.	6.80							−1.1*	−.4*	1967	−.5	−.4	−.7*	−.8	−.1	−.9			N.S.	−.8	−.6	12.30
Tacoma, Wash.	6.50						−.7	−.7	−.3	1968	−1.4*	−.6*	−.9	−.9*	−.1				N.S.	−.6	−.8	9.44
San Bernardino, Calif.	5.10						−.9*	−.1	−.7	1970	−.8	−1.3	−.5						N.S.	−.6	−.9	7.10
Minneapolis, Minn.	4.90			−.6	−.4	−1.5	−1.0*	−1.3	−1.0*	1971	−1.5	−1.3							N.S.	−1.0	−1.4	11.16
Waterbury, Conn.	4.80							−2.4	−1.3	1970	−.9	−1.7	−.5						N.S.	−1.9	−1.0	4.80
Rochester, N.Y.	4.30			−2.4	−2.5	−1.6	−3.0	−2.8	−2.4*	1971	−3.3	−3.1							N.S.	−2.4	−3.2	5.16
Seattle, Wash.	4.14		−1.0	−1.1*	−1.5	−.6	−.8*	−.9	−1.6	1971	−1.5	−1.1							N.S.	−1.1	−1.3	10.25
Dayton, Ohio	3.20								−.6	1969	−1.1	−1.4*	−2.0	−2.0					a	−.6	−1.6	3.96
Buffalo, N.Y.	3.20									1967	−2.5	−4.0*	−1.3*	−1.3*	−1.2	−2.2			a	a	−2.1	5.79
Warren, Ohio	2.80								−.5	1969	−.7	−.3	−.5	−.9					a	−.5	−.6	2.80
St. Paul, Minn.	2.57									1965		*	*		−1.0	−.5	.7	−.5	a	a	−1.3	6.77
South Bend, Ind.	2.50							−1.3	−1.0	1970	0	−1.2	−.9		(less decline than expected)				N.S., .05	−1.2	.7	3.80
Rockford, Ill.	2.40								.7	1969	.9	−1.3	−.6	−1.1					a	.7	−.5	2.40
Flint, Mich.	2.39						−3.5	−1.5*	−2.0	1971	−2.9	−1.7*							N.S.	−2.3	−2.3	3.69
Syracuse, N.Y.	2.20						−2.6	−1.4	−1.7*	1967	−1.9	−1.8*	−1.7	−2.0	−1.7	−2.0*			N.S.	−1.9	−1.9	3.65
Colorado Springs, Colo.	2.10							.4*	−.3	1971	−.1	−.2							a	.1	−.1	2.30
Indianapolis, Ind.	2.02	yes			−1.3	−1.0	−.2	−1.4	−1.7	1970	−1.1	−1.9*	−1.7*						N.S.	−1.1	−1.5	3.06
New York, N.Y.	1.76				−2.0	−1.9	−1.8	−1.6	−2.2	1964	−2.6	−2.9*	−2.0*	−3.0*	−2.9*	−3.3*	−2.3*	−1.4	−1.3	.02,N.S.	−1.9	−2.4	7.67
Pittsburgh, Pa.	1.44							−.3	−.5*	1968	−1.7	−.5*	−.5*	−.4	−.8	−.8*			N.S.,.02	−.4	−.8	3.18
Toledo, Ohio	1.20								−4.3	1969	−.5*	.2	−1.0*	−.2					a	−4.3	−.4	1.37
Waterloo, Iowa	1.91							−.6*	−.4	1971	−.6	−.4							a	−.5	−.5	2.25
Gary, Ind.	1.30									1967		−2.2	−1.6	−1.3	−2.4	−1.5*			a	a	−1.8	1.64
Milwaukee, Wisc.	1.10		•				−.3	−2.4	−.3	−2.5	1972	−1.9							a	−1.4	−1.9	2.02
Louisville, Ky.	.83						−.9	−1.2	−1.0	−.5	1972	−2.2							a	−1.9	−2.2	.83
Des Moines, Iowa	.82								*	0*	1969	−.1	−.4	−.3	−.6				a	0	−.4	1.10
Los Angeles, Calif.	.66							.2*	−1.5	−1.8*	1971	−1.6	−1.5						a	−1.0	−1.6	1.56
E. St. Louis, Ill.	.29										1967		−3.7	−2.5*	−4.2	−4.3*	−4.4		a	a	−3.8	.73
Kansas City, Mo.	.26						−2.4	−1.9	−2.7*	−1.6	1969	−1.8	−1.6	−1.9	−2.3*				N.S.	−2.1	−1.9	.44
Detroit, Mich.	.25						−4.5	−1.8	−1.9	−1.9	1967	−1.3	−1.9	−2.8	−2.0*	−1.2*			N.S.	−2.5	−1.8	.26
San Diego, Calif.	.19							−1.2	−2.0		1967	−5.6	.1	−.5	−.2	−.4	−1.3		N.S., .01	−1.6	−1.3	.19
Chicago, Ill.	.17						−1.4	−1.4	−4.9		1968	−3.7	−1.6*	−1.5*	−2.0	−1.8*			N.S.	−2.5	−2.1	.46
Philadelphia, Pa.	.02		−2.0	−3.0	−1.0	−3.3	−1.4	−.9	−1.1		1972	−.1							a	−1.8	−.1	.02
Hartford, Conn.	.01						−3.8	−3.7	−2.5		1968	−3.6	−4.7	−3.7	−1.9	−2.3			N.S.	−3.3	−3.2	.01

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APPENDIX 2: CHANGE IN PERCENTAGE WHITE FROM THE PREVIOUS SCHOOL YEAR COMPUTED FOR EACH YEAR BEFORE AND AFTER SCHOOL DESEGRATION (CONT.)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)	(15)	(16)	(17)	(18)	(19)	(20)	(21)	(22)
			Change in % White Students								Change in % White Students									Average	Average	
School District	% Students Reassigned	Court Ordered	−7 Years	−6 Years	−5 Years	−4 Years	−3 Years	−2 Years	−1 Year	Major Plan Date	+0 Years	+1 Year	+2 Years	+3 Years	+4 Years	+5 Years	+6 Years	+7 Years	Signif. Level	Pre-series	Post-series	Total Deseg.
Control Group:																						
Akron, Ohio	0						−1.0	−1.0	−1.0	–	−1.0	−.7	−.9	−.5	−1.1				a	−1.0	.8	0
Albany, N.Y.	0								−3.1	–	−1.8	−2.2	−1.1	−2.1	−1.1				a	−3.1	−1.7	0
Albuquerque, N.M.	0									–		−1.3	−.3	−.5	−.4				a	a	−.6	0
Boston, Mass.	0						−1.4	−.3	−1.5	–	−3.9	−2.5	−1.9	−2.6	−1.9				.05, .01	−1.0	−2.6	0
Camden, N.J.	0									–	−4.4	−2.7	−2.3	−2.8	−1.8				a	a	−2.8	0
Charleston, W. Va.	0									–	.1	−.2	0	−.1	.1				a	a	−.0	0
Cleveland, Ohio	0									–	.2	−1.2	−1.0	.1	−.3				a	a	−.4	0
E. Orange, N.J.	0									–	−4.7	−3.9	−3.2	−3.4	−2.6				a	a	−3.6	0
Erie, Pa.	0									–	−.3	−.7	−.6	−.2	−.9				a	a	−.5	0
Hamilton, Ohio	0									–	−.2	−.2	.3	−.2	−.2				a	a	−.1	0
Jersey City, N.J.	0									–	−3.9	−2.1	−2.9	−1.0	−2.0				a	a	−2.4	0
Kansas City, Kans.	0									–	−3.3	−1.6	−.9	−2.0	−1.7				a	a	−1.9	0
Lima, Ohio	0									–	−1.3	−1.5	−.5	−1.4	.6				a	a	−.8	0
Omaha, Neb.	0									–	−1.3	−.6	−.1	−.5	−.6				a	a	−.6	0
Newark, N.J.	0							−3.0	−2.2	–	−2.7	−2.9	−.9	−2.0					N.S.	−2.6	−2.1	0
Santa Monica, Calif.	0									–	.1	−.6	−2.1	−.6	−.9				a	a	−.8	0
Trenton, N.J.	0									–	−4.1	−2.2	−1.9	−1.8	−.9				a	a	−2.2	0
Utica, N.Y.	0									–	−1.3	−.6	−.7	−1.4	−.5				a	a	−.9	0
Washington, D.C.	0				−2.3	−1.9	−1.8	−1.4	−1.5	–	−2.1	−.6	−.5	−.6	−.4				N.S.	−1.8	−.8	0
Portland, Oreg.	0						−.6	−.3	−.2	–	−2.5	−.9	−.6	−.9	−1.1				.02, .01	−.4	−1.2	0
Passaic, N.J.	0									–	−7.8	−2.6	−3.7	−3.4	−2.4				a	a	−4.0	0
Paterson, N.J.	0									–	−3.8	−3.1	−3.9	−2.3	−1.5				a	a	−2.9	0
Phoenix, Ariz.	0									–	−1.4	−1.1	0	−1.2	0				a	a	−.7	0
Wilmington, Del.	0						−3.0	−2.3	−3.4	–	−3.9	−7.1	−3.9	−1.3	−1.8				N.S.	−2.9	−3.6	0
Youngstown, Ohio	0									–	−.1	−2.0	−1.4	.4	−1.6				a	a	−1.1	0
Springfield, Ill.	0									–	−.5	−1.1	−.5	−.4	−1.0				a	a	−.7	0

*Additional desegregation implemented.
N.S. = not significant.
a = unable to compute.

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APPENDIX 3: BOSTON'S PHASE I AND PHASE II DESEGREGATION (1974 AND 1975)



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An Autopsy of Collective Security

EARL C. RAVENAL

A logical analysis of the inherent contradictions that lie at the root of the concept of collective security leads to pessimism about the establishment or maintenance of this form of international system. Particularly, the essential condition of collective security—concert—and the essential function of collective security—enforcement—are not only improbable in themselves, empirically, but are arrayed in a logical contradiction, one with the other.[1]

"Collective security" is the salient feature of a distinct type of international system, one which might become an object of the foreign policy of nations. International systems can be identified, defined, and differentiated in terms of three kinds of operational elements: the distribution of power; the mechanisms for regulating or controlling power; and the behavioral "rules" that are internalized by each member of the system and reflected in its foreign policy. Defining international systems in

[1] Of course, in the long history of attempts at collective security and critiques of collective security, most of the individual arguments presented here have been made. My attempt is to put the arguments into a tighter logical framework and to examine them with reference to the prospects for the international system.

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terms of these elements will generate several distinguishable types:[2] (1) a single unitary state or universal empire; (2) a regime of collective security based, at least, on a "concert" of powerful nations[3] or, at most, on a global federation; (3) a world organized into opposed but relatively stable blocs, or semipermanent alliances; (4) a more fluid multipolar balance of power; and (5) a pluralistic system of general unalignment.[4]

The term "collective security" refers to the second of the five alternative types of international system. In this system, the undue aggregation or improper use of power is typically restrained by the assembling of a contrary and "benign" preponderance of power. Thus, "collective security" is both a shorthand description of a type of international system, and an identification of its essential adjustment mechanism.

Some Attempted Revivals

With the world and American policy in flux, several types of international system seem to be accessible and recommend themselves to various policy makers or observers as objects of our national efforts. Some would attempt to repair our alliances, restore American dominance, and reconstruct a more stable version of the bipolar order. The Nixon-Kissinger administration accepted and espoused a kind of balance of power as the actual emerging state of the world and as its preferred philosophy of order. The approach favored here, on strategic as well as moral grounds, is disengagement and restraint, and accommodation to an eventual international system of general unalignment.

There has also been a renaissance of schemes for collective security.[5]

[2] This kind of projective, definitive exercise, of course, generates "ideal types." That is, (1) none of the descriptions that are analytically and synthetically generated completely and minutely describe actual historical or present systems; and conversely (2) certain systems included in the spectrum have never actually existed, and might never exist in the future.

[3] This system was not historically, as is now popularly believed, a "balance of power" –even though its members themselves sometimes described it in these terms. During the brief interval in which it actually functioned (from 1815 until 1822–*not* uninterruptedly throughout the nineteenth century, it was a preponderance rather than an equilibrium of power, and a collusion rather than a competition of states. As such, it represented a proto-League of Nations Council or a proto-United Nations Security Council, as these institutions were originally conceived.

[4] Inevitably this is an arbitrary scheme, both in its restriction and its selection of characteristics. In theory there could be an infinite number of systems, depending on the identification of cutting points; nevertheless there is only a limited number of really differentiable types–particularly in the sense that each type of system might inspire, in its essential members, an equally distinctive foreign policy.

[5] Or at least a nostalgia for this type of international order. See, for example, among others, Charles W. Yost, *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs: Reflections*

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This is an approach that has enjoyed perpetual intellectual support, and exists in a residual organizational form in the United Nations. It is now being revived in a modified and somewhat more sophisticated version. Many such proposals specify a strong world organization, disposing of real military forces or enjoying reliable access to the forces of members, and capable of restraining even the larger nations.

Collective security has been often envisaged, and occasionally historically approximated, globally or regionally. Woodrow Wilson defined it simply: "There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common peace."[6] In more recent times the vision of collective security has had many types of exposition. The archetype is the "Clark-Sohn" plan.[7] This proposal was the basis for the World Federalist Movement, and the nominal basis for the organization, Members of Congress for Peace Through Law—though for this disparate group of lawmakers it is merely a general philosophical orientation.[8] The Clark-Sohn plan remains the contemporary ideal of a collective security system, the definitional standard against which other, partial, approaches are measured.

A recent approach to collective security that is more adaptive to stubborn realities is that of Charles W. Yost.[9] Yost poses as the "ultimate

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on U.S. Foreign Policy Since World War II (New York, 1972); and the statement of Senator Frank Church, "A Democratic Foreign Policy for the Seventies," June 22, 1972, particularly p. 6.

[6] Address to the Senate, January 22, 1917; quoted in Ray Stannard Baker and William E. Dodd (eds.), *The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson: The New Democracy*, vol. II (New York, 1926), pp. 407–414.

[7] Grenville Clark and Louis B. Sohn, *World Peace Through World Law*, 2d rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1960).

[8] It is also the basis of at least one strategy for attaining such a regime: Richard A. Falk and Saul H. Mendlovitz (eds.), *The Strategy of World Order*, 4 vols. (New York, 1966); this work presents essays that illustrate the requisites and concomitants of systemic change. Another work that sums up several practical approaches to collective security, through investigating the implementation and consequences of complete and universal disarmament, is Richard A. Falk and Richard J. Barnet (eds.), *Security in Disarmament* (Princeton, N.J., 1965), particularly Part Two, "The Protection of States in Disarmament," and Part Three, "Security in Total Disarmament."

[9] I take Yost's exposition, in the following discussion, as archetypical of contemporary approaches to collective security. Yost's argument is revealed in his book, *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs*, as well as in an unfolding of syndicated articles, commenting on current political-military events and policy initiatives. (Yost was American ambassador to the United Nations from 1969 to 1971.) Actually he prescribes "four parallel elements." The first is simply the more realistic and moral conduct of foreign policy by each powerful nation state. (One can hardly quarrel with this prescription.) The second is "an association of developed democracies" (p. 200). Yost admits that such an "imperial league of democracies" can never be enough, and that this scheme might lead to an Orwellian tripolar world or become a "rich man's

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objective" "a single universal political structure," "an eventual world federation," with a "central executive and parliament with overriding powers in those areas where the unrestricted license of one sovereignty could jeopardize the tranquillity and welfare of all sovereignties."[10] Most essentially, such an organization must have "sufficient preponderant military power to prevent large-scale violence."[11] There would be other functions, of course, but these are not of the essence of this type of organization. "This," says Yost, "is precisely what the United Nations was created to be"; and he would affirm the Security Council's "authority" and "obligation" to *impose* settlements.[12]

Proponents of this alternative typically state their case in terms that are both prescriptive and predictive: A system of collective security is not only the sole alternative to universal disaster, but a state of affairs toward which the world is actually moving, driven by the same factors that create the need. As Yost puts it: "It would seem to follow the grain of history that all these unions, together with those peoples still accidentally disunited, might eventually merge into a single universal political structure, polymorphous and flexible but sufficiently integrated to preclude civil war and to cope with intolerable overloads of either affluence or deprivation."[13] Thus the argument incorporates the logical necessity of union and the empirical theory of integration—two elements in the kind of "requisite analysis" that characterizes proponents of authoritative international organization.

The notion of collective security is not merely a potentiality, an ideal system; it has actual historical precedents—though, significantly, they were all brief, and approximate, and probably the result of other motives and pressures that drove the participants. Such an international order was certainly a serious object of American foreign policy at certain critical times. For example, "at the end of World War II the United States once more became the leading exponent of an international security system

club" (pp. 202–204). The third element in Yost's structure is "peaceful collaboration among superpowers." Yost hopes this will stop short of a "concert of two, three, or five great powers, including one or both of the Communists" (p. 204); he intends here only modest, individual, ad hoc agreements such as limitations of arms. But, as we shall see, a "concert" of all the great powers is the very foundation of his fourth element, which is a universal federation of states, engaged in an enterprise of collective security. By being so eclectic in adapting his case for collective security to reality, Yost seems to be trying to amalgamate the features of several elements–to have, literally, the best of all worlds. But, since the tendencies of several of these elements are contradictory, they should inspire a *choice*, rather than a superimposition.

[10] Ibid., p. 223.

[11] Ibid., pp. 223–225.

[12] Ibid., pp. 186, 221.

[13] Ibid., p. 224.

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transcending the classic system of countervailing alliances. This time it supported the concept of a concert of great powers to make the system of collective security work."[14] The seriousness of the American attitude toward international organization and collective security was manifested in the context of anticolonialism in its treatment of the Dutch-Indonesian nationalist conflict between 1945 and 1949. In retrospect, it may have been this instance of adherence to the ideal of collective security, rather than the more ambiguous and accidental response to Korean conflict,[15] that marked the zenith of American interest in this system. Of course, the underlying basis for such a system—the continuing concert of the victors of World War II—had eroded several years before. Thus, it is fair to say that collective security was the object of American foreign policy from about 1944 to about 1947 (or even 1948), giving way gradually to a stance which increasingly promoted, and reflected, an international system of bipolar confrontation of blocs. A previous period of American commitment to collective security, even briefer and less pervasive, though more fervent, had been the policy of Woodrow Wilson, from a few months before intervention in 1917 to the congressional rejection of the League and Wilson's incapacity in the fall of 1919.

In both these postwar cases, the salient fact was the double coincidence of the target of collective security with the aggressors of the previous wars, and the underlying concert of nations with the alliance of the victors. In the wake of such general conflicts as the Napoleonic wars or World Wars I and II, two conditions prevail that are virtually essential to the fact, or the illusion, of collective security: (1) The victorious powers are momentarily in concert; this provides the basis for equating their provisional coalition to a disinterested concern for universal order. (2) The defeated powers are, by consensus of the victors, clearly labeled the "aggressors." But of course this situation does not last.

The definitive condition for a regime of collective security is the delegation by nations of vital political-military powers to an international agency, or, at least, to a generally disinterested supranational political will. (This "agency" could even be a condominium of powers, if it is understood that the powers have residual and transcendental responsibility for world order, beyond their own specific and immediate interests.) Conversely, there are many kinds of international organization

[14] Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, 1968), pp. 33–34. Osgood later describes this regime as a "condominium."

[15] See my later discussion of the circumstances of Korea. The Indonesian conflict, and the role of the U.N. Security Council and the United States, are reviewed in Evelyn Colbert, "The Road Not Taken: Decolonization and Independence in Indonesia and Indochina," *Foreign Affairs* (April 1973).

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that do not subsume security responsibilities.[16] But the mere existence of such functional international organizations, performing nonsecurity activities, does not define the international system; and such organizations have no necessary implications for the continuation of the nation-state because they do not transcend the mere regulation of international transactions. Only the delegation of the *security function* (1) achieves, on the systemic level, a distinct structure of the international system, and (2) constitutes, on the national level, a distinct strategy for attaining world order.

The animating idea of collective security is that each outbreak of aggression will be suppressed, not by a partial alliance directed specifically against certain parties, but by a universal compact, binding *all* to defend *any*. Neutrality is explicitly—usually formally—abjured. Although, conceptually, collective security can be regarded as a limiting case of collective *defense* (in the sense that it represents a universalization of a military alliance—an alliance of all members against, potentially, each), and though, historically, these two kinds of regimes have coincided for limited periods, the two modes of international organization are quite distinct and have widely differing consequences.[17] Collective security is the essential function of a distinct structure of international system; collective defense, or the contracting of bilateral or multilateral security pacts, is an instrument available to states in systems of bipolar confrontation or multiple balance of power.[18]

[16] A typology of international organizations is presented in Lynn H. Miller, *Organizing Mankind: An Analysis of Contemporary International Organization* (Boston, 1972). In terms of Miller's dimensional categorization [to paraphrase it roughly, (1) universal or regional and (2) conflict management (either pacific or enforced) or welfare (either cooperative or integrative)], I characterize the type of organization that represents a *structural transformation* of the international system as: universal, conflict management (enforced). This definition of international organization links it with the type of international system to which it is appropriate.

[17] See the classic differentiation of these two concepts by Arnold Wolfers, *Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics* (Baltimore, 1962), particularly chap. 12, "Collective Defense versus Collective Security," p. 181ff. The confusion has been compounded by the fact that, in its early days, NATO, the typical case of collective *defense*, was occasionally characterized as collective security: "It is directed against no one; it is directed solely against aggression." (U. S. Department of State memorandum, quoted in Robert W. Tucker, *The Just War* (Baltimore, 1960), p. 55n. Some organizations (such as the Organization of American States—OAS) may have a dual function: internally collective security, and externally collective defense.

[18] Curiously, collective security can also be regarded as a limiting case of the multipolar balance of power. The ideal balance of power is utterly flexible, and is indeterminate in the possible application of the collaborative and constructive discipline of force in the interest of the maintenance of the system—that is, against a transgressor (not necessarily an aggressor) who threatens to subvert the interna-

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To make the judgment that a regime of collective security—*as a type of international system*—is empirically probable, or has actually been attained in the past, no mere citation of a number of successful exercises of collective enforcement is conclusive.[19] The critical points are whether one can *predict* action by an international agency to repress or punish any significant aggression, whether nations can *rely* on such action to the extent of delegating or pledging their essential security powers to such an agency, and whether each nation can *expect* all others to support exercises of collective enforcement even if they contradict those other nations' immediate interests. Using such criteria, the attainment of collective security, as an international regime rather than a sporadic exercise, seems remote.

Concert and Enforcement

The eroding bipolar system of contending blocs could, in theory, have been transformed in either of two directions. (1) There could be greater collaboration of the formerly contending powers, possibly leading to a condominium that would underpin a system of collective security. This could occur through the firmer installation and thicker institutionalization of detente. There would be a proliferation of partial but essentially structural agreements pertaining to security and codifying the relative political and military situations of the major powers and their conduct toward other nations and toward threats to the stability of the international order. Later there would be more pervasive and extensive in-

tional order by agglomerating an excess of power or territorial dominion. Of course, in the typical balance of power system, there will be two opposing, however temporary and provisional, alliances or, more properly, coalitions or alignments. And also, neutrality will be a licit option for a state, though the mechanisms of coalition-building will tend to discourage neutrality. But still, the limiting case of that situation–clearly not impossible of realization–is "the rest" against the one. Thus the disposition of a balance of power system to operate in that way, if necessary, makes it close, in that extreme ideal case, to a system of collective security. Several analysts have noted some affinities between balance of power and collective security systems; see, for example, Quincy Wright, *The Study of International Relations* (New York, 1955), p. 163; and Inis L. Claude, Jr., *Power and International Relations* (New York, 1962), p. 9. Wright considers collective security as the institutional perfection of balance of power, Claude as a more advanced point on a continuum of central power and authority.

[19] Ernst B. Haas, *Collective Security and the Future International System*, Social Science Foundation, University of Denver, monograph (January 1968), presents a thorough tabulation and classification of instances where the United Nations has acted effectively–even in disputes "involving" a major power (over one-third of such exercises were effective). The cases are classified in terms of the power distribution of the international system, the type of consensual system that prevailed (this is the intervening variable), and the nature of the disputants and thus the type of issue.

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stitutionalization, both incorporating and transcending the structure of existing international organizations. There are some pieces of evidence (the various bilateral arms control agreements, the frequent and semi-regular summit meetings, the Nixon-Brezhnev Declaration of Basic Principles of May 29, 1972, and the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of June 22, 1973) that elements of this process have begun, in fragments and haltingly, and by no means irreversibly.[20]

(2) A more apt description is that the international system is being transformed, through the actions of the United States and the behavior of other powers, in the other direction; that is, toward a multipolar balance of power. (There are also those who advocate, in various forms, the repair and strengthening of a sort of bipolar dispensation in the world.)[21] If we regard the international system as evolving toward more multipolarity and less coordination, then the alternatives for the international system appear to be between a multipolar balance of power that is reasonably stable and orderly and a further disintegration toward a fragmented, disorderly, and generally unaligned system. Such alternatives would exclude collective security (and bipolar confrontation).

It is characteristic of proponents of collective security to opt for, and also to predict, an evolution of the international system through increasing specific cooperation among adversaries leading to general detente and, eventually, an underlying concert—whether formal or not—that might support a universal regime of authoritative management and restraint of power. It is the confluence of the objectives of all possible major rivals (who would be adversaries in several other types of system) that makes—and, historically, has made—collective security possible. Thus, such a concert is both the limiting case and the minimum condition of a collective security system.

Indeed, the classic arrangement of power of the years that succeeded the Napoleonic era has often been mischaracterized as a "balance of power." It was actually a concert, or an embryonic and hardly institutionalized system of collective security.[22] The mischaracterization is not only

[20] Indeed, various reports indicate that Soviet proposals and drafts, both for SALT I, in July 1970, and for the Agreement on the Prevention of Nuclear War of June 1973, attempted to institutionalize a condominium by providing for joint Soviet-American intervention to forestall or punish breaches of order. *The New York Times*, July 22, 1973.

[21] Examples would be the Trilateral Commission (composed of nongovernmental representatives of the United States, Europe, and Japan), Atlanticists such as Eugene V. Rostow [see his *Peace in the Balance: The Future of American Foreign Policy* (New York, 1972)] and perhaps those opponents of detente and subtle balance of power maneuver such as Senator Henry Jackson.

[22] The Concert of Europe, founded on the Quadruple Alliance and the Holy Alliance

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understandable; it is authoritative, since the architects of the 1815 treaty themselves mentioned a "balance of power" as the specific objective of their alliance; and British Prime Minister Canning, after leading his country out of the Quadruple Alliance in 1822, retrospectively described the abandoned concert as a "balance of power."[23] Even the secretary-general of the United Nations, in the wake of the United States summits with China and Russia (in February and May 1972), warned *against* "a concert of great powers," as if this would be antithetical to collective security.[24]

There seems to be no historical exceptions to the necessity of concert as a condition for collective security. The United Nations intervention in Korea in 1950, though it was celebrated as an exercise of collective security *without* the necessary concert of all the great powers, did not really meet the requisites of that description. It could be argued that it *was* actually a result of a concert of powers, but a truncated concert, produced accidentally by the temporary absence of the Soviet Union from the Security Council.[25] Or even this intervention, or "police action,"

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of 1815, has been correctly classified, in its first phase (1815–1822) as a regime of collective security, by Robert E. Osgood, *Alliances and American Foreign Policy* (Baltimore, 1968), pp. 22, 27: "In its ultimate form, this function of an alliance (international order) becomes collective security. In different ways, the Quadruple Alliance after the Napoleonic Wars and the OAS have exercised this function of maintaining order. Before the onset of the cold war, the United States expected the Big Three, as the core of the United Nations, to be guarantors of a new world order. . . . The Concert of Europe . . . might be called the first modern experiment to form an organization for international order–a forerunner of the League of Nations and the United Nations." The affinity between collective security and concert has also been remarked by Ruth B. Russell, "The Management of Power and Political Organization: Some Observations on Inis L. Claude's Conceptual Approach," *International Organization* (Autumn 1961), 630–636.

[23] Though the resulting system of nations retained elements of collective security, it did evolve into a more typical balance of power. The breakdown of the Concert in the 1850s, the rise of Prussia, and the advent of Bismarck and his more dynamic, flexible, and unprincipled diplomacy ushered in the most characteristic balance of power since the mid-eighteenth century. This fluid balance, in turn, hardened into the semifixed alliances that opposed each other at the beginning of World War I.

[24] The error in Waldheim's formulation was exposed by Stephen S. Rosenfeld, "Mr. Waldheim's Year at the U.N.," *Washington Post*, December 15, 1972: "But at the same time, unremarked, he saluted the emerging promise of great-power consensus in the Security Council. A contradiction? No, he smoothly insists, consensus is good but should not lead to domination; small countries' rights must be respected; the U. N. is the proper place to adjust the blend."

[25] Three resolutions were introduced by the United States, on June 25, June 27, and July 7, respectively: (1) declaring a breach of the peace by North Korea and demanding its withdrawal; (2) requesting members to assist South Korea in repelling the attack; and (3; placing members' forces under a command led by the United States. The only

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could be characterized ambiguously as support for world order and resistance to communist expansion. In other words, it was as much an early exercise in bipolar confrontation (that is, collective defense) as it was a late—perhaps the last—exercise in collective security.

So, although the Korean action apparently symbolized collective security, it actually signaled its demise. What was attempted by the United Nations after Korea—including the Middle East, Cyprus, and Congo operations—was not collective security in the essential sense of the term.[26] Participation in these actions and their funding was selective, or members of the peace-keeping forces withdrew at critical moments of challenge. And one or more of three serious requisites of collective security were lacking: the operations were not coercive, or did not discriminate between aggressor and victim, or did not deal with the large powers or their immediate proxies (as opposed to merely their favored local forces). Thus, these peace-keeping operations did not constitute a definitive test of the essential properties of a collective security system.

The cause of the failure of this essential function of authoritative supranational organization is clear and inescapable, and cannot be remedied by administrative adjustments or voting formulas or Charter revisions.[27] It is the absence of an implicit concert among the essential powers in the international system, a concert sufficient to support collective coercive enforcement in significant cases. The problem does not lie in any particular institutionalization of collective security; it inheres in the logic of all systems of collective security. The very notion of a concord

power whose adverse vote would have constituted a veto, the Soviet Union, had absented itself from meetings since January 13, 1950, in protest against the refusal to seat the delegate of the People's Republic of China.

[26] In an analogous way, the Congo intervention by the United Nations in 1960–1961 was hailed as a demonstration of the executive powers of the secretary-general and the autonomy of a supranational organization under a strong Secretariat, exercising initiative and invoking the support of the General Assembly. But it was, rather, an apogee and an illusion. By its very brilliance of improvisation (tactical, administrative, political, and legal) in the face of political obstruction, it ensured that a reaction by the disadvantaged great power would preclude its replication. The "troika" initiative by the Soviets, to emasculate the office of the Secretary-General, though it failed in its technical form, succeeded as a permanent warning and a limitation on the ambitions of any incumbent.

[27] The most frequently proposed revision (with the possible exception of weighted voting in the General Assembly) is the restriction of the veto of the great powers in the Security Council. But this requirement is like Aesop's fable about the mice belling the cat: The procedural reform has the same liability as the substantive situation which the procedural reform is designed to remedy. Most proposed formal revisions are not so much remedies themselves as the implementation of remedies. They usually beg the questions they purport to address.

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of great powers sufficient to repel and punish significant aggression is a contradiction between the two essential, and yet mutually incompatible, conditions for a regime of collective security: concert and enforcement. This contradiction goes to the heart of the improbability of this form of international system and this kind of international organization: the essential members—the great powers—do not, and cannot, police each other. To the extent that they did, they would transform the system into something else. And yet, if the system is not operative in its most challenging case, it simply rests on the accidental and momentary confluence—or absence—of interest of the major powers.

History and present reality support this abstract analysis. A less categorical, and more empirical, way of describing the defect of this kind of system is to say that it is fragile. Such systems, in fact, would fail their first serious test, simply because, one way or the other, whether the system ignored or responded to the challenge, it would have failed. Indeed, the United Nations is founded on the institutionalized exemption of the essential powers from the operation of the enforcement system.

Not only is there an inescapable contradiction between the necessary elements of concert and enforcement, but in fact each element, taken separately, does not exist in sufficient measure. First, since World War II there has never been the requisite collaboration among the essential powers. The United Nations was based on the hope, not the fact, of implicit collaboration between the United States and the Soviet Union. And now, in the present multipolar context, especially with Peking in the Security Council, the positions among the great powers on vital issues are even less reconcilable.[28]

[28] For a thorough discussion of Chinese behavior in the United Nations, including their attitude toward the great-power veto, see Samuel S. Kim, "The People's Republic of China in the United Nations: A Preliminary Analysis," *World Politics* (April 1974). It is true, as Kim points out, that "functional paralysis in the Security Council resulting from Chinese overkill with the veto has failed to follow the ominous scenario projected by many of Peking's antagonists." But the very presence of Peking has added another axis of conflict among the essential powers; it has stymied the occasional possibility of Soviet-American coordination in the U. N., since the Chinese have explicitly dedicated themselves to representing the Third World against such collusion of the two "superpowers." And the Chinese presence has complicated enormously the possibility of arriving at an agreement on a regime for the use and exploitation of the seas and the sea-beds.

And the U.N. General Assembly, which was a refuge for the United States in the decade and a half after the Soviet return to the Security Council in late 1950, has become a body in which a preponderance of third- and fourth-world activism is resisted, in a last-ditch stand, by the United States and a handful of medium-size Western states. Note the debates on Israel, the exclusion of South Africa, the redistribution of the world's resources.

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Second, the reasonable assurance of thorough and impartial enforcement depends, at least, on the implementation of "the agreements envisaged in Article 43 of the Charter by which the great powers and other states were to make available to the U.N. the necessary forces and facilities for checking threats and punishing breaches of the peace."[29] This original militant and ambitious vision of collective enforcement was articulated by Ralph Bunche in his Nobel lecture of December 11, 1950:

> To make peace in the world secure, the United Nations must have readily at its disposal, as a result of firm commitments undertaken by all of its members, military strength of sufficient dimensions to make it certain that it can meet aggressive military force with international military force, speedily and conclusively. . . . Unfortunately, there may yet be some in the world who have not learned that today war can settle nothing, that aggressive force can never be enough, nor will it be tolerated. If this should be so, the pitiless wrath of the organized world must fall upon those who would endanger the peace for selfish ends.

This formulation, proposed in the midst of the unique and ambiguous United Nations operation in Korea, was both an anachronism and a contradiction. It enshrines the dual illusion that the great nations will act in disinterested concert and that aggression can be clearly attributed. The functions it predicates upon a universal peace-maintaining organization could more appropriately be attributed to a military alliance in a world of bipolar confrontation.

The concept of "peace keeping" grew out of the inevitable stalemate of enforcement, and out of an appreciation of the anomaly of applying force—which, in a system still composed of sovereign states, equates to war—to secure peace.[30] (Indeed, peace keeping is designed to obviate the issue of enforcement.) There may well be scope for peace-keeping operations of many types, including fact finding, mediation, truce supervision, and temporary administration; cooling and interposition; denun-

[29] The quotation is from Yost, *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs*, p. 182. Of course, such a delegation of power and dedication of forces could not be revocable. Another requisite is that "host" nations could not exercise the veto they have generally held over a U.N. military force (the 1974 Middle East disengagement supervision forces were, during their specified tenure, an exception, since they were removable only by a vote of the Security Council).

[30] Peace keeping received its definitive statement in the Address of Secretary-General U Thant to the Harvard Alumni Association, June 13, 1963: "There has been a tacit transition from the concept of collective security, as set out in Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, to a more realistic idea of peace-keeping. The idea that conventional military methods–or, to put it bluntly, war–can be used by or on behalf of the United Nations to counter aggression and secure the peace, seems to be rather impractical."

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ciation of regimes and coercion short of armed force.[31] But peace keeping is not equivalent to the practice of authoritative, coercive collective enforcement. One would have to conclude that the prospects for collective security, in its strict and essential sense, as a possible international system, are dead.

Improbability and Undesirability

Calls for the establishment of world government or the perfection of the collective security mechanism, and for the adoption of these states of affairs as objects of American foreign policy, are based typically on two premises: (1) the serious, even desperate, "need" of the world for more effective, humane, and fair dispensations; and (2) the postulated satisfactory operation of such a system. The notions of world government and collective security are attractive as ideals. It is correspondingly unattractive to oppose either—as long as they assume their own attainment and perfect operation.

But these are precisely the points that are most debatable. We are not, after all, comparing utopias. We must consider, as part of a scheme of international order, (1) the conditions under which—if at all—such a regime could be attained (in other words, whether such a regime is available), as well as (2) the conditions that would prevail if such a regime were to come into being (in other words, whether such a regime is desirable).

Unfortunately, most of the calls for effective world government or authoritative peace enforcement merely codify needs; or, if they go beyond this, postulate solutions without indicating what it would cost to get "from here to there." This approach can be called "requisite analy-

[31] These categories are paraphrased from Alan James, *The Politics of Peace-Keeping* (New York, 1969). For a discussion of the possibilities of United Nations peace keeping, see Larry L. Fabian, *Soldiers without Enemies: Preparing the United Nations for Peacekeeping* (Washington, D. C., 1971). Fabian defines peace keeping as consensual, noncoercive, and impartial. These, of course, are virtually the opposites of the characteristics of collective security operations as originally envisaged. Moreover, peace keeping depends on the initiative of the Secretariat rather than the Security Council, and involves middle and smaller powers rather than the large powers, except for logistical and technical support. See also Inis L. Claude, Jr., "The Peace-keeping Role of the United Nations," in E. Berkeley Tompkins (ed.), *The United Nations in Perspective* (Stanford, Calif., 1972). Claude notes the *decline* of peace keeping as a function of the United Nations after the contentious experience of the Congo operation. And for a detailed description of peace-keeping operations, see Rosalyn Higgins, *United Nations Peacekeeping, 1946–1967* (London, 2 volumes, 1969, 1970); and David W. Wainhouse et al., *International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads: National Support–Experience and Prospects* (Baltimore, 1973).

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sis": The realization of certain values (in this case, security or even survival) in the face of certain situational factors (science, technology, a shrinking world) *requires* a certain kind of international order, and in turn the fulfillment of certain conditions (authoritative and powerful universal institutions, and the subordination to them, in critical aspects such as security, of lesser sovereignties such as nation-states).[32] Requisite analysis is the typical mode of reasoning of most policy science. But it poses the wrong kinds of questions. We should be asking, rather: (1) What are the costs of trying to achieve a certain state of the international system? (2) Why do we think the situation is sufficiently amenable to our control or influence? (3) What, in addition to the specific things we "must" do, will it cost to gain the leverage and access that equate to control and influence? (4) What would happen if we did not make the attempt? Could we live with the situation as it would be? (5) If we were to invest in an attempt to achieve a certain state of the international system, what other things would be precluded that might be useful hedges against the failure of this attempt?

Especially in situations where power is diffused and real interests are opposed and intractable, the requisite approach is fruitless; it becomes simply a fond and self-validating wish-list. Circumstances call for a different methodology and a different rule of conduct, one that would discern the tendencies and constraints of the system and seek to adjust to them, rather than investing much in trying to alter them. In short, we might have to "do" with less than we "need."

Even if an international regime of collective security could be achieved, there is the question of whether its operation would be justifiable. There have been two kinds of criticisms of such a regime. The first is that it would be a consortium of powerful nations that stifled opportunities even for peaceful change, and certainly for revolutionary change. This has been the line of criticism of the Marxists.[33] But this view of collective

[32] A few samples of this kind of logic and rhetoric can be taken from Yost, *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs*, pp. 195–197: "The new conditions created by science during the past thirty years can no longer be successfully met by traditional methods for the conduct of foreign affairs among nation-states. . . . New institutions are required and will have to be created. . . . Obviously we must begin with what we have and mold it as rapidly as we can into what it needs to become." Requisite analysis also characterizes most arguments for interdependence, giving them an air of circularity: interdependence (complex relationships of mutual and common vulnerability) requires still more interdependence (collaboration in common institutions and cultivation of cross-cutting relationships).

[33] N. Gordon Levin, Jr., *Woodrow Wilson and World Politics: America's Response to War and Revolution* (New York, 1968), p. 30, paraphrases Lenin's attitude toward the League of Nations: "So far as Lenin was concerned, the concept of the unity of international-capitalism was conceivable of realization in only one of two forms:

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security as a mechanism for the repressive enforcement of the peace settlement in the interest of the victors, has wider support. Elihu Root argued, with reference to Article 10 of the League Covenant: "If perpetual, it would be an attempt to preserve for all time unchanged the distribution of power and territory made in accordance with the views and exigencies of the Allies in this present juncture of affairs."[34] Even partisans of the League recognized that it embodied a contradiction between its function as "executor for the victors" and its function as "an organ of reconciliation."[35]

The rare and brief historical impositions of collective security bear out the main outlines of this criticism. The Concert of Europe was avowedly restorationist, reactionary, and repressive. One purpose and effect of the League of Nations, if it had been fully implemented, and of the United Nations (which is not restorationist), was to ensure the policing of the defeated powers and the stabilization, if not the containment, of Marxist revolution. In fact, the cement of regimes of collective security, and the condition that allows their installment, is the fact that they can be a committee of victors and yet claim universality and thus the status of an international *system*, since for a brief historical moment the opponents and outcasts are regarded as nonnations.

The second objection to any possible regime of collective security is that it demands—at least in theory—disinterested, indiscriminate, and unbounded response. Disinterest is the conceptual opposite of neutrality; collective security thus could be the most general ground for intervention—a standing invitation to risk one's own security in some irrelevant or unfavored cause.[36] This principle was recognized by Woodrow Wilson

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either as a temporary union of many capitalist states in military and commercial alliance against one or two others, or as a union of major capitalist powers for the purpose of destroying a revolutionary-socialist state." In addition to direct citation of Lenin's writings, Levin also cites C. Dale Fuller, "Lenin's Attitude Toward an International Organization for the Maintenance of Peace, 1914–1917," *Political Science Quarterly*, 64, No. 2 (June 1949), pp. 245–261. Levin himself characterizes the League as combining the perpetuation of the alliance of victors for the repression of the defeated powers with the construction of a new international regime, liberal-democratic, potentially universal, but implicitly opposed to the spread of revolutionary forces–in other words, both anti-imperial and antirevolutionary.

[34] Quoted in Philip C. Jessup, *Elihu Root*, 2 vols. (New York, 1938), vol. II, pp. 392-393.

[35] The phrase is by Alfred Fabre-Luce, *Locarno without Dreams* (1927); quoted in J. B. Duroselle, "The Spirit of Locarno: Illusions of Pactomania," *Foreign Affairs* (July 1972), 759.

[36] The concept of neutrality (1) does not condemn aggression, (2) does not strive to repress violence in the system, (3) abstains from conflict (each nation for itself), and (4) sanctions and protects this status in international law. On the contrary, the Char-

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and, characteristically, asserted as a virtue: "The central idea of the League of Nations was that States must support each other even when their interests were not involved."[37] It was also recognized by "limited internationalist" opponents of the League and considered a cardinal defect.[38] Since participation in a system of collective security entails (1) implicit involvement in conflict and (2) open-endedness of occasions for involvement in conflict, the result, for a participating nation, would be wider exposure to intervention and yet weaker control over the conditions for intervention.[39]

Since a system of collective security entails collective enforcement and is omnidirectional in its orientation to threats and breaches of the peace, it must be energized by the identification and attribution—sincere or tendentious—of "aggression." But the same objective differences that divide the nominal members of the collective security system will make a travesty of this process. In a real crisis, attributing aggression would become technically meaningless, legally diffuse, and practically counterproductive. (It is for these reasons that the more recent emphasis on peace keeping seeks to avoid this attribution.) The attempt at collective enforcement would divide a world organization and produce aggravated conflicts, or desperate appeasement of dissatisfied powers, or untenable bluffs undone by untimely separate peace initiatives, uncoordinated strategies, and embarrassing refusals to meet force contributions.

An individual member nation, if it were to take seriously the injunc-

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ter system is based on (1) identification and condemnation of aggression, (2) collective repression, and (3) the requirement and (4) the legal obligation that all nations join in enforcement. Neutrality seeks to reduce the exposure of an individual nation to conflict in the system through preserving the option of abstention, but allowing violence in the system. Collective security intends to accomplish this through reducing violence in the system precisely by compelling collective enforcement.

[37] Remarks at the Council of Four meeting of April 22, 1919; quoted indirectly in Arthur S. Link, *Wilson the Diplomatist* (Baltimore, 1957), p. 240.

[38] Link makes this point in reverse: "All the limited internationalists opposed any such approval of the treaty as would commit the United States unreservedly to such a system of collective security as the Covenant of the League had created. . . . A system of collective security that is world-wide in operation is not likely either to work or to endure the strains that will inevitably be put upon it, because in practice . . . no nation will go to war to vindicate Article 10 unless its vital interests compel it to do so" (ibid., p. 136).

[39] The only way to reconcile these conflicting demands on national policy is to retreat into the tautology of perfect deterrence. As Link paraphrases Woodrow Wilson: "In answer to critics who had argued that unconditional affirmation of Article 10 would involve the United States perpetually in war, Wilson replied by attempting to demonstrate that future wars would be virtually impossible and almost unnecessary if the collective security provisions of the Covenant implementing Article 10 were observed and enforced by the members of the League" (ibid., p. 143).

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tions of a collective security system and internalize them as national policy, would have to generate popular support on moralistic grounds, playing on the attribution of aggression. Once generated, this type of support would be hard to direct and control, or to turn off. The peculiar demands of collective security would create the least manipulable hostilities, the least reversible commitments. Yet the irony is that collective security, designed to be free of national interest, is supposed to be the most flexible system of all. Certainly collective enforcement would be a cumbersome instrument, in contrast to the discretionary and precisely graduated application of force required by a balance of power policy.

The questions of availability and desirability of collective security are linked, operationally, in the conditions for its establishment and functioning, and in our willingness, and that of other nations, to make the necessary investment. If the goal of an international regime of collective security will never command the investment, then it cannot really be a policy, no matter how unarguable it may be as a need, or how attractive it may be as a remedy.

The Durability of the Nation-State

Inevitably, the case for supranational organization stresses the obsolescence of the nation-state. In the words of Charles Yost: "The idea of nationhood . . . is at the height of its power and the beginning of its decline. It is the most stupendous of political anachronisms, the most contemporary and the most archaic of systems of government. . . . The nation-state system . . . is now too parochial, too clumsy, too competitive and too unscrupulous to serve us safely any longer."[40]

But, in their assault on the nation-state, proponents of a federal world typically mistake the phenomenon of political community—the nature of loyalty, the conditions of trust, the limits of delegation, the bases of legitimacy. These identities and relationships are not supranational. If anything, they tend to be *sub*national; indeed, the nation-state might be their *highest* practicable expression (even if, in fact, many present "nations" are artificially divided or composed). These proponents also typically ignore the fact that the basic functional referent for political unity, and the basic subject of political delegation, is *security*—precisely the matter they wish to remove irrevocably into the hands of a supranational—thus a "foreign"—entity. In fact, the objective distrust of "other" communities forms the practical limit of political delegation.

This touches on the peculiar significance of a political community and

[40] Yost, *The Conduct and Misconduct of Foreign Affairs*, p. 211.

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the "legitimacy" of its government, and the reason why the definition of political community turns primarily on the delegation of the *security* responsibility. Economic interdependencies or welfare efficiencies are not a sufficient condition for international integration; they do not necessarily spill over, or translate, into political community. In fact, welfare enhancement and efficiency might not even be necessary conditions for the integrity of a political community and the legitimacy of its government. Legitimacy, to be operationally defined, must be seen as residual: It is the capacity of a government to elicit a response from its community (1) beyond the calculation by that community, or its constituent parts, of immediate cost-benefit, welfare, or utility (though there might have to be, in the much longer run, general faith in some net utility, and thus some rough balancing of costs and benefits); and (2) beyond the threat or application of pure coercion. Similarly, the operational test of the bounds of a political community is its willingness to delegate to a particular government (but to no other) the ultimate responsibility for its security, and the willingness of each constituent of the community to submit to taxation or conscription (without fine or instant or individual calculus of cost-benefit) to support the security of all constituents. (For the purpose of this definition, it does not matter at all that a national government cannot in fact—as no government, literally, can any longer—protect the physical security of its community.)[41]

The tight and stubborn notion of national community might have its ironies and pose its supreme dangers; but it is the essential political fact, and must be taken into account by designers of international systems and foreign policies. An authoritative international organization would be a serious threat to individual state governments, which in various ways and degrees serve and represent their communities, and to which these communities, explicitly or implicitly, delegate the functions and responsibilities of security and welfare.

In the last analysis, though the problems and disasters might well be the product of nation-states, the solutions might also have to be within the powers of individual nation-states. Universal government and collective security, though perhaps "required," are not available, in the sense of being attainable through our efforts; even if they were, the costs and the consequences would not be bearable or desirable.

[41] A corollary of this definition is that it not only is useless, but might be meaningless, for one nation, say in its recognition policy, to try to go "beyond the exterior to determine whether [another] government was legitimate, or politically moral, as well as constitutional in form or *de facto* in authority" (the novel tests devised by Woodrow Wilson and applied to Mexico and the Bolshevik regime in Russia; described in Link, *Wilson the Diplomatist*, p. 20.)

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Comment on "An Autopsy of Collective Security"

INIS L. CLAUDE, JR.

While I find much to agree with, and even more to admire, in Professor Ravenal's article, the emphasis of this comment will inevitably fall upon points of disagreement.

All discussion of collective security is plagued by difficulties stemming from the diversity of definitions of the concept. Ravenal has taken admirable care to state his own definition, but he has not thereby escaped those difficulties. His mistake, as I see it, lies in his lumping world federation with collective security as the preferred version of his second type of international system, in his five-part typology.

I object, first, on logical grounds. Global federation seems to me a form (indeed, most theorists' preferred form) of world government, a governmental alternative to the order-without-government scheme that I think is the essence of collective security. Hence, it appears that world federation should be listed under Ravenal's first, rather than his second category, or at least treated as an intermediate type, tucked between the two. The important thing is to distinguish it from, rather than to identify it with, collective security.

I object, secondly, on historical grounds. Wilson and other early advocates of collective security rejected world federation and considered their scheme a distinct alternative; equally, theorists of world federal government have rejected collective security and considered their scheme a dis-

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tinct alternative. It is conceivable that Ravenal's logic of categorization is superior—he is certainly entitled to assert that claim—but that is not the point; he sets out to analyze and criticize the historic doctrine of collective security, and this requires that he react to the doctrine that *has been*, not to his own version of the doctrine that *ought* to have been in vogue. Otherwise, some of his rapier thrusts bring forth not blood, but straw. This, I believe, is exactly what has happened.

The most notable outpouring of straw occurs in the concluding section, "The Durability of the Nation-State," where Ravenal criticizes—most effectively, in my view—the notion of the obsolescence and the advocacy of the demise of the nation-state. He believes that his critique applies to collective security as well as to world federalism—i.e., to both segments of his second type of international system. I disagree; the case for supranational organization, with its assault upon the nation-state, has itself been developed in reaction against and set forth as an alternative to collective security. Federalists have considered collective security inadequate precisely because it neither anticipates nor promises to bring about the drastic reduction of the role of the nation-state in the international system. Ravenal's criticism is applicable to the critics rather than the proponents of collective security. As for the latter, they have purported to offer a way to make the multistate system work, not a scheme to accomplish its structural transformation.

My other major criticism relates to Ravenal's thesis that there is an inherent logical contradiction between collective security's requirement of concert and its function of enforcement. The author, indeed, seems never quite to decide whether collective security involves a mere condominium of the great powers or a concert of all the states constituting the international system; consequently, the issue of the potential target of collective enforcement is not clearly resolved. If he means to suggest that there is a contradiction between assuming that all states will remain in harmonious relationship with each other and expecting that some states will become deviants to the extent of requiring collective enforcement actions, he is, of course, correct. But this is a gratuitous attribution of simple-mindedness to theorists of collective security. Collective security assumes a concert that occasionally becomes a concert-minus-one-or-a-few; it relies upon the expectation that, in any given situation, most states—enough to constitute a preponderant force—will remain loyal to the system and will act upon the belief that their interests require them to join in suppressing a challenge to the order of the system. In today's world, this expectation may be false—I believe that it is—but I detect no logical contradiction in the scheme. *Every* system of law and order prescribes obedience to rules and provides for the contin-

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gency of disobedience. Whether we are considering the familiar municipal legal system or the international scheme advocated by theorists of collective security, the fact remains the same: no system for the maintenance of order *needs* to work unless some violators of rules are likely to appear, or *can* work unless most of its members obey and support the effectuation of its rules.

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Environmental Preservation and Politics: The Significance of "Everglades Jetport"

ROBERT S. GILMOUR
JOHN A. McCAULEY

Early in 1970, the Nixon administration announced what John Volpe, then secretary of transportation, called an "extraordinary agreement" between federal, state, and local officials halting construction of a massive international jet airport adjacent to Florida's Everglades National Park. President Nixon hailed the accord as "an outstanding victory for conservation." Less than two years later, after an inconclusive search for a new jetport location and powerful prodding by Senator Henry Jackson, chairman of the Senate Interior Committee, and newly elected Florida Senator Lawton Chiles, President Nixon again made a major pronouncement for the entire Everglades ecosystem. On November 23, 1971, the president formally proposed legislation matching the Chiles-Jackson effort to acquire 547,000 acres of drainage land surrounding the original jetport site, thus creating "Big Cypress National Freshwater Preserve."

These two governmental actions—first a presidential project veto, then a bipartisan legislative initiative—spared Everglades National Park yet another powerful human threat to its existence. In this case, massive developments attracted and generated by a major airport's economic accelerator would probably have struck the final blow to surviving rem-

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nants of the Everglades' ragged ecostructure. These decisions also demonstrated the fundamental changes that have gradually taken place in the political structure of environmental policy making. Traditionally, the "pork barrel" system of politics determined the scale and timing of virtually all major public works projects, easily withstanding the occasional outcries of conservation groups. But a vigorous alliance of preservation-minded organizations has demanded and won nearly total victory.

Water, Ecosystems, and Super Jets

Historically, the jetport is just another problem in a long series of difficulties which have confronted Everglades National Park and which continue to endanger its existence. Although the presence of a massive jet airport facility would present a variety of threats to the survival of the park's ecosystem, it would primarily menace the water supply of the Everglades. To survive in its present form, the park must have an adequate amount of water of a certain minimum quality supplied over a regular period of time annually.

Three interconnected drainage basins—the Okeechobee, Everglades, and Big Cypress—define an ecosystem which occupies roughly 70 percent of the coastal lowland of southern Florida. Highest elevations in this basically flat area are about twenty feet above sea level, sloping gently from Lake Okeechobee to Florida Bay and the Gulf of Mexico, a distance of approximately 100 miles, and allowing for a runoff of about one-half mile per day. A simplified but fundamentally sound understanding of this phenomenon would picture water leaving Lake Okeechobee in the north, then flowing gradually southward across the shallow "river of grass" (a 4000 square mile area of saw grass with occasional island "hammocks" of tropical hardwoods), and finally arriving at the sea coast three or four months later via the brackish mangrove swamp at the southernmost perimeter of Everglades Park. This ancient process extends the period of wetness (the hydroperiod) in the park and, consequently, supports a unique web of life there, including abundant flora and fauna such as the anhinga, alligator, and the roseate spoonbill, which are rare or unknown to the rest of North America.

Interposed, to some extent, between the "headwaters" of Lake Okeechobee and the National Park is Big Cypress Swamp. This area of approximately 1200 square miles consists of mixed cypress, pineland, wet prairie, and large areas of marsh and stunted cypress, where the water table is above ground level much of the year. Big Cypress was to be the site of the new jetport.

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The controlling factor in the entire ecosystem is a timely supply of sufficient quantities of suitable water. Indeed, the very development of this extraordinary area has been a natural response to the historical presence of a consistent and cyclical supply of water. Contemporary human development of south Florida has already altered drastically both the cycle and the ecological system it supports. In the words of Stewart Udall's Overview study of the jetport proposal, "The remarkable natural structure of the Everglades ecology, held in creative balance for 5000 years, has been dealt, in little more than 70 years, a series of heavy blows."[1]

When Congress authorized establishment of the Everglades National Park in 1934, the fact that the park's boundaries did not include a self-sufficient ecosystem, if it was even considered, was not regarded as a problem. Dikes and canals established up to that time did not interfere to any dangerous degree with the supply of water to the park. Since then, however, construction of an elaborate drainage system in what is now known as the Central and Southern Flood Control District has made the park directly dependent upon external political entities for its water supply, and thus its survival. During the long and damaging drought of 1962–1965, Everglades officials learned at first hand that Army engineers in cooperation with the Florida Flood Control District (FFCD) could and would shut off the park's very lifeblood in time of water shortage. Moreover, as agricultural, commercial, and residential development continue outside park boundaries, long-term prospects for the Everglades water supply are not optimistic. To this long-standing dependency of the park on the Army Corps of Engineers and on the state conservation district managers to the north, the proposed jetport added the threat of water contamination and further possibilities of damaging noise and air pollution.

South Florida's Transportation Crisis

In the geological trough of south Florida, the Everglades ecosystem is sandwiched between the increasing urbanism on the limestone and sand ridges of the east and west coasts. The constantly increasing flow of tourists to strip cities of Florida's "Gold Coast" caused a continuing transportation crisis. Despite the planned expansion of Miami International Airport, it was estimated in the mid-1960s that air traffic would reach the saturation point by 1973.[2] To the west, growing Gulf Coast

[1] The Overview Corporation, "Beyond the Impasse: The Dade Jetport and the South Florida Environment," December 10, 1969, p. 20.

[2] Later estimates pushed this date back to "about 1980 and no later than 1985." "Jetport: Somewhere Something's Gotta Give," *Miami Herald*, November 19, 1971.

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cities remained well to the rear in their bids for northern tourist dollars, but eagerly hoped to create a transportation crisis of their own.

In addition to actual or hoped-for increases in tourism, pressure for air transport expansion in south Florida has been disproportionately high because of increases in southern transoceanic service. Moreover, Miami is a turn-around or end-of-line location for many domestic carriers, some of which have established extensive maintenance and pilot-training operations in the area. Finally, as the airlines industry and local officials looked to the future, Miami offered a promising American location for supersonic transports because of its over-the-water approach and take-off advantages.

The need, then, for expanded airport facilities in south Florida rarely was denied. Even the staunchest opponents of the Everglades jetport site at Big Cypress Swamp admitted that the basic proposal was an excellent one. As Gary Soucie, chairman of the Sierra Club's Everglades Committee put it, "The idea of starting out when land is cheap—with something huge—is the way all airports should be planned." Prior to the president's veto of the site, the jetport controversy focused on *where*, not whether, to build an airport.

Selection of the Jetport Site

General plans to locate a major training airfield somewhere in the Southeast were developed by the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) as early as 1952, but site deliberations went unresolved during the 1950s and early 1960s. In 1965, the "Miami Urban Area Transportation Study" by the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) focused attention on south Florida as the location for training facilities and a possible new airport. By that time Miami International was beginning to experience the effects of overcrowding, while training flights accounted for almost one-third of MIA's total operations.

Airport and aviation aspects of the HUD study were relegated to the FAA, which initiated a three-county search for an appropriate training site. After considering various alternatives, FAA officials and members of the Air Transport Association and the Dade County Port Authority (DCPA) jointly concluded in April 1966, "that the best location would be in the vicinity of Monroe Station, probably just north of U.S. 41 (Tamiami Trail)."[3] No public mention was made that the site might be utilized as a second major south Florida airport until nearly a year later when, on February 7, 1967, the Port Authority announced its proposal

[3] Dade County Port Authority, "Dade-Collier Airport Site Selection and Approval and Training Airport Development," FAA and DCPA, dated May 3, 1966, p. 2.

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for an airfield *"which can ultimately be used as a supplemental air transportation and aviation-space facility . . . ."*[4]

When the DCPA made known its intentions, it was clear that the site selection and the further plans for development had won the support of airlines, pilots, and Dade County Commissioners, as well as that of the FAA. However, neither the Flood Control District nor the National Park Service had been consulted, even though the proposed site would have been located wholly within FFCD Conservation District No. 3 and directly adjacent to Everglades National Park's northern boundary. The Dade County Port Authority evidently regarded both of these conservation areas simply as fortuitous assets, guaranteeing against future human development and complaining citizens. Instead, officials of the Flood Control District were "unyielding in their refusal to permit uses of these lands for airport purposes."[5] Within a month, plans for the first site fell through.

Following this setback, the DCPA and other interested parties rapidly renewed their examination of alternative sites, including some well to the west of their original choice, necessarily involving Collier County in subsequent negotiations. During this period the Park Service made repeated attempts to gain access to the selection process so that its interests would be taken into consideration. These attempts were unsuccessful, except at the national level, where the service was assured by the FAA that "no action will be taken without coordination with NPS."[6] In early November 1967, Dade and Collier County authorities announced that a thirty-nine square mile Big Cypress Swamp tract straddling their mutual county line had been selected as the airport site. The tract was located just six miles north of the Everglades preserve, but park officials first learned of the agreement in the morning *Herald*.

It soon became clear that the scope of the project had moved far beyond that of a mere training facility. Barely two months after announcement of a new site, Deputy Director Richard H. Judy of the Port Authority wrote eleven airlines that "long-term plans include the possibility of eventually instituting passenger activities, aircraft manufacturing and an air college."

Throughout this phase, controversy surrounding the jetport proposal was confined to a very small number of contenders at a rather low level of visibility. At this juncture the affair offered a rather clear example of

[4] Dade County Port Authority, "Report on the Need for Transition Training and Supplemental Airport," File A, February 7, 1967.

Dade County Port Authority, "Final Site Recommendation and Report," File A, February 15, 1968, p. 11.

[6] National Park Service, U. S. Department of the Interior, "Jetport," Internal Document, undated, p. 4 (mimeo).

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what Theodore Lowi and others have termed the *distributive* pattern of political decision making.[7] According to this model, various governmental authorities such as the Bureau of Land Management, Army Corps of Engineers, or the congressional rivers and harbors subcommittees serve as the veritable quartermasters of a great American dispensary of land, forests, mineral rights, radio frequencies, air routes and fares, and countless public projects. Working in tandem, a resource or public works agency and its corresponding set of congressional committees constitute an independent "subsystem" or "subgovernment" along with its clientele of private interests. Corporations and individuals situated to take advantage of these opportunities offer themselves in "the public interest" to construct new railroads and airports, clear swampland, unearth minerals, harness rivers, and, in short, to turn the wheels of American "progress." Such patronage in the distribution of a presumably unlimited cornucopia of natural assets is the very essence of pork-barrel politics.

In almost classic fashion, the Dade County Port Authority had come as a claimant before the Federal Aeronautics Administration to receive public funds for a new airport. The major airlines and other business interests that hoped to benefit from the project were carefully consulted by the DCPA while they waited eagerly in the wings for project approval and funding. Everglades Park officials and National Park Service executives in Washington did voice concern about the jetport's potential danger to the Everglades ecology, but they found themselves well outside this "subsystem" of communications and decision making. Moreover, the Park Service's "lead time" required for completion of its own studies of jetport's environmental impact corresponded roughly with the time needed by developers to begin construction. Ground-breaking ceremonies were held at the Big Cypress Swamp site in September 1968.

Enlarging the Scope of the Conflict

So long as decisions on the jetport's site location and related considerations remained primarily in local hands, tightly held by a relatively small number of participants, the Dade County Port Authority was in an excellent position to overwhelm latent opposition to the project and to control specific policy outcomes. Supervisors and scattered defenders

[7] Theodore J. Lowi, "American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies, and Political Theory," *World Politics*, XVI (July 1964), 677–715; Theodore J. Lowi, "Four Systems of Policy, Politics, and Choice," *Public Administration Review*, XXXII (July–August 1972), 298–310. See also Grant McConnell, *Private Power and American Democracy* (New York, 1967), pp. 196–245.

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of Everglades National Park had little leverage. Local conservation groups (traditional weaklings in south Florida politics) could also be ignored. The result might simply have been the construction of the jetport and its gradual enlargement if one participant had not instinctively recognized that "scope" in the political contest was crucial. As E. E. Schattschneider has written:

> The outcome of all conflict is determined by the *scope* of its contagion. The number of people involved in any conflict determines what happens . . . when the scope of the conflict is multiplied. . . . (1) There is a great possibility that the original contestants will lose control of the matter. (2) A host of new considerations and complications are introduced and a multitude of new resources for a resolution of conflict becomes available; solutions inconceivable at a lower level may be worked out at a higher level.[8]

It was the chairman of the Central and South Florida Flood Control District, Robert Padrick, who successfully elevated the issue to national attention, despite the fact that the physical site was no longer under his jurisdiction. After being "rudely awakened" to DCPA and State Road Department plans for a jetport transportation corridor passing directly through Conservation Area No. 3 (contrary to DCPA assurances), Padrick wrote to more than 100 conservationists in Florida and around the nation calling on them to "assist us to insure defeat of this abominable proposal." Three weeks later *The New York Times* began national press coverage of the issue.

During December, the Flood Control District began to hold preliminary strategy meetings which were well attended by representatives of numerous concerned interests including the National Park Service and other Interior Department officials, the Florida Governor's Office, and national conservation groups. These meetings were inconclusive in any strategic sense; but by February 1969 two facts had clearly emerged. First, the Dade County Port Authority had no jurisdiction over the most critical threats to the jetport's surrounding environment. The DCPA environmental plans were strictly limited to the thirty-nine square mile tract. Thus, in the absence of any regional planning power, many of the broader questions had no answers at all. Second, despite the lack of information, construction of the new airport facility was already under way.

Subsequent meetings among national and regional conservation groups resulted in formation of the "Everglades Coalition" and in a firm decision to oppose the jetport at its present site. On April 17, the coalition made a statement of intent to Secretary of Transportation Volpe in an unpublished letter:

[8] E. E. Schattschneider, *The Semi-Sovereign People* (New York, 1960), pp. 2–11.

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> The undersigned organizations represent practically the entire conservation and environmental movement of the United States. They comprise together a very large membership. . . . They publish a number of powerful monthly magazines, . . . which will be devoted consistently toward public education on this issue until the matter is resolved favorably to environmental protection. . . . *We would hope that the burden of resolving this conflict would not have to fall upon the shoulders of the President of the United States*, who has other weighty matters to which he must give his attention.[9]

Six days later, having not yet received Secretary Volpe's reply, the coalition held a public meeting and released a similar statement to the press, omitting all reference to the president.

Escalation of the Conflict

In Florida, the coalition's call for a halt in the jetport construction quickly triggered editorial and private rebuttals. The *Ft. Myers News-Press* charged that the coalition's national conservation organization had "gone off half cocked. The objections they raise are not valid and the dangers they apprehend are remote." According to the *News-Press*, "Even if the airport were being built within the vast Park itself [these] effects would be slight, but the jetport is far from the main body of the Park."[10] The Greater Miami Chamber of Commerce labeled the coalition's effort "limited in vision, based on incomplete information and also indicat[ing] an apparent unwillingness to work with local groups toward compromise agreements . . . . "[11]

In an attempt to calm the growing furor, the Dade County Port Authority passed a resolution reaffirming its intentions "to construct the presently planned two-runway system for the operation of a training facility in a manner that will not do irreversible harm to the Everglades National Park or Conservation Area No.3" and pledging to "develop the Dade-Collier Airport as a commercial airport only after it has been

[9] Italics added. Initial members of the Everglades Coalition included the National Parks Association, Wildlife Management Institute, National Audubon Society, Sierra Club, The Wilderness Society, Citizens Committee on Natural Resources, Nature Conservancy, National Recreation and Park Association, United Automobile Workers of America, American Forestry Association, The Wildlife Society, American Fisheries Society, Nature Area Council, Defenders of Wildlife, Anti-Pollution League, Florida Audubon Society, and the National Wildlife Federation. Three additional members joined the Coalition shortly after its formation; Audubon Naturalist Society, World Wildlife Fund, and the American Forest Institute.

[10] "Jetport No Threat to the Park," *Fort Myers News-Press*, April 25, 1969.

[11] DCPA File E, Selected Citizens' and Public Officials' Letters and Other Documents of Interest Concerning the Dade-Collier Airport Site and Training Airport and Possible Future Commercial Facility.

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assured that such a facility would not irreversibly harm the Everglades National Park or Conservation Area No.3."[12]

Members of the conservationist coalition were not so easily assured. Joseph Browder, Audubon's southeastern representative, summed up the coalition's skepticism rather succinctly:

> As things stand, we have the Dade County Port Authority building a training airport in the Big Cypress, promising not to develop it as a passenger jetport until they are ready to do so anyway, sponsoring an environmental plan they admit will not be binding, helping to form a tri-county organization that will have no planning authority over the area in question, issuing conflicting statements about the economic spin-off development expected in the area, and disclaiming any responsibility for such development and its adverse effects on Everglades National Park. . . . if we're going to protect the Park, we'd better move quickly and stop devoting most of our energy to the plan-and-study program being promoted by the Port Authority.[13]

Secretary Volpe's belated response to the coalition noted that the "impressive" union of conservation and environmental organizations on the issue "deserves the highest priority of attention," yet division and brooding conflict over the Everglades jetport were far from resolution at the national level. In a May 14 meeting with Assistant Transportation Secretary James Braman, coalition members reminded the department that the Transportation Act prohibited approval of the jetport without formal findings (1) that there was no feasible alternative to the site selected, and (2) that the project included all possible planning to minimize ecological damage. On this basis, the coalition warned that "further development of this project without compliance to the statutes might be subject to injunction."[14]

On the following day the *Washington Post* revealed that Interior Department officials, though remaining silent, also were "concerned" about potential damage to Everglades National Park, and that they tended to agree with the national conservation coalition. Predicting a possible "head-on collision," the *Post* article argued that development of the jetport had an extraordinary appeal for Transportation because of its enormous runway capacities, adequate to the requirements of "jumbo jets" already in operation and matching projected needs of supersonic planes in the future. "The Department is an avid backer of the SST and is anxious to provide the airfields to handle it . . . . If Transportation presses

[12] DCPA File A, Resolution of DCPA, May 14, 1969.

[13] Interview, New York, N. Y., February 1969.

[14] "Confidential" memo to all members of the Everglades Jetport Group from Anthony Wayne Smith, undated.

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forward while Interior opposes it the fighting could get very rough."[15]

Policy disputes involving powerful national and local interests rarely escape the attention of Congress. Senate Interior and Insular Affairs Committee Chairman Henry M. Jackson needed little prompting to place the blame for jetport problems on a "lack of coordination and cooperation between Departments, Agencies and Committees of Congress." Speaking before the Audubon Society's annual convention, Senator Jackson went on to say, "No one seriously questions that these inconsistent Federal land-use policies and activities have and will continue to detract from the Park's values."[16] Jackson then called his committee into session in early June for an investigation of the entire south Florida water problem.

The Jackson committee hearings generated interest in south Florida's water difficulties, but they also diffused the issue by taking up projects only tangentially related to the jetport—e.g., the enlargement of Lake Okeechobee's storage capacity and the possible creation of a new flood control district. It was the national press and electronic communications media which brought the sharply focused issue of the jetport's environmental threat to widespread national attention. *The New York Times*, in addition to copious news reporting of the issue, ran repeated features and editorials stressing the jetport's threat to Everglades Park. Television contributed frequent coverage on major evening news broadcasts, as well as lengthy features on the special character of the Everglades and the jetport threat. An August article in *Business Week* reported that land prices around the jetport perimeter were up from $200 to over $800 an acre. In a striking picture article in early September, *Life* magazine declared that "the commercial-political-financial establishment of Dade, Collier and Monroe Counties are sweaty with the excitement of a new boom, huge profits, explosive growth."[17] Another picture feature in *Look* magazine asserted that even though there are studies "of the effects of the airport on the environment . . . there is no assurance that the county will be willing to abandon years of ambitious planning even if that is the only thing that will save the Park."[18]

In response to the national pressure of a generally bad press, "save the jetport committees" sprang up in various south Florida chambers of

[15] Spencer Rich, "Clash Seen Over Jetport Plan," *The Washington Post*, May 15, 1969, p. 61.

[16] Senator Henry M. Jackson, in an address before the National Audubon Society Annual Convention, St. Louis, Mo., April 26, 1969.

[17] John D. MacDonald, "Threatened America—Last Chance to Save the Everglades," *Life*, September 5, 1969, pp. 58–66.

[18] Anthony Wolff, "The Assault on the Everglades," *Look*, September 9, 1969, pp. 44–52.

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commerce. Their proclamations charged that outside interests were trying to usurp local prerogatives and that these interests did not realize or care about the economic needs of south Florida.

The Appeal to Science

During June of 1969 three separate groups began intensive studies of environmental problems posed by the new airport. Although scientific evidence on the jetport proposal varied somewhat, expert opinion converged on the need to protect the unique and delicate character of the south Florida ecosystem. In early September the Department of the Interior released its report, "The Environmental Impact of the Big Cypress Swamp Jetport," which was prepared under the direction of Luna B. Leopold and scientists associated with the U.S. Geological Survey. A few days later, a study of even larger scope, supported by private foundations, was issued by the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering, which treated the jetport as only one of the *Environmental Problems of South Florida.* A final report, "Beyond the Impasse," released in December, was commissioned by the Dade County Port Authority and conducted by Overview, a newly organized private environmental consulting firm headed by Stewart Udall, a former secretary of the Interior. Although no one questioned Udall's credentials as a conservationist, it was generally regarded as difficult to maintain an uncompromised position while relying on financing from a vigorous developmental interest such as the Dade County Port Authority.

All three of these studies agreed that the threat of full-scale development of training, cargo, and commercial facilities might lead to serious and probably disastrous environmental consequences. The Leopold report put the case most plainly: "Regardless of efforts for land-use regulation, the result will be the destruction of the South Florida ecosystem. Estimates of lesser damage are not believed to be realistic."[19] After the first two reports were issued, "Secretary of the Interior Hickel and Secretary of Transportation Volpe, in consultation, concluded," in an undated Interior Department press release, "that the impact of a commercial jetport at the present site, together with the development that would follow in the adjacent land area, could destroy the Everglades National Park and the ecology of South Florida."

The question of the training strip remained, and that was a major point of subtle but important difference between each of the reports. The Academies' report concluded: "A training jetport at the present site

[19] U. S. Department of the Interior, "Environmental Impact of the Big Cypress Swamp Jetport," September 1969, pp. 33–35 (mimeo).

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would not pose severe environmental problems provided adequate safeguards were instituted."[20] The Leopold report, while agreeing that a training airport in itself would not present insurmountable ecological problems, asserted that mutually reinforcing social and economic pressures for further development might well override possible administrative controls.

Overview's report went beyond the immediate issue of the training airport, and counseled that, "If conservationists, local, state, and Federal officials are serious about preserving the park and the South Florida environment, then they must face seriously the necessity of acquiring and protecting the Big Cypress Swamp."[21] As to the jetport's selected location, Overview concluded: "Moving the airport site would, at best, prevent an acceleration of the urbanization trend already at work in the Big Cypress . . . ."[22]

Final Confrontation

In October 1969, even before Overview had completed its commissioned assignment, DCPA released some future projections of its own in a report entitled "The Dade-Collier Airport Story." After expressing concern over the "perpetual life of Everglades National Park," this report went on to enumerate three possible stages, the final one envisioning an airport facility capable of handling an annual capacity of 50 million passengers and 1 million aircraft. At this stage, the Port Authority admitted that there might be some development adjacent to the jetport's perimeters. It was argued that such developments would be limited, but the fact was conceded that "Beyond provisions for controlling a 3-mile peripheral strip outside the airport's boundaries . . . the Authority has no control over surrounding development."[23]

Partially in response to this Port Authority vision of full commercial development at the jetport site and partially to continue its pressure on the Transportation Department, the Everglades Coalition—through the National Audubon Society—filed a brief requesting the Secretary of Transportation to make a determination under the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, disapproving the jetport. This was the same action that the coalition had threatened in their first meeting with Assis-

[20] Environmental Study Group to the Environmental Studies Board of the National Academy of Sciences and the National Academy of Engineering, *Report: Environmental Problems in South Florida*, Part II (Washington, D.C., March 1970), p. 2.

[21] Overview, "Beyond the Impasse," p. 41.

[22] Ibid., p. 29.

[23] Dade County Port Authority, "The Dade-Collier Airport Story," File A, October 1969, pp. 1–12.

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tant Secretary Braman six months earlier. This time, however, the urgency of the request was supported by evidence from the Leopold report, by Corps of Engineers plans to establish drainage districts in Monroe County, and by the public pronouncements of the DCPA declaring their intention to continue with the development of a full-scale commercial airport. The filing of this brief could also be offered as evidence that every possible remedy had been exhausted, should the coalition decide to take the Secretary of Transportation to court.

In early December, Secretary Volpe approved the jetport's single runway as a commercial training strip. *The New York Times* then alerted its readers editorially that "The Secretary decided in favor of the more optimistic and less realistic of the two major studies"—the National Academies' report—"which hopefully reported that the strip itself, as distinct from the monster jetport, originally proposed, would be acceptable provided various safeguards were instituted . . . . But the trouble is that the suggested safeguards, however reasonable scientifically, are not politically or socially realistic."[24] At the same time, attentive observers to the controversy were aware that Interior Secretary Walter Hickel had been opposed to the jetport, even as a training facility, from his first public entrance in the dispute.[25] He now was supported by the Leopold report, by seven of his own Interior bureaus, and by the Everglades Coalition.

Presidential Veto and a New Agreement

The conflict between his cabinet secretaries was at least partially responsible for President Nixon's decision to intervene in the role of authoritative arbiter. The prospect of additional Senate hearings on the jetport and south Florida water problems evidently played a part also. John Ehrlichman was then the president's special assistant for domestic affairs and formerly a Seattle lawyer who had specialized in land-use law. Ehrlichman immersed himself in the jetport problem during the summer of 1969. With his staff, he prepared a summary of issues and alternatives and sent them to the president. According to one account:

> Mr. Nixon studied this briefing book in seclusion, as is his habit. Then, at one of their many meetings, the President informed his assistant of his basic decision: South Florida needs a new airport, but it must be located away from

[24] "Dooming the Everglades," *The New York Times*, December 12, 1969.

[25] Recalling his trip to the jetport site during the thick of the controversy, Secretary Hickel wrote, "As we flew over the site, we could see one runway already complete. The potential long-term damage was obvious. . . . I stated at the time, 'If it were turned over to Interior, it would be turned back to nature.' " Walter J. Hickel, *"Who Owns America?* (Englewood Cliffs, N. J., 1971), pp. 97–98.

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> the Everglades to avoid spoiling their natural wonder. The training strip already built near the Everglades must be shut down as soon as another becomes available.[26]

Instead of formally announcing his decision to reject the Big Cypress Swamp site, the president delegated authority to Ehrlichman for superintending negotiations among the Departments of Interior and Transportation and the Dade County Port Authority. In this manner the presidential site veto was allowed to surface as an "agreement" among the contending parties. Since the government's intent to support construction of the facility was not at issue, the questions of location and control were paramount. "The situation," as Joseph Browder, director of Friends of the Earth, saw it, "was that if Dade County cooperated in the relocation, Dade would control the airport and would not lose any money because of the relocation. Behind that, implicitly at least, was the threat that if Dade County failed to cooperate, the Federal Government would still build an airport but it wouldn't necessarily be under Dade's control."[27]

After several months of hard bargaining, the "Everglades Jetport Pact," proudly announced by the president, had been signed by the secretaries of Interior and Transportation, the governor of Florida, and officials of Dade and Collier Counties. The agreement specified the immediate beginning of a search to "relocate the commercial airport site" and continuation of training flights at the Everglades location only "until an alternative site has been agreed upon and acquired without cost to Dade County, and training facilities substantially equivalent to those now existing at the airport have been constructed on the site without cost to Dade County."[28] Construction of new facilities of any type at the initial site was banned. The pact, which was to be effective for three years, carried a warning that it would be terminated if "Dade County is not diligently attempting to locate a site for a regional airport." Even so, many conservationists remained convinced that the danger to the Park was not over.

Political Pluralism and Limited Resources

In part the jetport controversy reflects a major transition in environmental policy making from the distributive politics of the past to the more open and vigorously competitive process labeled "political plural-

[26] *The Wall Street Journal*, January 22, 1970, pp. 1, 17.

[27] Interview, Washington, D.C., June 1971.

[28] Department of the Interior news release, "Agreement Reached to Relocate Miami Jetport," January 15, 1970.

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ism." In no sense have the subsystems of an earlier era been disbanded. Rather, they have been enlarged to include additional federal bureaus; congressional committees and subcommittees; newly organized, contentious and politically well-equipped interest associations; the communications media in its various forms; and a growing number of state and local participants—elected politicians, agency officials, and private group representatives.[29] The crucial factor distinguishing pluralist politics from pork-barrel distributions is that of overt intergroup *competition*. It is this competitiveness that differentiates the enlarged subsystems of environmental power from the "logrolling" modus operandi of their historical predecessors.

The pivotal first condition in broadening these subsystems was the perception that natural resources were no longer unlimited, that one sort of resource use would preclude another, and foreseeable demand would outpace supply. Once it was generally recognized that conservationists' claims were even marginally valid, and once conservation groups had organized on a national scale to articulate their positions and to participate in political life on a sustained basis, it was difficult for established agencies and interests to deny them access to the councils of decision making.

Intense legislative battles culminating in passage of the Granger-Thye Grazing Act of 1950, the Multiple-Use Mining Act of 1955, the Multiple-Use and Sustained-Yield [of national forests] Act in 1960, and the Wilderness Act of 1964 all evidenced changes that had taken place in natural resource subsystems. Increasingly they involved contending coalitions or even formal alliances of resource users that were once independent claimants. Instead of simply considering alternative possibilities for the piecemeal distribution of public wealth, these subsystems now disputed fundamental concepts of resource utilization.

The last bastion of pork barrel resource politics was the distribution of public works projects—dams for hydroelectric power and irrigation, canal and harbor projects, ski area concessions in national forests, as well as airport development subsidies, and many others. Even these became subject to pluralist competitiveness as the limits of environmental wealth became more clearly recognized during the 1960s. Projects once almost universally regarded as a vital means of development and human progress came to be understood in conservationist circles as despoilers of wild rivers, scenic mountainsides, and incomparable wilderness areas such as the Florida Everglades.

Of course, changes in the structure of natural resources policy making

[29] For a more complete account see Robert S. Gilmour, "Private Interests and Public Lands," *Current History*, 59 (July 1970), 36–42, 52.

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altered policy outcomes. In the distributive subsystems, bargains and compromises had taken place between private claimants and those government agents with power to distribute subsidies, resource-use rights, and permits; to authorize project size; to control annual appropriations; and to make cost-benefit ratio calculations. As the assumption of unlimited resources was upset by increasingly visible depletion of natural assets, and as organized competitors for the same resources entered the arenas of decision, policy outputs increasingly emerged as the compromised "residues" of political struggles among claimants, with governmental actors participating more as arbitors (or sometimes, in the case of executive agencies, as overt claimants) than as above-the-battle distributors. In a general sense, however, the substance of resource policy remained in a fragmented and incremental state. Resource decisions had simply joined the mainstream of American pluralist policy making that Harold Lasswell described many years ago: "It begins in conflict and eventuates in a solution. But the solution is not the 'rationally best' solution, but the emotionally satisfactory one."[30] Any serious plan to develop a rational, comprehensive, and national environmental policy was still a hope for the future.

The immediate difficulty presented by pluralist environmental decisions is that of protecting *nonrenewable* resources—wilderness and delicate ecosystems—such as the Florida Everglades. Once such areas are sacrificed to short-term economic advantage, their long-term intrinsic worth and aesthetic values are irretrievably lost. Moreover, pristine wildlands are often the vital links in an interconnected chain of *renewable* resource production. The relationship between wholesale destruction of estuaries (such as the one created by the Everglades drainage system) and the recent declines in ocean seafood harvests is an obvious and poignant example. The importance of undisturbed wild areas as urban watersheds—e.g., the Everglades Biscayne aquifer—now is widely understood. Previously, those interrelationships had been obscured by the protective cover of vastness. The competition-bargaining-compromise basis of pluralist decision making, for all its considerable strength as a consensus builder, is ill suited to the clear-cut choices that are required to protect critical ecosystems.

Veto Politics and Environmental Protection

The striking importance of the Everglades jetport affair is signaled by the unequivocal "no" issued to well-financed and carefully organized development interests, including the port authority of a major trans-

[30] Harold D. Lasswell, *Psychopathology and Politics* (Chicago, 1930), p. 184.

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portation center. The jetport case shows a traditional pork-barrel distributive process for a large public works project that was successfully challenged by conservation and environmental groups. The initial result was the creation of an intense two-sided contest on a highly visible, national scale. The emerging pattern of pluralist politics was in turn supplanted by a new variant—a presidential project veto to ensure more secure means of environmental protection. As a guide to the structural requirements for preservation of similarly threatened areas, the process of decision making for the Everglades jetport is worth careful review.

However subtly employed, the Nixon jetport veto had an impact that was immediate and important. By ruling out one project for environmental reasons, the president forced eager claimants to come to terms quickly and quietly with another, quite palatable alternative. A more forthright application of presidential veto power would probably have achieved the same result, though perhaps at greater political cost to the president. It is also possible that the same veto impact could have been secured by the action of a determined congressional committee or appropriations subcommittee, such as the actions that blocked the Echo Park Dam threat to Dinosaur National Monument in Colorado.[31] Conservationists also have frequently sought redress in the courts for environmental wrongs—that is, a judicial veto.

Prerequisite to any environmental veto action is the need for governmental sanction or subsidy. The Everglades jetport offered a political situation in which a public project required both federal authorizations and funds to continue. These could be successfully denied by a single political participant (the president) or by a small group (a congressional committee or federal court) whose acquiescence in the normal course of legislative or administrative procedure was critical. As if to point up that fact, after the jetport decision, President Nixon vetoed further federal assistance to both the Turkey Point Nuclear Power Station on south Florida's Biscayne Bay and the Cross-Florida Barge Canal.

The practical potential of veto politics in protecting delicate ecosystems and other nonrenewable resources is clearly considerable. Even though the veto is of primary importance only as a negative reaction to proposals for resource exploitation and development, it does offer the possibility of clear-cut ecological protection. A veto system, nevertheless, suffers serious disadvantages as a secure means of long-term environmental preservation.

A successful veto requires both the determined political support and the sustained power of the vetoing agent. Otherwise, the most vigorous

[31] See Owen Stratton and Phillip Sirotkin, *The Echo Park Controversy*, Inter-University Case Program No. 46 (Indianapolis, 1959).

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proclamations amount to little more than what Murray Edelman has termed "symbolic reassurance."[32] Through this mechanism, the aroused fears of the public may be soothed and its attention directed elsewhere, while the initial cause for alarm is unaltered. One recent example of this difficulty is the on-again, off-again veto of the Cross-Florida Barge Canal. Acting on the recommendation of the White House Council on Environmental Quality and on the basis of extensive scientific evidence that the canal would not only destroy the beautiful Oklawaha River but would threaten south Florida's public water supply, the president empounded project funds that had already been appropriated by Congress. On February 4, 1974, less than a year after President Nixon resigned his office in disgrace, Federal Appeals Court Judge Harvey M. Johnson ruled that the president had exceeded his authority by ordering a permanent halt to construction of the canal. Judge Johnsen ordered the administration of President Gerald Ford to release $150,000 for an environmental impact study by the Army Corps of Engineers. Thus the Nixon veto was overruled, and the project was off to a fresh start.

Even a veto that is firmly maintained will not ordinarily end the process of a specific resource-use decision. Instead, it encourages the involved parties to consider immediately parallel alternatives. If the veto action was simply a matter of symbolic manipulation, the original claimants are likely to come up with slightly different but similar proposals to those vetoed earlier in order to maintain their special interests while preserving the symbolism. Where nonrenewable resources are at stake, it is probable that the initial threat to their destruction will remain. Illustrating this possibility, as the search for a new jetport location dragged on inconclusively for many months after the agreement of 1970 was announced, members of the Everglades Coalition were less than astonished to hear repeated hints that site selection insiders still viewed Big Cypress as the "logical site."

A final difficulty with the veto method of environmental protection is its lack of comprehensiveness. Sporadic, even idiosyncratic efforts to save threatened beauty spots, watersheds, and estuaries, however successful and important, are still a long way from an integrated natural resource and environment policy. No matter how dedicated a conservation-oriented president or congressional committee might be, even their most systematic attempts to veto injurious public works proposals and plans involving exploitation of publicly owned resources would hardly constitute a balanced program of ecological preservation and fulfillment of acknowledged economic and social needs.

[32] Murray Edelman, *The Symbolic Uses of Politics* (Urbana, Ill., 1964), chap. 2.

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Beyond Pluralism

President Nixon's announced proposal in late 1971 to acquire 854 square miles of Big Cypress Swamp's natural "treasure-trove" matched in virtually every respect the earlier bill of Florida's Senator Chiles and of Senator Jackson, chairman of the Senate Committee on Interior and Insular Affairs. This new bipartisan initiative ended the lingering fears of Everglades defenders that Big Cypress Swamp would eventually be the jetport site in spite of a presidential order and the agreement that followed. Affirmative action on the proposal proceeded in the slow-moving mechanics of the legislative process until 1974, when Big Cypress National Preserve was enacted by public law 93-440.

The jetport and Big Cypress decisions may yet be relegated to the symbolic level of importance when assessed against other threats to the national and international environment. Nonetheless, these events did touch off an unprecedented political response in Florida that may have set the pattern for similar changes elsewhere. Following the Everglades jetport agreement, a tough and alarming report of the Florida Governor's Conference on Water Management in South Florida, and a severe winter drought in 1971–1972, the Florida legislature established the first serious statewide environmental planning authority, passed a comprehensive land- and water-use act, and set up a referendum authorizing state bonds of $240 million to purchase land areas of "critical concern." Florida's legislative concern for the environment was matched in kind by Vermont's adoption of stringent land-use and development controls in 1971, and by Delaware's state moratorium on all heavy industrial development of its Atlantic coast during the same year. Between 1972 and 1975, Oregon, Idaho, Colorado, and Wyoming, among other states, passed various proposals to zone out unwanted developments and strip mining in particular. In 1974 North Carolina enacted a statewide land-use plan. And in 1974–1975, companion proposals for federal assistance to state land-use planning moved gradually toward acceptance by the House and Senate.

The planning agencies and regulatory commissions implied or already adopted by these proposals and state acts are not new to American political history, nor have their successes been especially noteworthy. More often than not, planners have been rendered ineffective by their distance from "real" policy making or their lack of control over fiscal decisions, and regulators have become largely indistinguishable from the interests they were supposed to regulate.[33]

[33] See especially Marver Bernstein, *Regulating Business by Independent Commission* (Princeton, N. J., 1955).

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In spite of this history, if the threatening projections of population forecasters such as Paul and Anne Ehrlich[34] and world modelers such as Jay Forrester[35] and Donella and Dennis Meadows[36] are correct in even their most general parameters—and there is little reason to suppose that they are not—then national resource and environmental planning will not wait for the twenty-first century. It seems probable that new-style planning and regulatory agencies will decreasingly represent the singular interests of resource-consuming clientele groups. Such agencies would likely be more secretive and elitist in character, and more authoritative than those now known. Yet they may well be the very ones to which a pluralist government turns for comprehensive national control of scarce and nonrenewable environmental resources as well as for occasional vetoes of undesirable local projects.

[34] Paul R. Ehrlich and Anne H. Ehrlich, *Population, Resources, Environment* (San Francisco, 1970).

[35] Jay W. Forrester, "Counterintuitive Behavior of Social Systems," *Technological Forecasting and Social Changes*, 3 (1971), 1–22; Jay W. Forrester, *World Dynamics* (Cambridge, Mass., 1971).

[36] Donella H. Meadows, Dennis L. Meadows, Jorgen Randes, William W. Behrens, III, *The Limits to Growth* (New York, 1972).

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Book Reviews

Breach of Faith: The Fall of Richard Nixon *by Theodore H. White. New York, Atheneum, 1975.—373 pp. $10.95.*

Watchmen in the Night: Presidential Accountability after Watergate *by Theodore C. Sorensen. Cambridge, Mass., The MIT Press, 1975.—xviii, 178 pp. $8.95.*

The Plot that Failed: Nixon and the Administrative Presidency *by Richard P. Nathan. New York, John Wiley & Sons, 1975.—xiii, 193 pp. Cloth, $8.95; paper, $4.95.*

Theodore White asserts that Richard Nixon's true crime was to destroy the myth that binds America to the popular belief that the people will always choose the best person to lead them, who will, in turn, be ennobled by the presidency (pp. 322–324). Perhaps he should have suggested that Nixon did the republic a service by reminding us that power corrupts and that presidents are not demigods. But White is so much a believer in the idealization of the presidential office as the sole hope of national fulfillment that he cannot even conceive of such a question.

The inability of American liberals to deal with original sin is manifested in White and Sorensen's books. They still want to join power to virtue much as did those who wrote about the presidency before Vietnam.

White puts his case in rapturous tones: "Only the President can put it all together. . . . Only the President can make national policy which is at once moral, wise and workable. . . . All of which means that the office has become one in which greater and greater power has to be concentrated" (pp. 338–339). Such power is not only secular, it also has a "priestly function" which is to guard the faith that the president is pure (p. 339).

Sorensen, unlike White, has learned something from Vietnam and Watergate. He knows that it has been a great mistake to idealize presidents and the

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presidency or to grant too much automatic power to the president. He is a celebrant of the pluralism of society and government which requires a president to struggle for influence and to lead by persuasion and compromise. Sorensen still sees the president as the chief agent of right action in government but he has stripped away the illusions of Camelot.

White and Sorensen may be right. Perhaps only the president can "put it all together." But this is scarcely a comfortable thought unless one knows how to render presidents accountable. A falling back on the model of pluralistic politics, as Sorensen does, makes it difficult for the president to "put it all together." Sorensen is content with the politics of struggle in which the president is not guaranteed influence over any decisions. Richard Nathan raises the question of whether such a model is adequate for the problems ahead. Nathan suggests that the model of pluralist bargaining which has permeated thinking and writing on the presidency is shallow and asks us to consider the Nixon efforts at reorganizing the executive branch as necessary and proper for giving the president the power which his authority promises him.

We thus have a double-edged problem. If the presidency is the chief source of virtuous national action then we are faced with the choice of giving the president great latitude in the use of power and seeing it abused or we can hobble the president and see virtue go unfulfilled.

In *Breach of Faith*, a history of the Nixon presidency in the retrospect of Watergate, White shows us again that he is a good reporter and descriptive writer but a poor analyst of institutions. He nicely pieces together the record of illegalities to show that the new administration began to break the law early in its tenure and thus set the course of events with tragic finality. He analyzes the presidential tapes to plausibly suggest that Nixon vacillated and refused to act decisively on closing out the cover-up in the spring of 1973 until it became too late and he was trapped. We are persuaded that Nixon had convinced himself that he had done no wrong and had come to believe his own version of events.

White, however, fails to analytically explore the themes he develops. It is an alarming picture of the mechanisms of control of a president that his own chief of staff must do him in when the senior cabinet officers and Republican party leadership will do nothing. White does not explore this question of why there was such limited peer-group pressure on the president. For example, he describes Nixon's meeting in the cabinet room with the Republican congressional leadership on his next to last day and tells us that "almost all were crying, as if at a death in the family" (p. 31). What is this hold that the presidency has on our symbolic loyalties which makes it so difficult for us to unseat a leader?

White never analyzes the truth of the myth of the presidency as ennobling the incumbent. He tells us that the very atmosphere of the White House generates an intoxication and arrogance of power, but he does not isolate the causes of the hubris. We are told that the presidency has become "a job of paralyzing

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complexity and bloated power" in which "it was infinitely difficult for one man to control the office—but it was even more difficult to control that man" and presidents were therefore guided by "their own instincts and character" (p. 50). And yet the book closes with the plea that only the president can pull it all together. The problem of accountability when character fails us is never faced. White is worried about the seeming decline of the legitimacy of the presidency as a place of leadership in the wake of Nixon. But surveys suggest that the decline of popular support for government and all our institutions antedates Watergate. Future presidents may lack the kind of support needed as leaders seeking to forge coalitions for unpopular but necessary action. But the causes are deeper than the reaction against Watergate and, indeed, infect all modern democracies. White does not seem to see this and so his concerns are superficial. In short, we have excellent journalism, passable history, and poor political science.

Sorensen, in *Watchmen in the Night*, has stripped away the myth that the president and the presidency are virtue incarnate. But he wishes to retain the substance of presidential leadership as the chief force for liberal social action in the polity. He thinks that if the presidency is partially demythologized and Congress, the press, the parties, and many different publics are vigilant in their duties, that presidents will be required to lead by persuasion. He is concerned that actions will be taken to weaken the presidency as an institution which will also weaken the President's powers to do good and which would probably not have prevented the specific crimes of Watergate. Sorensen sees Nixon as a weak president who did not know how to lead and accrue influence democratically and who, thus, resorted to secret and authoritarian methods of ensuring his control of government. Therefore, all that is necessary to prevent future Nixons is vigilant oversight by the normal checking institutions of American politics and government.

Sorensen suggests four tests to determine the kind of president a candidate is likely to be: the openness and healthy self-confidence of his operating style; his candor with the press; the person he selects to be the vice-presidential candidate —a key to future cabinet choices; and the campaign staff he has—an indicator of the kind of White House staff he will select (pp. 152–155). He thinks that a president who leads by persuasion and compromise will strengthen his political and policy resources. A strong president who could kick the habit of executive secrecy might discover that he liked open government because "a wider recognition of the stark facts and harsh choices with which he is confronted might win him greater understanding. Decisions taken after full discussion are likely to retain greater public support longer" (p. 107).

Sorensen fails to face the possibility that the dark sides of the presidency are endemic to the office. The Ford White House is a fairly open and relaxed place because of the personality of the president and the character of the senior staff.

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But these men, who come from legislative backgrounds of openness and accommodation, find they must struggle against the temptations of authoritarian presidency. They idealize the president. They confuse images with policy. They are ready to join the symbolism of the presidency with that of American nationalism in foreign policy. There is always the potential hubris of nonelected persons who find themselves with power to use or misuse. The Ford cadre and the president himself are conscious of these vices and anxious to avoid them. But the actual temptations seem inherent in the situation. Sorensen does not face the problem that the very dynamics of government in a presidential system and nationalistic society may require the mythologizing of the presidency, and that the ugly side of American nationalism and the celebration of power may also be part of the myth.

In *The Plot that Failed*, Nathan describes the strands of motivation behind the brief second term administrative presidency of super secretaries and tight control of the bureaucracy. Congress had not been cooperative in enacting the New Federalism legislative programs, particularly special revenue sharing and welfare reform. Therefore, the president decided to implement the intended programs through administrative means. Policy was to be secured through operations. The power of the federal bureaucracy was to be reduced. This was congruent with the Nixon team's distrust of entrenched bureaucrats and with the ideology of the New Federalism which sought to reduce federal bureaucratic authority by decentralizing and decategorizing programs. Congress was to be defied through impoundment and veto.

President Ford has reversed this pattern, but Nathan wonders if this is not a temporary hiatus and poses the fundamental question of whether the president should be the manager of the executive branch. He somewhat hesitantly answers yes, and is concerned that the reaction against Watergate may lead to efforts to strip the president of administrative authority. The book is neat, modest, and unpretentious and covers the ground quickly and easily. One cannot fault him for not resolving the question. He is quizzical, worried, and uncertain about what is best.

None of these books gives us a satisfactory answer to the dilemma first posed. If the president is given latitude in his administrative authority he may abuse it, but undue curbing of such freedom to act may constrain the effectiveness of government. Sorensen comes the closest to having a complete theory in his argument that the president should have to struggle for influence in all spheres and that policy will be the better for it. White and Nathan are concerned that this model of a pluralist presidency may lack effectiveness for future problems. They may be right. But neither gives us a countermodel in which presidential power is joined to accountability. American democracy does not seem to be able to get beyond models of pluralist bargaining in either theory or practice. Attempts to do so are often inspired by authoritarian methods and this temptation seems

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always present in the presidency. Our polity is lacking in circuits of accountability between leaders and people. Perhaps if we had a clearer sense of ideological purposes for government, and political machinery to achieve such goals, we would find ways to make power constructive and yet accountable.

ERWIN C. HARGROVE
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Voters' Choice: Varieties of American Electoral Behavior *by Gerald M. Pomper. New York, Dodd, Mead & Company, 1975.—xvi, 259 pp. $10.00.*

Voters' Choice, Gerald Pomper's third book-length analysis of electoral politics in the United States, is undoubtedly his best. Prior to this, the literature consisted of landmark works on particular elections [such as Campbell et al., *The American Voter* (New York, 1960), or Berelson et al., *Voting* (Chicago, 1954)]. No book considered the sweep of recent politics and placed the social and individual determinants of voting choices into the context of a variable electoral climate. *Voters' Choice* is the first to integrate the postwar research on voting into a comprehensive analysis of electoral behavior.

Pomper initially draws two "portraits" of the American electorate—one, "the dependent voter," the second, "the responsive voter." "The dependent voter does not rely primarily on his own resources and opinions in making political choices. Rather, he relies on cues of his social groups—his economic class or race or accustomed party. Following these cues often may serve an individual's objective interests, but the association is highly contingent. The dependent voter does not make an autonomous choice on the basis of the issues and candidates" (pp. 5–6). In contrast, "The character of this [responsive] voter, and the influences upon his choices, are not permanent, but change with the circumstances of the times and with political events. Issues are often important to the responsive voter. In the proper environment, public questions and the candidates' issue positions become critical to the electoral decision. Variability in electoral behavior is most evident, not determinism" (p. 8).

Pomper's preference of portraits is well known from previous works. His views on politics are fixed in the tradition of V. O. Key, Jr., who believed that voters are attentive to the cues of candidates and parties when those positions are clearly articulated and center on salient concerns. Pomper's most convincing statistical tests of this view are drawn from his articles, "From Confusion to Clarity," *American Political Science Review*, 66 (June 1972), and "Variability in Electoral Behavior: Longitudinal Perspectives from Causal Modeling," *American Journal of Political Science*, 19 (February 1975).

The remainder of the book will be new to readers. His data source is the

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University of Michigan electoral surveys of 1952–1972. Particularly novel are chapters on the influence of class, generations, sex, and race. The chapter on the political values of women presents some intriguing analyses on the distinctiveness of southern women (those who were reared in the South versus those who migrated to the region), on the minimal importance of differing sex roles among women, and on the importance of age and education as well. The controversies such studies raise promise to elicit a number of primary and secondary analyses of sex and sex roles in political behavior.

The text, made enjoyable by Pomper's entirely readable style, is appropriate for advanced undergraduate and graduate courses in electoral behavior. Much of the analysis rests on cross-classification tables; the remainder, on multiple regression and path analysis. Instructors will have to explain the nuances of the latter to undergraduates, but that effort will undoubtedly be rewarded by the book's reception.

The concluding chapter will also generate important controversies. Pomper contrasts the emergence of invigorated citizens with enervated institutions. "Modernizing developments" such as increased political participation, growing acceptance of protest movements, national integration, and growth of ideological politics give voters more political resources to influence policy choices. Yet, political institutions are said to be in decay. Political parties have lost their power to control nominations, and Congress cannot control a presidency that cannot control itself. The perspective is that of Burnham and of Huntington—a view of social crises rooted in the contradiction between a modern economic system and a primitive political one. Pomper's pessimism about the sufficiency of a rejuvenated party system and Congress contrasts rather sharply with his generally benign view of the potentialities of voters and institutions. Questions must be asked of what is becoming a conventional view. What does it mean to say institutions are in decay? Is the evidence clear that our party system and political institutions produce less accountability of our political history? What indeed is our model of a modern polity? If our vision is of a highly centralized system exerting substantial control over an economic and social system, what nations offer satisfactory guides to the achievement of this vision? It may be that a decentralized, pluralist system is as responsive to citizen preferences and as adaptable to changing social and economic forces as its more centralized counterparts. On these most important issues political scientists have only begun to explore the proper scope and modes of political institutions.

RICHARD W. BOYD
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Gerald Ford and the Future of the Presidency *by J. F. terHorst. New York, The Third Press, 1974.—xiv, 245 pp. $9.95.*

Like most early biographies of American presidents, this one is more concerned with sketching the broad details of the chief executive's life history than with detailed analysis of his political career, personality or White House performance. Jerry terHorst began writing the book when he was Washington bureau chief of the Detroit *News* and Jerry Ford was vice-president. By the time the manuscript was published, Ford was president and terHorst had served briefly as his press secretary, resigning over the new president's pardon of Richard Nixon. In an epilog to the main text terHorst explains his resignation and Ford's reaction to it. The former press secretary quotes approvingly Washington columnist Mary McGrory's remarks that part of the reason Ford pardoned Nixon so suddenly is that the Washington press corps had given Ford such favorable notices that the chief executive began to think he could do no wrong. Earlier in the work the author documents the long-standing nature of the Ford-Nixon friendship and Ford's important role in the campaign to save Nixon's place on the Republican national ticket in 1956. Although generally favorable to Ford, terHorst occasionally takes a critical perspective, including his discussions of Ford's attempt to impeach Justice Douglas, the former minority leader's involvement with lobbyist-author Robert Winter-Berger, and the quality of Ford's White House staff. This account of Ford's life contains no shocking revelations but it does have some surprises for those unfamiliar with Michigan political history. In 1948 Jerry Ford entered his first congressional race in Michigan's Fifth District as an avowed opponent of the state's reigning Republican "boss" Frank McKay. As an insurgent in the Republican primary Ford was encouraged by Michigan's internationalist Senator Arthur Vandenberg whose presidential ambitions were opposed by McKay and the incumbent congressman because of Vandenberg's foreign-policy views. The author notes that during Ford's early years in the House, he "strayed from the Republican fold more times than most Michigan Republicans in Congress" (p. 62) despite a strong record as a party loyalist. Ford's early identification with the liberal wing of the party was enhanced in 1952 when he became one of the first Republicans to urge Dwight Eisenhower to seek the Republican presidential nomination. However, by 1954 his conservatism on matters involving fiscal policy and national security made him attractive to a group of isolationist Michigan citizens who wanted him to unseat incumbent Republican Senator Homer Ferguson, a staunch defender of Eisenhower's foreign and domestic policies. Ford declined the offer as well as a similar one two years earlier when Vandenberg died and internationalists approached Ford about seeking his seat. The author attributes Ford's rise to prominence in the House to this ability to appeal to both wings of the Republican party, as well as his industriousness and con-

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genial personality which has allowed Ford to remain popular with those with whom he has disagreed. He reminds us that there was a serious effort to gain Ford the vice-presidential nomination on the 1964 ticket. He concedes that his former boss was not a creative legislator in his congressional days. The author points out, however, that because of Ford's long-time desire to be speaker of the House, he was a very flexible and progressive politician on the matter of expanding the national appeal of the minority-status Republican party. Additionally, terHorst documents Ford's ability to achieve advances in his political career without appearing to be ambitious (a talent lacking in his friend Melvin Laird). The writer clearly feels that whatever limitations Ford has as a politician, lack of intelligence is not one of them. Future biographers no doubt will return to this subject.

PAUL J. HALPERN
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Mediacracy: American Parties and Politics in the Communications Age *by Kevin P. Phillips. Garden City, N. Y., Doubleday & Company, 1975. —xvi, 246 pp. $8.95.*

Kevin Phillips, sometime aide to John Mitchell and self-styled designer of the "Southern strategy" has gone back to the drawing boards and has revised and updated his earlier analysis. The new "emerging Republican majority" is still emerging, but it is no longer Republican and not even a majority.

He has thrown together bits and pieces from the works of Daniel Bell, Herman Kahn, and Walter Dean Burnham into a sometimes jumbled presentation that suffers from a lack of editing, but a reconstruction of his design reveals flaws in each of its socioeconomic, political/institutional, and ideological components.

The socioeconomic premise of Phillips' argument is that American politics has entered a Post-Industrial Age, characterized by the dominance of a new economic sector, "the knowledge industry," which is engaged in the production, consumption, and dissemination of information. Those working in that sector, he says, constitute a "class" which is "displacing" the business-industrial power elite of the previous century. This new elite has a common interest in what Phillips calls "change," which stimulates demand for its output of basic research, technological innovation, news, and social engineering.

Geographically concentrated in the Northeast, the northern Midwest, and the Pacific Coast, the new elite, in coalition with the affluent, educated youth, and the poor of the nation, now controls the Democratic party. The elite has committed the party to advocacy of increased government expenditure on the health, education, and welfare programs of bureaucratic liberalism that nour-

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ish the elite itself. It has also gone beyond equality of opportunity to embrace equality of results—income redistribution—as its policy preference.

Countering the new elite are technologically obsolescent sectors of the working and middle classes outside "the knowledge industry," centered in the southern and western United States. They are resentful of the new elite's rising status and opposed to its reallotment of tax dollars away both from personal consumption and from government handouts to defense and aerospace industries. In the resurgence of ethnicity and nativism, the recrudescence of religious fundamentalism, and a rise in Americans' self-identification as "conservative" rather than "liberal," Phillips sees signs of a "counterreformation" more sweeping than the political movement to which it is a reaction.

The shift in the social bases of politics, coupled with a revolution in mass communications, Phillips continues, have contributed to the loosening of party loyalty and the disintegration of party organization in a way roughly analogous to the impact of the Industrial Revolution on the Whigs and Tories of mid-nineteenth-century England. Low turnout, ticket-splitting, and third-party voting, he takes as manifestations of this partisan disarray, which may last another decade. It will culminate, not in "realignment," but in the "reconstitution" of the American party system, with disaffected southern and Old Left Democrats joining conservative Republicans in a neopopulist party of the New Right, discarding the name, the connotations, and the loser's image of the not so Grand Old party.

In the Post-Industrial Age, moreover, the "liberal-conservative" dichotomy has lost its meaning, according to Phillips. Opposition to the new elite supplies the ideological cement for building the new party just as it did for Disraeli's in England: "In 1874, as in 1972, liberal moralism—at home and abroad—had much less appeal than economic liberalism, and working-class voters were amenable to issues of imperialism, economic nationalism, and ethnic rivalry" (pp. 161–162). Programmatically, this opposition party, besides rejecting the increased tax burdens and government control intrinsic to a "Great Society," will use government to undermine the institutional power of the new elite, in particular, of those "preeminent spokesmen for the cause of interest-group liberalism," the New York- and Washington-based "mediacracy" (p. 29). Agnew was thus a harbinger: "Media power may turn out to be among the most important focal points of this [governmental] activism" (p. 207). The First Amendment, in Phillips' eyes, is but the refuge of a new generation of economic royalists, much as the Fourteenth was for the captains of industy at the turn of the century.

Many of the socioeconomic premises of Phillips' analysis, as well as his political and ideological conclusions, are open to question. Just what he means by the dominance of the new elite is never clear. That such ostensibly diverse groups of Chase Manhattan financial analysts, Dow chemists, and Berkeley sociologists constitute a self-conscious class with an overriding common inter-

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est in "change," that this interest excludes reactionary change, and that this class is somehow displacing businessmen and industrialists as the power elite of America are hardly borne out by the evidence Phillips presents.

Politically, the catalyst of shared antagonism to the new elite can produce, at best, an unstable coalition of middle and working classes, riven with conflict over economic issues such as inflation and unemployment. Moreover, Phillips' own data on the shifting geography of the two parties, comparing the fifteen most Democratic states to the fifteen most Republican, indicates that the electoral arithmetic of the New Rightist majority does not add up: if each party were to hold onto its bastions, the Democrats would have a nearly insurmountable 234–129 lead in electoral votes. Finally, extrapolating from voting in the last two presidential elections allows Phillips to ford perhaps the strongest current in postwar American politics—the steady rise to dominance in Congress of northern Democrats, who, for the first time in thirty years, now hold a majority of House seats.

Ideologically, Phillips rests his case on the 1972 election, but he attributes McGovern's defeat solely to his stands on the issues rather than on his public image as incompetent to hold high office—a factor in presidential elections to which Republicans may become more sensitive by 1976. Phillips fails to differentiate between New Deal—or bureaucratic—liberalism and the redistributive, but antibureaucratic, and even antiregulatory stands at least publicly espoused by McCarthy and McGovern and by Governors Brown, Lucey, and Dukakis—all Leftist Democrats. Phillips also ignores a major issue which will underlie partisan divisions for years to come, despite politicians' efforts to straddle it: whether the planning needed to rectify the malfunctions of the market mechanism in allocating resources will take place in the private or the public sector.

Above all, Phillips provides a program for governance which would make the nation ungovernable and only frustrate the political party that adopts it: intensified nationalism, which, once aroused, it cannot satisfy; imperialism, which has historically divided any party in Britain or America tempted to pursue it; ethnic rivalry, which can only lead to political immobilism; and legislative and rhetorical attacks on the media, which are doomed to ineffectiveness or worse. Such legislation is likely to be held unconstitutional by courts which think more of the First Amendment than Phillips does, while virulent rhetoric tends to undermine the credibility not only of the media themselves but also of the voices they transmit—primarily those of the administration in office, whether liberal or New Rightist.

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Decade of Disillusionment: The Kennedy-Johnson Years *by Jim F. Heath. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1975.—xvi, 322 pp. $12.50.*

In *Decade of Disillusionment,* Jim F. Heath attends to a subject of considerable interest—what happened in the 1960s, and why things went differently, on the whole much less well, than many had expected in the early years of that decade.

The recitation suffers because much of it has become just too familiar. We are reminded once again of the conventional American optimism which characterized both the Democratic and Republican presidential candidates in 1960; and the high measure of ideological agreement, on matters foreign and domestic, which they reflected. Then, things began turning sour, and dissent emerged as a distinctive feature of United States public life. At decade's end, we had been left some rather unpleasant legacies: "punishing inflation, new cultural norms, greater racial bitterness, disillusionment with big government and technological expertise, and distrust of presidential power . . ." (p. 303).

The inclination to read on, even in the face of so familiar a presentation, is due in large part to the exceptional sweep of the transformations of the 1960s. The decade opened with perceptible optimism as to the capacity of governmental action to solve long-standing problems; it ended in a climate of pessimism concerning the adequacy of such public responses. The growth of executive authority had been generally hailed by liberals since the days of Franklin Roosevelt, but in the late 1960s many liberals recoiled from the vigorous application of power by a liberal Democratic president. As recently as Lyndon Johnson's 1964 electoral triumph, the New Deal seemed to inaugurate the "political present." But over the latter 1960s, in rapid fashion, the New Deal became "history." The structure of conflict was massively altered: new collections of political interests; new packages of concerns and demands among colliding groups; a basic redrawing of the political agenda.

No book on changes of such moment can fail to command some attention. And Heath has produced a volume which in many ways merits our admiration. It is smoothly and tightly written. Even more impressive, perhaps, is the author's sense of balance. Writing on a subject which so readily lends itself to polemical treatment, he has managed a calm, sober yet penetrating account.

Still, one must lament the absence of an integrating conceptual dimension. Lots of things happened in the 1960s which were unexpected, and many of the developments contributed to national disillusionment. Heath describes these nicely. But he tells us little about why history unfolded as it did. There is precious little attention to the engines of change. A broader sociological perspective could have shown us a polity being tossed about as the social system of which it is a part underwent exceptional changes. Can a history of the United States in the 1960s be written adequately without systematic attention to the trans-

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formations of American society? I doubt it. And because Heath ignores the larger social systemic dimension, he has produced a history which does not satisfy even though we admire the skill and care with which it was crafted.

EVERETT CARLL LADD, JR.
University of Connecticut

The Reaffirmation of Republicanism: Eisenhower and the Eighty-Third Congress *by Gary W. Reichard. Knoxville, University of Tennessee Press, 1975.—xv, 303 pp. $14.95.*

This careful and systematic study of executive leadership in the Republican Eighty-third Congress should help to dispel much of the fuzzy thinking which has heretofore obscured attempts by historians and political scientists to understand the significance of the Eisenhower presidency. Reichard has expertly traced the tangled and complex legislative histories of presidential programs in foreign affairs, fiscal policy, welfare and resource development, and has applied both roll-call analysis and traditional historical techniques in an effort to identify the nature of congressional support and opposition. Reichard's conclusions, fresh and for the most part persuasive, serve to undermine both the critical image of Eisenhower as a bumbling, political innocent, as well as the claim, advanced by some of his more enthusiastic followers, that he was the leader of a "New Republicanism."

Eisenhower emerges from these pages as a cautious but fairly skillful party leader, who worked closely and effectively with regular Republicans in Congress and who succeeded in marshalling large majorities for almost all of his major programs. Of the roll-call votes examined in this study, Eisenhower won 81 percent of those in the Senate and 84 percent of those in the House—an impressive showing by any standard and especially so in a Congress in which Republican control was so narrow.

Eisenhower was especially effective, according to Reichard, in foreign affairs, where he blunted the challenge to executive authority posed by conservative supporters of the Bricker Amendment and won widespread Republican support for such "internationalist" policies as foreign aid and reciprocal trade. "By the end of the Eighty-third Congress," Reichard concludes, "the internationalist president had succeeded in altering considerably the foreign policy stance of his party" (p. 96).

In fact, this probably overstates the case. After all, most Republican congressmen had earlier voted for the Truman Doctrine, the Marshall Plan, and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, endorsing the broad outline, if not all the specific tactics, of the new diplomacy of containment. The "conversion" of the Republican party to "internationalism" was less a product of Eisenhower

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and the Republican Eighty-third Congress, than of Truman, Vandenberg, and the Republican Eightieth Congress. Nevertheless, Eisenhower displayed considerable skill in adapting the policies of the Truman era to the concerns of congressional conservatives, accepting substantial cuts in the foreign aid budget, emphasizing military aid over economic assistance, and allocating more money for Asia. By so doing, he undoubtedly smoothed the final transition from prewar "isolationism" to the postwar consensus fashioned during the Truman years.

Reichard's conclusions on domestic affairs are even more interesting. He shows that despite all of his rhetoric about "modern Republicanism" and the "middle way," Eisenhower retained a strong commitment to the entrepreneurial values of traditional Republicanism—economic individualism, the rights of property, and limited government. His domestic programs reflected these ideological predilections and, not surprisingly, won widespread support from Republican conservatives. If Eisenhower failed, as some critics have charged, to transform the Republican party, it was not because he lacked the force or the will, but rather because his "views did not differ much from the views of most Republicans" (p. 217).

The focus of Reichard's study is fairly narrow, concentrating primarily on Republicans in only one Congress. The role played by congressional Democrats, while acknowledged, is never fully explored. A more inclusive study, moreover, might have placed the "conversion" of Republican conservatives to "internationalism" in a somewhat different and less dramatic perspective. There are also occasional errors of interpretation. For example, Reichard argues at one point that Eisenhower's support for reciprocal trade indicated that "he was not particularly interested in becoming the protector of American businessmen" (p. 231). While many small businessmen, producing primarily for the domestic market, did in fact oppose reciprocal trade, the leaders of the large, internationally oriented corporations, including many Eisenhower supporters, were usually ardent advocates of liberal trading policies. Reichard's suggestion at another point (p. 236), that the schism within the postwar Republican party has been greatly exaggerated, is intriguing and perhaps correct, but demands far more documentation and analysis than is available in this volume. On the whole, however, this is a fine study and a major contribution to our understanding of the Eisenhower era.

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The Glory and the Dream: A Narrative History of America, 1932–1972 *by William Manchester. Boston, Little, Brown, 1974.—x, 1396 pp. $20.00.*

This is an enormous, sprawling encyclopedia of a book. Manchester counts himself among the school of historians which holds, in his words, that "great events may tell us less about the past than the trivia accumulated by ordinary people" (p. 1301). *The Glory and the Dream* recalls plenty of social detail—books, movies, radio programs, TV shows, music, clothing, you name it—from the last forty years. And whatever the strictures about great events, Manchester does devote a good deal of space to public men and public policies right up to Richard Nixon and Watergate. There is a certain absorbing quality to Manchester's accumulation of social trivia. Did you know that in the early 1930s the word "teenage," according to Webster's, meant only "brushwood used for fences and hedges" (p. 63)? There is also a frequently compelling immediacy to Manchester's narrative episodes. Here is Eisenhower taking a call from Anthony Eden during the week of the Suez crisis ("Well, Anthony, how *are* you"). Here is Lena Horne, walking down the aisle in a prisoner of war camp, putting her back to the German soldiers seated in the front rows, and singing for the black American guards in the rear.

Yet whatever the attractive readability of *The Glory and the Dream*, Manchester's narrative history fails to avoid the pitfalls of the genre. Narrative history draws its fundamental power from dramatization. The trouble is that what is dramatically—or melodramatically—appealing may not be historically significant, at least not in proportion to the length at which Manchester often tells his stories. More important, while individual men and women of course make history, by themselves they do not make the historical process. Narrative history need not ignore the way that individuals, great and small, interact with social attitudes, political forces, or economic interests. Manchester fails to analyze this interplay, which makes for the chief weakness of his book.

Over Manchester's entire narrative lies the unhappy foreknowledge of what is to come: not only the enlargement of social liberty but the increase in social license; not only the rise of presidential power but its ultimate abuse; not only the end of isolationism but Vietnam. Manchester, venturing here and there to extract the meaning of events, finds signposts of the ominous future in various blithely taken turning points of the recent past. Yet there is so little analysis that his observations often amount to gratuitous, sometimes astounding assertions. Not atypically, he celebrates Robert Taft as "the only American statesman who really understood the role of congressional prerogative and the danger of an omnipotent presidency—the one man who could have foreseen the end of the long road running from Pusan to My Lai. . . ." (p. 667). Had Taft lived there might have been no Vietnam, Manchester suggests here, ignoring the cold

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war state of mind which helped make the intervention possible and the extent to which conservative Republicans supported it.

Early in World War II Manchester, then in his early twenties, joined the Marine Corps. He returned home to an America which, in the late 1940s, he nostalgically writes, "glittered on a solitary peak. . . . It could only lose its lead by some extraordinary misfortune, such as a President or Presidents who would squander its wealth and youth on a distant Orwellian war" (pp. 440–441). *The Glory and the Dream* may suffer from oversimplification; it may also reveal, beyond its chronicle of the past four decades, the current attitudes of the generation that came to political and social maturity in the 1940s. Taken from Manchester, those attitudes would include a mixture of approval and dismay about the revolution in social, especially sexual, mores. They would include a regard for the presidency but a strong distrust of presidential power, and, above all, something approaching revulsion at the nation's record in the world arena and relief at its return to domestic matters.

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Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction *by Numan V. Bartley and Hugh D. Graham. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1975.—xvi, 233 pp. $10.00.*

Southern Republicanism *by Louis M. Seagull. New York, Halsted Press, 1975.—vi, 186 pp. Cloth, $10.95; paper, $5.95.*

These two books, which have much in common by way of points of departure and method, are respectable additions to a growing literature which attempts to explain the breakup of the old southern politics and project the directions of the latest wave of new southern politics. Both focus on voting patterns within the framework of the party system in an effort to determine what has happened in the South since 1948 vis à vis such previously developed analytical typologies as maintaining, deviating, converting, and realigning elections, and concepts of partisan adherence which result in the possibilities of dissolution or convergence in the patterns of party competition. Both rely primarily on aggregate data, although their analytical techniques differ; and both tend explicitly and implicitly to look to the New Deal coalition as the paradigm against which regional change is assessed in a national setting.

Southern Politics and the Second Reconstruction is an ecologically based study of the effect that the combination of federally induced changes in race relations and the locally initiated "Bulldozer Revolution" (i.e., industrialization and urbanization of the South) has had on the politics of the region since

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World War II. The authors collected and analyzed voting returns on a county and precinct basis for primary and general elections in the former Confederate states from 1944 through 1972. The ecological framework against which the voting patterns are evaluated consists of two categories—a demographic one which separates counties or other units into metropolitan, urban, and rural-small town types, and a geographic-cultural one comprised of eight subregional conformations: mountain, Piedmont, black belt, white belt, and the four peripheral areas of south Florida, Catholic Louisiana, Mexican-American Texas, and west Texas. In addition, a racial and social class categorization of voting precincts in twenty-seven southern cities is used. Comparisons and contrasts among the patterns of voting within the defined areas in various presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections are presented by means of such relatively simple statistical measures as percentile bar or line graphs, tables and maps, and coefficients of correlation.

In *Southern Politics* (1949) the late V. O. Key, Jr., indicated that disfranchisement, malapportionment, the one-party system, and Jim Crow were the main features of southern politics standing in the way of developing the liberal propensities among certain groups in the South into a basis for a more competitive political system which, as was already the case in the rest of the country, would reflect economic class orientations rather than racially based cleavages. The major finding of the Bartley-Graham book runs directly counter to Key's optimistic projection. Despite the phenomenal increase in qualified and participating voters (black and white) in the South, reapportionment on a one-man, one-vote basis, the collapse of Democratic party dominance, and the legal (and in many respects, de facto) end of Jim Crow, the hypothesis of ". . . a basic continuity of . . . [the] Bourbon pattern, even in the face of the considerable changes wrought in the South by the Bulldozer Revolution and the Second Reconstruction . . ." (p. 23) appears to be borne out by the election results during the period covered by the book.

Southern Republicanism, as its title obviously suggests, attempts to measure the extent to which the breakup of the one-party South has resulted in a realignment of voters sufficient to produce a stable Republican vote large enough to suggest a convergence of party competition along the lines of national tendencies since the advent of the New Deal. The analysis is based on the varying contributions to the Republican vote since 1940 of three principal independent variables—traditional Republican, black-belt, and white-collar voters. The author applies three increasingly sophisticated measures of changes to presidential, senatorial, and gubernatorial elections: the strength of the vote at the state level, correlations of Republican votes by counties in successive pairs of elections, and multiple regression analyses to clarify the effect of change in one voter variable on another. The growth of presidential Republicanism is examined first, and Seagull then uses the same measures to examine the diffusion of

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Republican competition into the statewide contests for the limited states' Senate and the gubernatorial offices. In both cases a distinction is made between the states of the deep South and those of the rim South.

The major conclusion is that, while the patterns of Republican voting are divided between the Goldwater (protest?) type and the white-collar dominant one, only the latter has the possibility of being sufficiently stable to result in a realignment that would bring southern politics into closer compatibility with the national model. To a considerable extent that realignment has already demonstrated its potential in the rim states, where a greater amount of social change has tended to produce a more stable white-collar Republican vote and thus more consistently recurring interparty competition. Only South Carolina among the deep South states shows signs of comparable realignment. But the author is also careful to note that recent changes in national patterns many indicate an incapacity of the New Deal coalition to maintain the alignment among voters on which the national Democratic party has sustained its majority position since 1932. In other words, the nationalization of southern politics may have less effect on the larger configuration than the southernization of national politics.

Although both of these books are carefully done, and the quantitative demonstrations are related to solid contextual understandings of historical backgrounds and state and subregional variations in bases of competition, issues at stake, and personalities and styles of candidates, the major findings are more impressive for their validation of previously established observations and for certain incremental conclusions than for any major theoretical advances. The rapid disruption of the solid South from 1948 onward, the steady spread of presidential Republicanism, signs of realignment in the rim South, the failure to develop a coalition along economic lines between blacks and working-class whites, the perpetuation of unstable patterns among voters who waiver between old and new party or factional adherence and protest votes, and ambivalent tendencies on the part of voters toward national and local versions of the major parties are already familiar to students of the South.

But in their respective ways each of these new studies enlarges our perspectives on these and other electoral and party orientation tendencies. The refinement of the liberal-conservative continuum in Bartley and Graham, for example, is highly suggestive in connecting older categories of voter types (populists, progressives, bourbons) with more recent ones; and Seagull's contrasts of the 1964 and 1972 pairs of elections with those of 1960 and 1968 perceptibly enlarges our understanding of the nature of the fluctuating patterns of southern voting. Even if their desire for ideological purity seems to impair Bartley and Graham's appreciation of the seemingly random, but nonetheless real, development of electoral competition in the South in recent years, and even if the wish for a model of two-party competition in the South fathers more optimism on Seagull's part about early realignment than is warranted by his analysis, both

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books do what scholarship in this area should be doing: They start from an accumulated base of knowledge about their subject, and build on that base by critical inquiry from which they draw clear and generally well-supported conclusions.

WILLIAM C. HAVARD
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Congressional Power: Congress and Social Change *by Gary Orfield. New York, Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, Inc., 1975.—xii, 339 pp. $4.95.*

Gary Orfield's purpose in writing this book is to challenge a number of what he terms "obsolete images" of the Congress. According to the author's argument, there are three of these images he wants to address, and—with one exception—his case is quite convincing.

First, he argues that the widely held view of Congress as a generally weak and fundamentally conservative institution is simply false. He shows that in recent years the "progressive" forces in Congress have gained in strength, both numerically and in terms of occupying important institutional positions. Then, through an extensive analysis of three policy areas (civil rights, aid to education, and public jobs legislation) which forms the heart of the book, and through less detailed treatment of other legislative issues, he demonstrates the important and often decisive impact Congress can have on policy outcomes, even when the position advanced by a majority of the legislators is opposed by the president. As Orfield states, "any effort to stereotype Congress as inherently passive or conservative is doomed to failure. Any serious attempt to describe the policy impact of Congress must obviously describe the time period, the policy areas under consideration and the existing division of power with Congress during that period" (p. 280).

The second image that the author challenges is the belief among many liberals that the only hope for innovative progressive solutions to perceived social problems is the presidency. Of course, given the recent experience with the Nixon administration, the idea that the president will (for some reason) be automatically progressive does not need much rebuttal. Orfield addresses the other side of the question: he argues that Congress can and does, from time to time, innovate. Using the policy areas noted above, he shows that Congress—whatever one may think of the validity of the proposals—has originated "progressive" legislative proposals and seen them through to enactment. Among the items he cites are many of the pieces of urban legislation of the 1960s and 1970s, some tax reform, aid to higher education, the eighteen-year-old vote, and (depending on the action of a few more states) the Equal Rights Amendment. Another example

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he could have cited is campaign finance reform, which was also congressionally initiated.

The third point that Orfield addresses is the question of the importance of institutional reform. His view is that "While tinkering with legislative arrangements may permit some minor improvements, basic social reforms probably require a political movement to change public values. . . . If we are to achieve basic change we must change not the rules of Congress but the outcome of elections" (pp. 10, v). It is here that the only major weakness of the book lies. It is probably true that the major determinants of legislative outcomes are the preference patterns among members of Congress and the general public. However, in making his case, Orfield underestimates the importance and impact of changes in the rules.

First, rules can be structured to make certain outcomes difficult or impossible to achieve, and changing those rules can then make those outcomes feasible. House passage of the repeal of the oil depletion allowance was made possible by the adoption by the Democratic caucus of the closed rule reform; without this reform the Green amendment proposing total repeal of the depletion allowance could not even have come to a vote on the floor. Second, rules can be changed to make the Congress as an institution more effective and efficient. This is the aim of the budget reforms now being implemented, and if the new procedures are successful they may mark the most important change in Congress in decades.

These points regarding reform should be seen as a disagreement about emphasis, and not as a challenge to the major arguments made by the author. As noted above, the author presents a convincing case. Most important, this is a book which leads the reader to rethink—and in some cases alter—his presuppositions. That is a rare achievement indeed.

DAVID W. ROHDE
Michigan State University

Constituencies and Leaders in Congress: Their Effects on Senate Voting Behavior *by John E. Jackson. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1974.—xi, 217 pp. $10.00.*

Why do American congressmen vote the way they do? An answer to this intriguing question has been hazarded by a number of political scientists in recent years. Their conclusions, while less at odds with one another than a cynic might expect, differ. Some have stressed factors internal to the legislature itself—party leaders, committee members, informal leaders, cue-givers, and the like—as the primary influences, if not necessarily the ultimate causes, of the votes of legislators. Others have concluded that the congressmen's constituencies, described

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and measured in a variety of ways, go further in explaining why members of Congress vote aye or nay. John Jackson's book seeks to determine which of these views most accurately and realistically depicts Capitol Hill reality.

The study consists of an elaborate statistical analysis of the roll-call voting behavior of United States senators during the years 1961–1963. Jackson begins with the assumption that the relationships between the variables which predict Senate voting and the senators' observed votes takes the form of a linear equation. Then he devises operational measures for these variables and empirically derives coefficients so that each senator's voting behavior is represented by an equation. These prove to be quite effective predictors of the senators' voting behavior as measured by Guttman scales.

Most previous models of voting by legislators have been process analogs; that is, they purport to represent the processes by which legislators make up their minds as well as to predict their votes. Jackson's model is clearly not of this type—senators do not solve multiple regression equations in their heads before they vote. But his approach has potential advantages when it comes to drawing inferences about causation. For if the equations contain all the relevant predictor variables, and if the measures of the variables are valid, then the estimated coefficients in each senator's equation provide a measure of the relative weight of each variable in predicting his or her vote.

This strategy is both elegant and straightforward. But to carry it out requires grappling with numerous problems of method and measurement which defy easy or exact solution. One cannot but be impressed by the author's sophistication, caution, and candor in dealing with these technical problems. But, at least in the mind of this methodological primitive, some doubts still lurk at the end. I am worried, for example, by the fact that the same set of variables are not included in all members' equations since the coefficients in the equations provide a measure of the relative importance of only those variables contained within them. And the author's novel approach to the measurement of constituency preferences results, as he discusses at length, in a tendency to overstate the importance of constituency as a variable. This is particularly unfortunate since it tends to undermine confidence in his central empirical finding—that constituency variables are more important determinants of Senate voting than leadership.

Ultimately Jackson rejects both the pure organizational/leadership and the pure constituency explanations of congressional voting in favor of a hybrid which he calls a "coalition representational model" (p. 134). This model stresses variation in the intensity as well as the direction of constituency preferences; this leads legislators to try to trade their support on bills of little interest to their constituents for votes on bills of deep concern back home. Rather than continuously renegotiating the trades necessary to follow this strategy on hundreds of bills, legislators find it convenient to belong to weakly organized

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standing coalitions (political parties) whose leaders function as brokers for the interests of their members. "The important point is that the functions, roles and responsibilities of the party members and the cue source voting emphasized by organizational models facilitate coalition representational voting behavior and the associated bargaining and trading of support. The coalitions, or parties, supplement but clearly do not entirely replace representational voting" (p. 136).

DONALD R. MATTHEWS
The University of Michigan

Monitoring Revenue Sharing *by Richard P. Nathan, Allen P. Manvel, and Susannah E. Calkins. Washington, The Brookings Institution, 1975.—xxii, 394 pp. Cloth, $11.50; paper, $4.95.*

The federal revenue sharing program that began in 1972 will end on December 31, 1976. Before that date Congress must decide whether to let it expire, extend it as is, or try to improve it in various ways. Its members will need a lot of facts about how much money was given to what governments and the ways in which it was used by them. Both Congressmen and concerned citizens should also review the objectives of the program. How well were they realized? What adverse effects should be noted? This excellent volume provides much useful material for the debate which has already begun and will intensify during the coming election year.

As the authors explain, they "decided at the outset to make the project chiefly one of monitoring. That is to say, its concern lies not with making a final judgment on whether revenue sharing can be labeled 'successful'; it lies, rather, in understanding how the program works. The essential purpose of the research is to provide systematic and uniform data on the effects of the State and Local Assistance Act of 1972 and to examine important policy issues in the light of such data" (p. 5). Three effects were studied: distributional, fiscal, and political. The distributional effects follow from the formula adopted to divide the amount of revenue being shared. The authors tell a fascinating story of how that formula was determined by the interplay of opposing forces. The needs of high-population, industrialized states were championed in the House, those of low-income, rural states in the Senate. The final compromise allowed each state to choose the formula that gave it the most with each allotment then being reduced by the percentage needed to bring the total within the amount available for distribution. There was also conflict over many other issues such as how much freedom should be given state governments to decide the distribution of their grants to local governments, whether special purpose local governments (e.g., school districts) should participate (they were excluded), what should be done about layering where the same people were included within two

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or three different governments, and whether very small general purpose governments should be included (they were).

So many different interests urged their cases that the writing and passage of the final bill took nearly two years. The comment of one dissatisfied member of the House Ways and Means Committee is interesting and perhaps significant: "We finally quit, not because we hit on a rational formula, but because we were exhausted. And finally we got one that almost none of us could understand at the moment. We were told the statistics were not available to run the print on it. So we adopted it" (p. 135). The three authors of this Brookings study now provide the missing statistics and promise a second volume which will show how alternative formulas might have distributed the money differently.

Support for general revenue sharing came from surprisingly diverse sources and motives. Cities in fiscal straits wanted additional revenue that did not have to come from overburdened property tax payers. State officials likewise wanted to be able to stabilize or reduce their tax bills while continuing to maintain or increase their direct services to citizens and their subventions to local governments. Economists and others seeking greater "economic justice" saw federal revenue sharing as a way to equalize fiscal conditions as between rich and poor states and localities. They also favored a greater use of progressive federal income taxation as opposed to local property taxes and the clearly regressive state and local sales taxes. The Nixon administration saw general revenue sharing as a way to "decentralize government" and reduce categorical grants directed from Washington, something they declared to be good for the country and clearly felt advantageous for the Republican party in an election year.

Since President Ford's reelection strategy for 1976 seems already cut to the same pattern, an extension of general revenue sharing seems more likely than its termination. The question is not whether, but how much and with what distribution formula. Large cities and poor states will surely push hard for larger slices of the pie.

This time the Ways and Means Committee will have the benefit not only of abundant data from the Treasury, the Census Bureau, and state and local sources, but also the results of the extensive field research which is a highlight of this report. The Brookings team employed twenty-seven experts to go into the field and ask questions about the effects of revenue sharing on a sample of sixty-five recipient jurisdictions which included eight state governments, fifty-six local governments (in nineteen states), and one Indian tribe. The basic questionnaire contained twenty-three probing questions to determine as truly as possible the real, as opposed to the declared, uses of the money received. The experts also reported their own opinions as to the complex effects of the aid given.

Other agencies which have done research on the Act of 1972 include the

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Institute for Social Research of the University of Michigan's Social Research Center, the Opinion Research Corporation of Princeton, the National Science Foundation, and an ad hoc National Clearing House which focused on the impact of general revenue sharing on the poor and minorities.

Of special interest to political scientists are the conclusions of the report on the structural effects of revenue sharing on the 38,000 local governments which received two-thirds of all the funds distributed. This includes effects on the budgetary process, on political merger and annexation proposals, on intergovernmental cooperation, and on state-local relations. Even though revenue sharing was intended to be limited to general purpose governments, the narrow scope and function of certain townships and small municipalities substantially impeded attainment of that goal. Only a small fraction of all the local governments that received shares under the 1972 law had previously received grants of funds directly from the federal government. Whether they should continue to do so or whether a minimum-size cutoff should be incorporated in the 1976 bill is a major point that will have to be decided.

ROBERT B. PETTENGILL
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Essays on John Maynard Keynes *edited by Milo Keynes. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1975.—xviii, 306 pp. $16.50.*

This fascinating set of essays, with the single exception of Galbraith's well-known "How Keynes Came to America" reprinted from *The New York Times*, naturally divide into three groups: appreciations of Keynes as uncle, brother, teacher, colleague, and friend; assessment of the man as World War I Treasury official, faithful son and servant of Kings College, enraged participant at the Versailles Peace Conference, designer of the central Bretton Woods institutions, international negotiator, City of London tycoon, philosopher, Arts Council entrepreneur, historian, collector of books and pictures, and familiar of Bloomsbury; and, naturally, evaluation of Keynes as the dominant economist of his century.

On the first theme, the most interesting vignette is Milo Keynes's recollections of his uncle and aunt. "Maynard and Lydia Keynes" is an affective memoir particularly of Lydia, the former ballerina persistently underrated by the Bloomsbury circle. Lady Keynes, who now resides "in quiet retirement at Tilton, where few ever see her" is "this unique personality" (p. 8). "Maynard," recalls his nephew, "was a wonderful and understanding uncle who showed an interest in me as a human being even though I was only seventeen" (p. 2). A second personal memoir, that of the distinguished economist E. A. G. Robinson denies the charge made by Harry Johnson among others in this volume that

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Keynes was arrogant. On the contrary, "He was easier to argue with than many who have entrenched themselves in doctrinal positions today" (p. 11).

Whatever Keynes touched in the world of affairs, he tended to manage. Nicholas Davenport's "Keynes in the City" displays him as a financier during the 1920s impatient with received economic wisdom and eager to reform the investment policies of the National Mutual Life Assurance Society, not always, concedes his admirer, to the financial benefit of the stockholders. Although Keynes's imagination occasionally led him astray, his talents at investment and organization had much to do, as other contributors make clear, with the organization of the Cambridge Arts Theater, the national Arts Council, and the financial prosperity of his own beloved Kings College.

Keynes was an inventive intellectually in a number of other specialities as well as economics, as he was in matters of business. David Garnett, one of Bloomsbury's last survivors, compares Lytton Strachey and Keynes as biographers, rather to the advantage of the latter. Charles Wilson defends him as an economic historian who "asked the right questions" and "provoked good and fruitful controversy" (p. 232). E. G. Braithwaite, a distinguished philosopher, awards Keynes high marks as a logician for his *Treatise on Probability*. In an extraordinarily interesting section, he also tackles the influence of G. E. Moore upon Keynes, as Keynes evaluated it in "My Early Beliefs." Braithwaite concludes that despite Keynes's own disclaimers he was faithful to a consequentialist version of Benthamite utilitarianism. Braithwaite refuses to amend his own obituary notice in *Mind:* Keynes now as in 1946 remains for him a most "humane Utilitarian" (p. 242).

The professional estimates will be of most interest to economists. With the signal exception of Harry Johnson, the others offer no surprises. Robert Skiddelsky scolds Keynes for neglecting the influence of power and vested interest and exaggerating the impact of ideas. In his usual temperate tone, Professor James Meade locates the essence of the Keynesian revolution in Keynes's ability "to shift economists from thinking normally in terms of a model of reality in which a dog called *savings* wagged his tail labelled *investment* to thinking in terms of a model in which a dog called *investment* wagged his tail labelled *savings*" (p. 82). Joan Robinson repeats her view that Keynes is badly distorted by the standard textbook version which neglects the composition of the capital stock and ignores critical issues of income and wealth distribution.

All of the contributors, including the economists loved, admired, and respected Keynes in varying mixtures and degrees, aside from Professor Johnson. This conspicuous dissenter from the general celebration considers Keynes (whom he never met) "without any intention of slurring him—an opportunist and an operator" (p. 115), whose influence on British economics has been baleful. There was, if one believes Johnson, never a need for a Keynesian revolution. During the 1920s, the sluggishness of the British economy was the con-

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sequence of the country's decline as an industrial power and a disastrous currency policy: "Had the exchange value of the pound been fixed realistically . . . a prescription fully in accord with orthodox economic theory . . . there would have been no need for mass unemployment, hence no need for a revolutionary new theory to explain it, and no triggering force for much subsequent British political and economic history" (p. 110). This breathtaking swoop into conjectural history neglects, among other things, the American experience. The United States which was not losing ground in world markets, whose currency was not overvalued, and whose politicians paid no heed to Keynes, suffered all the same the sort of mass unemployment which did yield to Keynesian remedies.

The book is a delight to read. Economists and mere admirers of human genius will treasure all the essays, even that of the terrible-tempered Harry Johnson.

ROBERT LEKACHMAN
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The Wartime Alliance and the Zonal Division of Germany *by Tony Sharp. London, Oxford University Press, 1975.—xi, 220 pp. $19.25.*

Tony Sharp's book is marked by the wealth of new material it presents on the wartime decisions to divide Germany and Berlin into zones of occupation. The sources of the new material are the records of the British Foreign Office and Cabinet. Sharp also used published and unpublished American documents, considerable information that he gathered in interviews and correspondence with key participants, and the existing literature on the subject. His main theme is that the negotiations and decisions on Germany's future were affected most profoundly by military and strategic considerations.

The book, which is a revised dissertation, is certainly the most comprehensive available account of the wartime negotiations that led to the zonal division of Germany in 1945. The study takes the reader through the maze of proposals, plans, discussions, and agreements, beginning at about the time of the Casablanca conference in January 1943, and concluding with the final decisions of August 1945 on the French zone of Berlin. Among many other things, the book describes France's demands for participation in the postwar occupation and it shows how the French were given a zone of occupation and membership on the Allied Control Commission. The British were most anxious to give the French a zone, in part because they believed the Americans would withdraw from Europe as they had done after World War I and as Franklin Roosevelt said they might at the Yalta conference. The study provides fascinating new details on the dispute between the British and the Americans about who would occupy northwestern Germany and thus the Ruhr, and it emphasizes American reluctance to occupy southwestern Germany out of fear that American supply and

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communication lines might be threatened by French action or jeopardized by French political instability and possibly by revolution in France. The Americans finally agreed to accept the southwestern zone provided they got the so-called Bremen Enclave and access to the American zone through the North Sea ports and the British zone. One might wonder how much the American turnabout was influenced by the expectation that the Morgenthau Plan and postwar reparations deliveries would make the Ruhr a difficult area to occupy. In any case, it seems reasonably clear that the British repudiated the Morgenthau Plan—so soon after Roosevelt and Churchill initialed it at the Quebec conference in the fall of 1944—in part because the British assumed that they would eventually occupy the Ruhr. As a matter of fact, the combined military staffs had already agreed to such an arrangement at their level. Finally, among other things, the study shows how existing plans for zonal division changed as military fortunes changed. For example, Churchill and the British were prepared to abandon the existing zonal agreements after V-E Day. They wanted to keep the large areas of the Russian zone conquered by Eisenhower's armies, even if it meant removing the Allied Control Commission from Berlin and leaving the city to the Russians.

The study will be welcomed warmly by specialists on postwar Germany, the occupation period, and the origins of the cold war. It will probably not be very popular among general readers. There are too many plans, proposals, revisions, adjustments, and details, even though Sharp provided maps and illustrations to help the reader along. There are also too many agencies, committees, commissions, study groups, working parties, and joint staffs for the generalist to keep straight. The complicated story of how the various bureaus and groups were involved in the zonal division of Germany and of how they interacted with each other is here, but the general reader may have to work too hard to understand the story completely and clearly. In short, the study's details will certainly appeal to specialists in search of deeper understanding, but those very details will undoubtedly discourage the general reader.

JOHN GIMBEL
Humboldt State University

Advice and Dissent: Scientists in the Political Arena *by Joel Primack and Frank von Hippel. New York, Basic Books, 1974.—xi, 299 pp. $12.50.*

Here is a substantial and troubling study of the roles of scientific advisers in affecting public policy outcomes. It recounts and analyzes the uphill battles of "outsider" scientists to block or reverse the federal government's commitments to mindless technological applications. It argues mightily the case for public

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interest science as a safeguard of political democracy. Written with facts, force, and feeling, the book provides disturbing insights on the majestic but flawed science advisory structure.

In four case histories, the authors review the issues, the politics, the participants, and the tactics in the government's handling of decisions involving the SST, the ABM, pesticides, and cyclamates. Throughout, we are given chapter and verse on government's manipulation of scientific advice, misrepresentation, suppression of reports, and stalling. In each of the cases, the government was driven back, at least partly because of whistle blowing by concerned scientists outside the power structure.

By building the argument essentially around these horror stories, the impression is left that the whole insider advisory system is bought and paid for by the executive branch. Things are not all that bad, and Primack and von Hippel do not say that they are. Still, the terms on which expert advice is sought and given are such that public officials have the last word, and the scientist who disagrees and goes public is likely to be marked down as unreliable. The aim of the advisory process is consensus, and no one is more admired than the committee member who can lead his colleagues to reason together. Rare indeed is the government convenor who purposely casts the membership so as to put a fox among the chickens, though a few happy examples come to mind.

The dilemmas of scientific advice are most striking when the political stakes are high and the chips are down. A willful president or an arrogant defense secretary lays down a high card and the whole executive process closes ranks. The question for the advisers is not what, but how. They are brought in not to help in structuring choices but to legitimize them. When the advisers balk, as the President's Science Advisory Committee did on the SST and the ABM, their usefulness is crippled and the civil disobedience is remembered long and with bitterness. This is worth reflection as the Congress prepares to reestablish a science office in the White House.

The effectiveness of dissenting scientists at all levels of government has been quite striking as they have learned to work with the media and the legal profession. Advocacy politics has come of age. The federal government's muscles have gone flabby in the wake of Vietnam and Watergate, but as the book reminds us, it does not pay to underestimate the capacities of bureaucracy to resume its old habits. This is particularly so when government's back is to the wall in a confrontation with a chain of major crises—and they are rapidly accumulating.

Truth in public advising will not be guaranteed by the Freedom of Information Act nor the Federal Advisory Committee Act. Their symbolic importance is useful, but their efficacy is another matter. If there is to be a remedy for the misuse of scientific advice, it is more likely to be found in the willingness of an awakened scientific community to define the terms of accountability on which

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it will render advice in the future. If it can be made clear that the interest being served is the public interest rather than that of the administration, the ordeal of the concerned scientists will have been worth it.

WILLIAM D. CAREY
American Association for the Advancement of Science

The New Political Economy: The Public Use of the Private Sector *edited by Bruce L. R. Smith. New York, Halsted Press, 1975.—xiv, 344 pp. $20.00.*

Major institutional change often has a way of coming about insensibly and unrecognized until it is well advanced. In its specifics it may be familiar to nearly everyone but yet unseen in its large dimensions and unperceived in its significance. Such a change is the subject of *The New Political Economy: The Public Use of the Private Sector,* the American part of a concurrent study of developments in the United Kingdom and the United States sponsored by the Carnegie Corporation. The present work contains a collection of articles by Elmer B. Staats, Alan Pifer, Harold Seidman, Dael Wolfe, Martin Edmonds, Michael D. Reagan, David C. Warner, Paul M. Densen, Joseph Pois, Ira Sharkansky, and Harvey C. Mansfield. The particular topics range from the large problem of accountability to problems of control in medical-care programs and to developments in audits by the General Accounting Office. The work is introduced by a long and thoughtful essay by Bruce L. R. Smith.

The use of private organizations by government to achieve purposes presumably public in nature is itself far from new. As Staats notes (p. 47), the device goes back to the Erie Canal, railroad land grants, and the Morrill Act. What is new is its present large dimensions. Its scale is difficult to assess, not so much because governmental activity in the United States is vast as because it is hard to decide just which usages come under the category of "private" and which purposes are "public," and because we lack a widely accepted conceptual structure to make a general assessment. It is nonetheless clear that the practice of using private mechanisms for governmental purposes has become very extensive. Some of the recent examples are the Corporation for Public Broadcasting, the Federal National Mortgage Association, the National Park Foundation, the Rural Telephone Bank, and the U. S. Postal Service (for a list of such bodies see pp. 105–108).

The concerns and perspectives of the authors are as varied as the different topics they treat. Some of these, indeed, seem to be related only peripherally to the central issues, but all are in a broad sense relevant and important. Thus, Pifer is deeply troubled by the tendencies leading to compromise of the character of hospitals, universities, and foundations once regarded as unqualifiedly

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private. Similarly, Warner and Densen dwell on the somewhat special problems of administering Medicare and Medicaid, and Pois and Sharkansky examine quite large problems and ambiguities of auditing by the General Accounting Office. This diversity itself is perhaps sufficient indication of the as yet amorphous nature of the general phenomenon.

All the authors appropriately seek to avoid undue simplification, with Seidman explicitly warning against framing the central issue as one of independence versus control (p. 84). Smith, however, states it as a problem of devising administrative "apparatus that can mobilize wide energies in society for public purposes, but still be 'steered' by accountable officials" (p. 14). Different observers inevitably bring different ideological baggage to the evaluation of problems such as this. Thus, Seidman is particularly concerned, as are several others of the present authors, with the problem of accountability. He stresses the blurring of the distinction between things that are private and those that are public. Although the difference is far from polar, the statement by Wolfe carries a different emphasis. To Wolfe, realism demands acceptance of—and presumably acquiescence in—the blurring that has occurred and a pragmatic attitude toward what he feels is its inevitable further development. Wolfe supposes a past compact between universities and the state (although he sometimes substitutes "society" for "state") that is now unrealistic and must be renegotiated and reformulated. Seidman would seem to offer a clearer vision.

This book has some inescapable shortcomings, the most notable being the absence of a comprehensive theoretical viewpoint and the failure to give a precise definition of the problem. These must be forgiven, however, in view of the stubborn nature of the problem and the genuine service given in calling attention to it. It would be good to have a precise definition of its scope and boundaries, but to be able to do this would presuppose a clear solution to the theoretical problem. There is a curious predisposition to see things in an economist's perspective (e.g., "the private sector," "trade-offs"), which perhaps carries a particular bias. The copy editing of the work is also occasionally careless. These, however, are small blemishes on a valuable work that deserves serious attention.

GRANT MCCONNELL
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L'Univers politique des enfants *by Annick Percheron. Paris, Armand Colin and Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 1974.—xiv, 263 pp. 69 fr.*

New Directions in Political Socialization *edited by David C. Schwartz and Sandra Kenyon Schwartz. New York, The Free Press, 1975.—xii, 340 pp. $12.95.*

Psychology and the Political Experience *by Alan Hughes. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1975.—ix, 225 pp. $12.95.*

Political socialization, the process by which early learning influences later political attitudes and activity, has long been recognized as important by political theorists and participants. Yet it was virtually ignored by social scientists until work in the 1950s by David Easton, Fred Greenstein, and associates. Greeted with much critical acclaim, the early work was also sharply challenged for being ethnocentric, theoretically naive, methodologically deficient, and misleading. For example, the very same youngsters that Easton and Greenstein portrayed as highly compliant (they apparently viewed authority in nearly sacral terms) were soon thereafter engaging in freedom rides and occupying college buildings.

The appearance of the volumes by Annick Percheron and by David and Sandra Schwartz represents a solid advance in theories and methods, and illustrates the value of studying children to learn about politics. Annick Percheron, a French political scientist trained in France and the United States, seeks to understand the development of cognitive and affective structures underlying children's political attitudes. Rather than studying the manifest content of children's political attitudes, Percheron searches for a coherence in children's expressions of like, dislike, or ignorance regarding a host of diverse political concepts. The approach is disarmingly simple. One might ask whether Percheron is entitled (especially in light of her own caveat about not relying on manifest responses) to infer from the mere fact that a student indicates a preference or aversion for a theme that the student has acquired knowledge of the theme. Similarly, she classifies children as Left, Right, antipolitical, and apolitical on the basis of only a few questions. The small size of her sample and other technical difficulties constitute insuperable obstacles.

Nonetheless, granting the customary need for caution in interpreting an exploratory study, the book is an important contribution. It is superior to previous studies in its reliance on theory drawn from child psychology: Percheron attempts to apply Jean Piaget's developmental psychology to the study of children's political thinking. The search for the development of underlying structures, dimensions, and scales appears preferable to concentrating on discrete responses. The study breaks new ground by investigating the development of

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ideological and critical orientations in contrast to the usual stress on positive formal institutions.

And the empirical findings are fascinating. Percheron discovers that French children begin to develop coherent ideologies at an early age. Rather than uniformly expressing compliant political attitudes, devoid of cognitive depth, they display an independent, logical, and sometimes critical approach to politics. Children's responses fall along scales whose dimensions suggest the hierarchical character of the acquisition of political knowledge, and variable support and opposition with respect to democratic procedures, incumbent political officials, the Left, Right, and political authority in general. Of major interest is her discovery that French children are ideologically divided by the early grades of elementary school. In apparent contrast to research on American youth (and contrary to widely repeated observations that French political socialization leads to unstable adult attitudes), Percheron finds that young French children display the rudiments of structured, ideologically coherent positions, and many children express dislike of some aspects of the political system and its leaders. Whether the contrast between France and the United States is a result of the different approach used by Percheron, which is more sensitive to the ideological realm and dissenting views, and/or to political cultural differences between the two countries, is a question worth pursuing.

The volume edited by David Schwartz and Sandra Kenyon Schwartz displays an effervescent approach to political socialization. An introduction by the editors suggests the need for innovation and the succeeding essays provide some illustrations. The articles do not add up to a coherent whole, yet the diversity and even divergence among articles are refreshing.

Essays by Ira Rohter and Norah Rosenau attempt to apply learning theory and Piaget's developmental psychology to political socialization. Neal Cutler advocates a generational (cohort) interpretation of political socialization rather than a developmental approach. Sandra Kenyon Schwartz interviews very young children (ages 3–6) and finds extensive if rudimentary cognitive and affective links to the political system even among these preschoolers; in another essay, she studies the conditions under which junior high and high school students develop attitudes of political cynicism. Two papers by John Pollock and associates examine the socialization of older groups. David Schwartz and associates study "unorthodox" socializing agencies in two essays, one investigating the influence of popular music, and the other the influence of bodily health and body self-images, on political attitudes.

Alan Renshon's "The Role of Personality Development in Political Socialization" is perhaps the outstanding essay in the volume. Renshon (who also contributes another article on the relation between birth order in the family and political participation) is dubious about the value of studying children's political attitudes, since they are probably ephemeral and unstable. Instead, he as-

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serts, what is learned in childhood that will prove of more enduring political relevance lies at deeper layers of the personality. Renshon begins from Abraham Maslow's hierarchy of five basic needs and proposes a model linking these personality needs to basic beliefs and political attitudes. He suggests that "basic beliefs" originate in the attempt to meet basic needs. Basic beliefs are acquired in childhood, persist relatively unchanged, and provide a way to interpret and evaluate the world. Basic beliefs, in turn, inform political attitudes. In order to understand this process, Renshon selects one basic belief for closer study: it arises from Maslow's safety need and involves the extent to which the world is perceived as malleable and subject to personal control. Renshon calls it a belief in self or personal control. The link to politics lies in the degree of confidence citizens have that they are politically influential and effective. (Political scientists have termed this "the sense of political self-efficacy" and have demonstrated its relationship to many other political attitudes.) Renshon studies what factors in the family and school background of college students affect their belief in self-control and then traces the impact of this belief on other political attitudes. Compared to those with a high belief in self-control, those with a low belief have less faith in government, are more politically alienated, and are more apt to rate disruption rather than voting as the most politically effective technique.

Renshon's theoretical model is attractive; his empirical case study is suggestive but, mostly because of a slim data base, disappointing. However, the essay provides rich possibilities for improving the study of political socialization.

Political alienation is also at the forefront of Alan Hughes's concern. The scope of his book is more modest than its title suggests: it is a closely reasoned attempt to relate several psychological orientations to political attitudes. The methodological aim is to distinguish concepts that Hughes argues have often been confused in previous studies. Through surveys of Australian citizens, he adapts and develops scales to measure anxiety, authoritarianism, ethnocentrism, and alienation, and then attempts to measure their interrelationships. His major finding is that ethnocentric attitudes may result as much from feelings of political alienation as from authoritarianism; and that the latter two dimensions are not only analytically distinct but are concentrated in different groups. He elaborates what he calls the alienation triptych, in which alienation plays a central role by interacting with anxiety and fueling ethnocentrism. Authoritarianism has little part in this nexus, acting independently to shape ethnocentric attitudes. The Hughes volume is a model of craftmanship.

Like many students of political psychology, both Renshon and Hughes appear to view alienation as irrational and to see a moderate stance as a sign of "normalcy." For Renshon, those holding strong beliefs in personal control "are more likely to hold a balanced view of the government, being neither overly cynical nor overly optimistic" (Schwartz and Schwartz, p. 58). Hughes finds (in

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part because of the way he formulates questions for his authoritarianism scale) that "it seems reasonable to expect the alienated observer to be imperfect in his judgment" (Hughes, p. 86). Yet the alienated students in Renshon's sample appear to have the more accurate grasp of politics; and some of the "alienated" responses in Hughes's scale seem more valid than their opposite. Prompted in part by Percheron's finding that those French children displaying a stance of political opposition are relatively more politically knowledgeable, might it not be asked why political alienation should be regarded (as it so often is) as a symptom of personality disorder and not as rational analysis?

MARK KESSELMAN
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The Trial of Martin Luther King *by Alan F. Westin and Barry Mahoney New York, Thomas Y. Crowell Company, 1974.—viii, 342 pp. $7.95.*

When Martin Luther King, Jr., entered jail on October 30, 1967 (his nineteenth incarceration, as he remarked to reporters), it was to serve a five-day contempt-of-court sentence for actions taken during the 1963 Birmingham campaign of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.

The Birmingham trial, when considered with its subsequent appeals up to the U. S. Supreme Court, was, in the opinion of the authors, "the most celebrated case in which King was personally involved in his career as a civil rights leader. The trial was also the stimulus for his most famous piece of writing, *Letter from Birmingham Jail.* In both the literal and figurative senses, though, King was continually on trial. His campaigns against racial injustice always brought him into conflict with local public officials, who would arrest and prosecute him for a wide variety of offenses, all of which rested on disturbing the peace of segregated society. He was always 'on trial' too in the court of elite and public opinion, charged by some whites as being too radical and by some blacks as being too conservative" (p. 5).

The implications of this trial are still major concerns of American life. The problem of balancing the free speech rights of protest groups against the requirement of respect for court orders and the law is critical and exceedingly complex. Yet as the authors indicate throughout their well-written text, King was a master in knowing when and how to violate certain court orders, especially federal court orders.

Alan F. Westin, professor of Public Law and Government at Columbia University, and his Columbia colleague, Barry Mahoney, formerly with the New York Attorney General's office, deal in a style which is both scholarly and lively with the issues of the trial of Martin Luther King—the limits of lawful

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protest and the nature of the duty to obey the courts—as revealed in the case known as *Walker* v. *Birmingham*.

Walker refers to the Rev. Wyatt Tee Walker, one of Dr. King's top aides in the Birmingham struggle. Two other men also were sentenced for the contempt charge: Rev. Ralph Abernathy, King's closest associate and personal friend; and the Rev. A. D. King, Martin's only brother, the victim of a drowning accident in the summer of 1969. These men and others had defied a state court injunction that forbade the protest demonstrations that King was leading against Birmingham's segregation policies.

The story of the trial and the events leading up to it are presented by the authors in narrative style, with extensive documentation and careful reconstruction of the events of Dr. King's civil rights leadership, beginning with the Montgomery bus protest in 1955, and ending with Dr. King's tragic assassination in Memphis on April 4, 1968.

The Supreme Court decision which resulted in imprisonment for King and his associates was a 5–4 vote. As the authors point out, "Like so many of the 'hard cases' in American constitutional jurisprudence, *Walker* presented a difficult choice between two fundamental values of the American constitutional system; in this instance, between the First Amendment right to protest and the principle that court orders should be respected and reviewed through orderly judicial processes" (p. 238).

The authors list the arguments of those who find themselves in agreement with the majority decision of the Court, with approval centering around four criteria: "sound interpretation of the concept of 'jurisdiction'; considerations of federalism; the proper limits on protest; and the ideal of the 'rule of law' " (p. 278).

In spite of the weight of the arguments presented, Westin and Mahoney take their stand as believing that the *Walker* case was mishandled by the Supreme Court. ". . . The *Walker* rule," they argue, "is a repressive doctrine that can be applied to many interests exercising First Amendment rights besides protest groups, and . . . its hold over American constitutional law cannot be re-examined too soon. In a very real sense, we owe it to Martin Luther King, Jr. and what he did for American law, to reformulate the *Walker* doctrine" (p. 298).

This informative, scholarly, and timely book should be of interest to students of law and politics, to admirers of King and his contribution to American life, and to all who are concerned about any rule of constitutional law that threatens to stifle the exercise of First Amendment rights.

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The Politics of Black America *by Milton D. Morris. New York, Harper & Row, 1975.—xii, 319 pp. $6.50.*

Milton Morris examines selected issues and problems which he considers genuine to understanding the politics of black America. The scope of the book is threefold: (1) It examines the impact of race and racial conflicts on political structures and processes of multiracial societies; (2) it describes and evaluates the methods by which blacks have sought to induce change in their status; (3) it explores the internal politics of the black community which facilitates the basic features of black politics.

The contents reflect the author's judgment about those aspects of the black political experience which are pertinent to devising future political strategies. The efforts of black Americans to change their socioeconomic status through political activity are traced. Since the author concentrates on what he considers to be the most salient aspect of the black political experience, several components of black political life are not studied. However, this book is incomprehensive and does not add to the body of literature on black politics.

Such a study poses methodological problems, particularly because the author employs no single well-developed conceptual framework. He calls attention to the apparent need for developing a theoretical or conceptual framework suitable for the study of black politics and considers two circumstances that have attributed to the lack of such a framework: (1) the incomprehensive approach to the study of black political life, and (2) the tendency of political scientists to study black politics as just another ethnic group that is becoming an indistinguishable part of a pluralistic society.

The first portion of the book reviews and evaluates the literature on patterns of race relations that pertain to the black political experience. Relying on theoretical concepts about race relations, the author categorizes four distinct approaches to the study of black politics: (1) the moral-dilemma approach; (2) the power-relations approach; (3) the modernization approach; and (4) the colonized-people approach. The moral-dilemma approach emphasizes the moral basis of racial problems and the need to change the attitudes of individuals. The power-relations approach emphasizes the power of a group as the key element in inducing changes. The modernization approach views racial discrimination and racial conflict in multiracial societies as related to specific levels of socioeconomic development; these are considered to change as the society develops. The colonized-people approach views the persistence of racial discrimination against black Americans, and attempts to identify the forces or conditions that precipitate change in well-established patterns of race relations. All four approaches help to clarify those aspects of race relations which provide a framework for analyzing the black political experience.

Moreover, the book explores the utility of a comparative approach to the study of race and politics in hopes that such a comparison would clarify some

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ways in which race affects political life both generally and particularly within the United States. The comparison focuses primarily on race relations in the United States and South Africa as symbolic cases.

The author further observes the irony of "democratic values" which created and maintained a pattern of "subordinate-superordinate" relations between blacks and whites in the society. He analyzes the political structure which has preserved black subordination. Reflecting the issue of subordination, the author analyzes the problem citizenship and the tactics which blacks have used in the struggle to gain full participation in the political process. Black nationalism is viewed as a response to subordination.

The study identifies some of the political attitudes and values of black Americans. It also encompasses the level of black political participation in electoral politics, patterns of black involvement in party politics, and strengths and weaknesses of black interest group activity.

The book further explores the activities of the three branches of federal government in contributing to policy changes and deals with some of the problems that limit the effectiveness of blacks in influencing public policy.

The author concludes by assessing the varied political efforts of blacks to change their socioeconomic status, the nature of governmental responses to the black political thrust for changes, and their implications for future black politics.

LEE AUGUSTUS MCGRIGGS
Texas Southern University

Roll, Jordon, Roll: The World the Slaves Made *by Eugene D. Genovese. New York, Pantheon Books, 1974.—xxii, 823 pp. $17.50.*

Roll, Jordon, Roll is a monumental achievement, the most penetrating and profound analysis of slavery in the United States yet written, a work unlikely to be surpassed for years to come. Beginning with publication of Kenneth Stampp's *The Peculiar Institution* and spurred by the upheavals of the black revolution, the issue of slavery has for two decades engaged many historians—most notably Stanley Elkins, David B. Davis, Winthrop Jordan, Carl Degler, John Blassingame, George Rawick, Robert Fogel, and Stanley Engerman, as well as Genovese himself—in heated controversy. *Roll, Jordan, Roll* is in many ways a response to that debate, particularly to the issues of slave accommodation and resistance, but the breadth and depth of its analysis brings a new dimension to understanding the slaves' world and world view.

While Genovese's credentials as a historian had previously been well established, *Roll, Jordan, Roll* should certify him as a social scientist of the first

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order, a distinction that he might himself regard somewhat dubiously. Genovese's objective is not merely to analyze the institution of slavery, but, more broadly, to understand the dynamics of class relations—in particular, the mechanisms by which the lower classes in general and rural and agriculture peasant groups in particular, respond to the hegemony of the powerful. To do this he has not only closely examined the voluminous relevant manuscripts and published sources (most importantly the testimonies of former slaves), but he has deeply immersed himself in classical—especially Marxian—social theory as well as the works of leading contemporary European social historians such as Eric Hobsbawm and E. P. Thompson. Moreover, his superb discussion of slave religion, which is integral to his thesis of a dynamic slave community, is informed by an intimate acquaintance with the Bible, biblical tradition, and the nuances of diverse strands of Christian theology.

For Genovese, American slavery was an "organic" relationship in which masters and slaves lived symbiotically, mutually shaping each other's lives and cultures. This emphasis on the reciprocal dependency of master and slave stands in contradistinction to the view that has emphasized the unilateral power of the master and the powerlessness of the slave, a perspective that portrays the slave as a passive recipient rather than an active participant in a dynamic, but ambivalent, relationship involving reciprocal rights and obligations. The key to understanding the apparent contradictions and paradoxes of the master-slave relationship is the concept of paternalism, which "grew out of the necessity to discipline and morally justify a system of exploitation. It did encourage kindness and affection, but it simultaneously encouraged cruelty and hatred. The racial distinction between master and slave heightened the tension inherent in an unjust social order" (p. 4). But paternalism, above all, represented a system of values and social relationships to which both master and slave accommodated. The slaves did not accept slavery; indeed, they rejected it at every turn. But, according to Genovese, they did adjust to a paternalistic system with its mutual obligations and duties by defining the relationship in their own terms. And the rights the slaves exacted from the master in this relationship both confirmed their humanity and laid the basis for resisting dehumanization.

In the most sophisticated and sensitive treatment of the subject yet undertaken, Genovese argues that the partially autonomous religious system the slaves fashioned—a system based on love and joy—provided their most important defense against the slaveholders' denial of their humanity and a collective source of cohesion and strength in the face of the slave regime's pressures for disintegration and demoralization. Genovese maintains that if slave religion had served merely as a mechanism of social control initiated and dominated by the master, the slaves would have rejected it. Although it is impossible to determine precisely the extent to which African culture patterns persisted, Genovese argues that slave religion represented an imaginative syncretism of

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African and Christian traditions. It displayed the "creative impulse to blend ideas from diverse sources into the formulation of a world-view sufficiently complex to link acceptance of what had to be endured with a determined resistance to the pressures for despair and dehumanization. . . . It emerged as the slaves' most formidable weapon for resisting slavery's moral and psychological aggression" (pp. 183, 659). Genovese's entire discussion of slaves' religious system is illuminating, but particularly exciting is his discussion of slave funeral rites and ceremonies, a phenomenon usually overlooked by previous historians. For Genovese, however, funerals served to integrate slaves into "a human community unto themselves" and in the process undermined the slaveholders' claims to their total being.

Paternalism and the slaves' religious response to its demands are the underlying themes as Genovese examines several other dimensions of the slave world. Following the British historian E. P. Thompson, Genovese emphasizes the extent to which slave work habits conformed to the traditional irregular rhythms and patterns of rural people; as other preindustrial people, the slaves did work hard, but they resisted regularity, routine, and regimentation. In analyzing in depth the dynamics of several slave occupational roles—the Mammy, house servants, drivers, and skilled servants—he argues for their significance as mediators between black and white cultures. Finally, he discusses at length the nature and import of family relations and the annual round of life for the typical slave.

It is impossible fully to evaluate a book of this length and scope in a brief review. My reservations relate less to the substance of Genovese's analysis than to his procedures. Most important among these is a problem inherent in the kind of traditional methodological approach Genovese has selected—that of generalization; the words "many," "few," "usually," "sometimes" abound. It is certainly true that there was great diversity among slaves as in any population, but use of such terms leaves problematic—and dependent upon the perception of each individual historian—which patterns were most and least representative, as well as the relationships of such patterns to the social variables of occupation, plantation size, age, location, etc. A somewhat different, although not unrelated problem concerns Genovese's evidence. Although I have previously praised his familiarity with the many sources on the subject of slavery, frequently Genovese's interpretations (as, for example, in his discussion of some aspects of slave religion) tend to exceed his evidence. On the other hand, his frequent, and often not germane commentaries extolling the good sense of the lower classes are distracting.

But these are minor and relatively insignificant objections. This book will generate much controversy; it will raise new questions about and stimulate new monographs on specific facets of the "peculiar institution." But the totality of Genovese's achievement will stand, for this book has the ability not merely to stimulate the reader intellectually, but to move him or her—as it did me—

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emotionally as well. And that quality is, unfortunately, far too rare in the world of scholarship today.

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From the Diaries of Felix Frankfurter, with a Biographical Essay and Notes *by Joseph P. Lash. New York, W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 1975.—xiii, 366 pp. $12.50.*

Joseph Lash has given a fine balanced picture of Felix Frankfurter, although he is a bit severe in his judgment of the justice's restraint while on the Supreme Court that so much troubled his admirers. This essay should add greatly to a sympathetic understanding of the man.

The diaries themselves are really only fragments, covering seven short periods, always with days left out, over the years from 1911 to 1948. While the entries show Frankfurter's interest in everything going on—World War II, China, India, Palestine–and mention almost everyone of note active during the periods covered, those concerning the Supreme Court have the greatest interest.

These entries reveal aspects of the Court not generally known. Frankfurter had strong views about the chiefs he sat under: high praise for Hughes; impatience with Stone's argumentativeness (a trait Frankfurter was himself famous for); almost contempt for Vinson's superficiality. He mentioned Reed's statement that Vinson was "suspicious and distrustful" because of his Kentucky mountain background (p. 305). Unfortunately the diaries do not reach Warren's period.

The justice was appalled at the extent to which his colleagues Black, Douglas, and Murphy presented a common front—called the "Axis" (pp. 176, 197)—as well as their proneness to take matters into consideration that were foreign to the legal issues involved. Since Murphy sat next to him on the bench, many of their conversations are recorded. In January 1943 Murphy expected that Douglas might be nominated for the presidency (p. 155). Frankfurter was upset by Douglas' political ambitions:

> I remarked that every man must make his own judgments and I do not want to disturb his faith but the fact of the matter is that not long after Douglas came on the Court it was as plan as a pikestaff to me that he was not consecrated to the work of this Court but his thoughts and ambitions were outside it. And for me such ambition in a man corrupts his whole nature–especially if he is a judge, as the history of this Court amply proves. Roberts said he was very much distressed, and said it had come to the point where lawyers don't care any more about precedents or what this Court has decided or what may be relevant legal arguments–that they try to aim at what they think social and political prejudices of a majority are. I said

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> that when an opinion like that of the Bailey case comes around, I cannot but recall my mother's remark to us as children–that we should hold ourselves dear. I should think that that was particularly applicable to the Supreme Court of the United States and that an opinion of this sort writes us down as cheap. It presents a great difficulty to me because one hates to swallow all the tripe of such an opinion simply because one agrees with the result, and I equally dislike concurring in the result and thereby seeming to have a personal difference with Douglas (p. 230).

Lash has even headed one group of entries "Wrath Against Douglas" (pp. 309–338).

Some of Frankfurter's comments on individual justices are very sharp. He says about Black: "Black at his worst, violent, vehement, indifferent to the use he was making of cases, utterly disregardful of what they stood for, and quite reckless when challenged once or twice regarding the untenability of what he was saying" (pp. 226–227). He spoke of his "irascible and snarling tone of voice" (p. 283).

He told Murphy "you will persist in sinning against the light" (p. 299), and later "Murphy made a characteristic harangue, full of sophomoric rhetoric, tasting like rancid butter" (p. 337).

He considered Roberts an innocent.

He noted his own professorial manner—"not that I mind being a professor because that is what I am and I was appointed to this Court as a professor, so to speak" (p. 228). And many a lawyer arguing before Frankfurter felt this strongly, a point Lash, by the way, does not make.

There are surprisingly few entries about the arguments. He does include an unflattering one on the first Connecticut birth control case (pp. 157, 158), and on an elaborate description of the reargument of the Schneiderman case (pp. 208, 209) with Frankfurter's notes of the conference discussions after the first argument (pp. 210–217) and entries about the opinions of the various justices (pp. 247–249; 257–259).

His credo is best illustrated by his advice to Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., who was about to write an article on the Court:

> I said that it seemed to me that the important thing for a man like himself to do was to educate the American people as to the nature of the function of the Court and the nature of the duties of the judges; more particularly that the framers of the Constitution had decided not to make the Court another branch of the legislature; that the liberals all threw their hats up in the air when Brandeis cautioned the Court against becoming a super-legislature, and the point of that was not that the so-called old Court legislated in undesirable ways, but that it legislated at all, and that it is not merely a confusion of function but dishonesty to want the Court to legislate so long as it legislates in the kind of way that people like or to approve the Court's doing so when it does so (p. 276).

The entries certainly negate the picture of judicial calm. I doubt whether they do anything to enhance Frankfurter's stature.

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Many Sovereign States *by Dan W. Lufkin. New York, David McKay Co., Inc., 1975.—x, 253 pp. $7.95.*

"Dan Lufkin Goes Public." With this headline *Fortune* magazine announced in 1972 the decision of a founding member of the Wall Street firm, Donaldson, Lufkin and Jenrette, to accept the commissionership in the newly created Environmental Protection Agency of the state of Connecticut. Written three years later, *Many Sovereign States* is Lufkin's account of his state service, a tour of duty that his friends advised would be a "graveyard" for any political aspirations he harbored.

These warnings notwithstanding, Lufkin soon became an enthusiast of state government, which he came to consider more attuned to local needs than the federal monolith. After helping to start an environmental lobby group, Connecticut Action Now, in 1969, the author reported himself "amazed to see how responsive the machinery of state government could be to pressure from informed and concerned citizens" (p. 8). Later, as head of the agency that grew from his lobbying efforts, Lufkin successfully led a crash program to draft state air pollution standards within broad federal guidelines. His contrast of this experience with his agency's later efforts in the area of water pollution, attempted in a much more restrictive federal regulatory climate, is instructive. In the clear water program, Lufkin writes, "instead of establishing broad policy and letting the states come up with local workable solutions, the federal government produced the details of implementation and instructed the states to administer them through absolute adherence. . ." (p. 130). The result, he says, was a "bureaucratic horror story," "an administrative zoo."

As with many businessmen who have preceded him in government, Lufkin is convinced that much of the bureaucracy problem would be solved if only business methods could prevail in the public sector. Though he is not uncritical of business, he credits it with being a major cause of America's material and social progress and calls for "a new social contract" between American business and the American public. He favors contracting on a competitive basis for the provision of public services and suggests "salting the bureaucracy with businessmen" through an annual internship in state government to be underwritten by the nation's top 500 corporations.

Lufkin's confidence in business seems somewhat misplaced. Though competitive bidding for the provision of some services—solid waste disposal, for example—is a promising approach, government will still be left with the responsibility for providing those services from which profits cannot be wrung. In our system the private businessman remains responsive to a different constituency than the politician, and the "bottom line" provides him with a clear measure of his success or failure. No degree of corporate social responsibility can displace the primacy of that measure. The key problem in the provision of public services is the relative lack of similar measures of performance and success. Their development and implementation remains a top priority for state

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government. Furthermore, there is little indication from past experience that businessmen in government have "done better" at governing than have professional politicians; they have just been responsive to different values.

Many Sovereign States has other difficulties as well. To facilitate his defense of the states, Lufkin allows us to assume that they have been universally maligned. In fact, the attacks he refutes date from the 1930s and 1940s, and a spirited defense has been mounted by academics and practitioners through the 1960s and 1970s. The author praises the fifty states for their diversity, while attacking "proliferating local government." When, one might ask, does diversity become proliferation? Lufkin is impressed with the constructive, nonpartisan rationality with which the Connecticut legislature dealt with environmental demands. But this was at a time when the cost of cleaning things up was hardly discussed. With the rapidly rising energy bill of the last two years especially evident in Connecticut, a state heavily dependent on imported oil, have environmental politics been as civil?

The author is at greatest disadvantage when he seeks to reach beyond his personal experience. His three-page excursions into problem areas other than the environment—education, transportation, the property tax—do not begin to do these subjects justice. The result is rote recital of reformist solutions. Repeated overgeneralization damages the credibility of the entire book. A concluding statement, for example, that the "states themselves are almost without representation in Washington" (p. 209) illustrates almost total ignorance of the vaste intergovernmental lobbying network in the Capital.

No one can quarrel with Lufkin's commitment to responsiveness in government, a commitment he symbolized by ordering the use of the phrase "at your service" at the close of all correspondence leaving his agency. And the author, an activist executive, cannot be expected to be fully aware of the literature of state government. But the fact that he is not, makes this book of limited use to persons who have closely followed developments on the state level over the past decade and a half. Its usefulness may come in bringing to the attention of a wider audience what is already well known to professionals in the field.

GERALD BENJAMIN
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The Manchester *Union Leader* in New Hampshire Elections *by Eric Veblen. Hanover, N. H., The University Press of New England, 1975.—197 pp. $9.00.*

Franklin D. Roosevelt's 1936 landslide came despite great newspaper opposition. Since then empirical research appears to have strengthened skepticism about the ability of political communications to change opinion. The media, however, may

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have more impact in local than in national politics. In principle, they should also have more impact in primaries than in general elections, where voters often take their cues from political parties. In any event their effect on candidates must be distinguished from their effect on voters.

With such propositions as background, Veblen has written a careful, sophisticated account of the impact of one paper on New Hampshire politics between 1950 and 1972. Published by William Loeb, an authentic voice of the radical Right, The Manchester *Union Leader* is renowned for savage editorials and occasionally startling manipulation of news. It is uniquely dominant in its political arena, because none of its rivals circulates statewide, and because New Hampshire has no major television station. As Veblen says, if the *Leader* has little political influence, no newspaper can have much. For the same reasons, the *Leader's* importance as a general case may be limited.

Concentrating on gubernatorial and senatorial campaigns between 1960 and 1972, Veblen presents five principal findings relating to candidates and their staffs:

1. A few men were actually talked into running by Loeb himself; others undoubtedly realized they would not have been viable candidates without his support. Some decided not to file when they found he preferred another candidate. Some were deterred by concern about vitriolic personal attacks; others were not. In all, Veblen finds Loeb's influence on political recruitment hard to assess.
2. The paper clearly influenced candidates' handling of issues. Where they agreed with Loeb, they emphasized the issue; where they disagreed, they tended to subordinate it. When confrontation was unavoidable, the most common reaction was a frontal attack on the publisher himself in an effort to win support from the anti-Loeb regional dailies.
3. On the key issue of taxation, Loeb established the agenda of discussion during and between campaigns. He succeded in centering debate on the burdens to be imposed by new taxes rather than on the benefits to be conferred; and he induced friends and foes alike to assess candidates according to whether they *pledged to veto* income and sales tax bills!
4. The paper in effect defined political reality both for critics and supporters because all activists felt they had to read it to find out what was going on in the state.
5. Candidates were influenced by the paper because they *thought* it influenced the electorate.

The validity of this last point is Veblen's secondary, though still important, theme, and it is one he handles circumspectly. Electoral impact, he theorizes, is a function of (1) intensity of advocacy and (2) extent of market domination. It soon becomes evident, however, that his analysis actually includes a third variable—namely, the predispositions of the reading public, which in

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New Hampshire includes a significant number of urban working-class families of Franco-American descent.

In Manchester, where readers' predispositions are reinforced by market domination, the *Leader* is highly influential, and thus it carries more weight in Democratic than in Republican primaries; in the former, Manchester provides three times as much of the vote as in the latter. In all areas, however, the *Leader* makes itself felt not so much by converting voters as by activating or mobilizing them. Finally, Veblen finds that the influence of the newspaper has *risen* during the period covered by his study.

Several topics which Veblen chose not to explore might have provided a fuller view of his subject. Some of the *Leader's* influence derives from a rich network of alliances with police and fire-fighting officials, social clubs, churches, ethnic associations, and veterans organizations. The newspaper regularly carries feature stories about many of these groups, as well as about farm, senior citizen, and labor organizations. Interviews with labor officials would have cast light on the inability of New Hampshire's trade unions to provide a counterweight to the political power of the newspaper. Interviews with media officials in the Greater Boston area might have illuminated the *Leader's* future market position in a state where 60 percent of the people already live within twenty-five miles of the Massachusetts border.

LAWRENCE I. RADWAY
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Productivity in the Local Government Sector *by John P. Ross and Jesse Burkhead. Lexington, Mass., D. C. Heath and Company, 1974.—x, 170 pp. $14.00.*

Ross and Burkhead's *Productivity in the Local Government Sector* is a worthwhile addition to a literature that, most unfortunately, is notable more for its rapidly increasing quantity than its quality. The authors by no means have produced the outstanding theoretical work that is so badly needed in this area, but they have distilled from their own research and experience, plus that of others, a valuable though too brief work.

The first three chapters succinctly and quite adequately deal with the conceptual and measurement problems of public sector productivity. For anyone who desires a short course on the subject, Chapters 2 and 3 are particularly valuable. Chapter 4 surveys previous empirical analyses of public sector productivity, primarily studies dealing with the federal government. The fifth and sixth chapters represent an attempt to construct a model for the analysis of public sector productivity organized around the principle that "a functional relationship (exists) among expenditures, the cost of inputs, workload, quality

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and productivity" (p. 126). Data from New York City and several other New York local governments are analyzed in Chapter 6 in an attempt to illustrate the utility of the analytical model discussed in the preceding chapter.

While it is easy to pick away at some fine points in Chapter 6, wherein lies the central exposition of their analytical model, the authors in fact deserve applause for at least attempting some rudimentary analysis of productivity data. Their indices for workoad are inadequate and their definition of labor costs incomplete, but analysts with more sophisticated assumptions or better data easily can apply the central concept adopted by Ross and Burkhead for productivity analysis—"projected value." The concept of projected value is based on the central hypothesis noted earlier: that a functional relationship (one that is measureable and therefore of utility to managerial officials) exists among expenditures, workload, productivity, and quality.

The major weakness of the book is its preoccupation with productivity analysis and its failure to deal with implementation problems. While it is true that little is known about the conceptual, methodological, and measurement problems inherent in *analyzing* productivity in government, successfully *implementing* productivity gains is something about which even less is known. Not all productivity issues in government require systematic analysis in order to provide a rationale for change. For example, to use a well-known problem, that increased output per man-hour could be achieved by one-man rather than two-man patrol cars(or two-man rather than three-man sanitation trucks) is obvious to most informed persons. The major productivity "problem" in such cases is not how government officials should "conceive" of productivity or measure it but how government officials should alter their political/managerial behavior so as to maximize the probability that traditional work patterns or collective bargaining agreements can be eliminated or modified.

In this sense, the book falls short of providing an integrated view of public sector productivity. But the authors clearly were writing for government staff personnel responsible for analysis rather than public managers responsible for administration, and so the criticism leveled above at the scope of their study is unfair. For what they chose to study, Ross and Burkhead have made a valuable contribution to the literature and, hopefully, practice of public sector productivity. This book, along with C. Brescher and A. Eichner's recent book *Where Have All the Dollars Gone?*, provides evidence that scholars if not public officials are finally beginning to unravel the myriad of problems surrounding understanding of productivity in government.

RAYMOND D. HORTON
Columbia University

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Mugwumps, Morals and Politics, 1884–1920 *by Gerald W. McFarland. Amherst, University of Massachusetts Press, 1975.—xi, 291 pp. $10.00.*

Should a person leave his political party if that party nominates a man he does not respect? During the 1884 elections a group of progressive Republicans called Mugwumps broke with their party over the nomination of James G. Blaine for president. They left the party as a group, declared themselves independent, and supported the Democratic nominee, Grover Cleveland. Mugwumps claimed that Blaine was a spoilsman and thus they could not support him as a matter of principle. McFarland accepts this explanation and presents evidence to support a more idealistic perception of the Mugwumps. The author traces the career of the leading Mugwump personalities and their involvement with the reform causes of the nineteenth century. Many mugwumps had fought for National Civil Service Reform. Some had been involved in the development of professional associations and learned societies.

McFarland believes that his data outline a rather consistent pattern of reform sentiment among the Mugwumps prior to the Blaine nomination. The author believes that the Mugwumps movement was not simply a plutocratic effort to regain power lost to the political machines but a serious attempt by the professional and business elite to continue the moral momentum of recent civil reforms. To make this argument, McFarland chooses to ignore some of the political events surrounding the Mugwumps movement. By focusing on personalities and their rhetoric McFarland leaves the impression that Mugwumps were actors in a drama that had the nation as an audience. This was not the case. The Mugwumps were a perfect example of what we now call the Eastern establishment. McFarland does make this point but fails to show how the movement was related to various political changes in the population.

There are several other problems with the McFarland study. The author does not tell us why and how the Mugwumps failed in their attempt to nominate Senator George F. Edmunds of Vermont at the 1884 Republican convention. Were the Mugwumps poor losers? He does not supply any new evidence that James G. Blaine was more than a "symbolic" villain of the Mugwumps. Why did Mugwumps feel that Senator Edmunds' record was better than Blaine's? What was in the record of Grover Cleveland, the then governor of New York, that recommended him to the Mugwumps? Why didn't the Mugwumps form a new party? McFarland fails to answer these questions.

To the author's credit he does supply more background data on the leading personalities among the Mugwumps. McFarland does succeed in ascertaining that the Mugwumps were not the idle rich, but members of the professional/managerial class. The new data on the biography of Mugwumps alone make the book worth reading. Scholars may be able to glean some information about

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personalities and linkages among reform organizations. Nonetheless, the book will change few minds about the nature of reform politics of the Gilded Age.

WILBUR C. RICH
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Gentleman Boss: The Life of Chester Alan Arthur *by Thomas C. Reeves, New York, Alfred A. Knopf, 1975.—xvii, 500 pp. $15.00.*

Most historians have stressed the transformation of spoilsman Chet Arthur into President Chester Arthur, and Reeves is no exception. He views Arthur's pre-presidential years from the hostile standpoint of civil service reformers, relying particularly on Silas W. Burt for "many of the rarest and most perceptive insights about Arthur" (p. 39). Burt knew Arthur well and was a good observer, but he wrote his sketch of Arthur's career after they became estranged over civil service reform and after Arthur had deeply wounded him by failing to reappoint him New York naval officer. During the presidential years, however, Reeves quite properly discounts the hostile comments about Arthur by reformers and the followers of James G. Blaine. Reeves tends to place Arthur in the worst light while he served as Senator Roscoe Conkling's chief lieutenant and as collector of the port of New York, and in the best light while president. For example, when Arthur defended his administration of the customhouse, Reeves says he "oozed with self-righteousness" (p. 142), but when Arthur as president just as self-righteously declared he had always maintained that a public officer should be "absolutely free as any other citizen to give or withhold" political contributions (p. 323), Reeves treats it with the healthy skepticism it deserves but does not accuse Arthur of self-righteousness and avoids the slimy verb. These interpretive nuances help Reeves perpetuate the notion of Arthur's "Prince Hal-like" conversion on becoming president. Seeing little continuity in Arthur's career, Reeves stresses "the abrupt but nonetheless genuine transformation from a spoils-hungry, no-holds-barred Conkling henchman into a restrained, dignified Chief Executive who commanded the admiration of the American people" (p. 420). Reeves does not recognize that the dignified president's behavior—though influenced by Garfield's assassination—was rooted in his earlier administrative and political experiences as the gentleman boss.

Though his overall view of Arthur is familiar, much of Reeves's material is not. His work in uncovering papers bearing on Arthur's public and private life is of more than usual significance since Arthur destroyed his papers shortly before dying. Reeves's diligence, however, cannot make up entirely for their loss. Often developments cannot be viewed from Arthur's perspective, and Reeves is reduced at times to using words such as "perhaps," "surely," and "ap-

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parently" (p. 117). Arthur "appeared particularly interested" (p. 349) in the birth of the new steel navy, but Reeves's good chapter on that subject focuses on Secretary of the Navy William E. Chandler because the only Arthur citations worthy of mention are in the president's messages to Congress. Politicians who destroy their papers not only arouse suspicions of shady behavior but also prevent the delineation of their worthwhile contributions.

The paucity of Arthur documents makes Reeves's new material particularly valuable. From it Reeves has fleshed out a portrait of Arthur. He was a sensitive, emotional, and private man who resented reporters and shielded his family from the public. Reeves is particularly skillful in handling Arthur's medical problems. While historians have realized that Arthur died of Bright's disease, they have not been aware that it began debilitating him less than a year after Garfield's assassin had thrust him into the White House. Rather than alarm a public that had scarcely recovered from the shock of Garfield's murder, Arthur kept his illness a closely guarded secret. Failing health explains how, despite his advantage as incumbent, one of the nation's most astute political managers could mount an unbelievably ineffectual campaign for the 1884 presidential nomination. Reeves argues convincingly that because of his condition Arthur did not wish the nomination but went through the motions lest suspicions be aroused. Recently discovered Arthur letterbooks also enable Reeves to document more fully than previous biographers Arthur's talents for political organization in the campaign of 1880.

More than half of Reeves's book portrays Arthur as gentleman boss, but the solid contributions of both Arthur and Reeves fall in the presidential years. Reeves emphasizes that Arthur tried to convict the star-route thieves, conscientiously enforced by the civil service law, made reasonably good appointments, worked for tariff revision, strengthened the navy, and rejected Blaine's aggressive foreign policy. Arthur fulfilled the nation's desire for "calm and confidence" (p. 421), and Reeves concludes that "his record as Chief Executive is both respectable and admirable" (p. 423). Always interesting and informative and at times moving and original—particularly in relating Arthur's illness to his political actions—Reeves has made a valuable contribution toward the understanding of Arthur and his administration.

ARI HOOGENBOOM
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Hidden from History: Rediscovering Women in History from the 17th Century to the Present *by Sheila Rowbotham, New York, Pantheon Books, 1974.—xxxvi, 183 pp. $7.95.*

What purports to be "hidden from history" in Sheila Rowbotham's most recent effort to wed Marxism and feminism in the record of women's growth in con-

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sciousness, usually as subjugated and ineffectual, sometimes as potentially powerful and transforming. From the Diggers and Ranters of the seventeenth century to post-Pankhurst militant trade unionism, Rowbotham traces a radical tradition within which British women have struggled to relate their grievances to those of the society within which they functioned as an almost always invisible group. That they were not a self-conscious class so much as a loosely defined group is evident in the absence of unified goals even among women in the same economic strata. All the more revealing, therefore, are the ways in which political parties occasionally succeeded in accommodating the needs of middle- and upper-class feminists and of farmers' wives and factory workers. Indeed, the value for students of political effectiveness of a closely researched, if often partisan, study of this kind is that it points up instructive contrasts in the degrees of sensitivity to the feminist cause of such radical organizations as the Independent Labor party with its fuzzy socialism permitting considerable hospitality to suffrage and the Social Democratic Federation, more doctrinaire in its Marxism, but coexisting with a lethal amalgam of "anti-semitism, jingoism, chauvinism and the eugenic superman" (p. 95).

Like their American counterparts, the early British feminists were divided on the value of the vote as a means of securing their larger freedoms, since the vote was to be exercised on issues anticipated and defined by men. And Rowbotham's analysis of the watered-down British feminism of the 1930s recalls Gail Parker's distinction between the American feminists of the Heroic Age and their more cautious successors: "Feminism meant more reforms, more welfare, equal pay. It did not mean any longer a rejection of a man-made way of living and a man-made way of seeing" (p. 162). Also like the Americans, they differed in their willingness to feel hostility to men, with anarchist women the most reluctant to entertain strategies that bypassed harmony between the sexes. In fact, throughout the maze of political and industrial events, together with psychological and emotional issues like birth control and eugenics, that the author reconstructs, the view that men take of women (and only gradually the view women take of men) emerges as the single reliable indicator of historical change.

This is illustrated in the impact of ideas like those of Edward Carpenter and D. H. Lawrence. Both Carpenter and Lawrence wished to simplify life by a return to nature and were opposed to the dehumanizing effects of modern industrial society. Carpenter's prewar *Love's Coming of Age* was for many advanced souls a testament to the possibility of erotic freedom without the continual assertion of male power endemic to industrialism. Its popularity among radicals and feminists reflected the hopefulness of prewar socialism. D. H. Lawrence, whose thoughts in many other respects echoed Carpenter's, moved away from his earlier affinity with the socialist opponents of industrialism toward a mystical ideology that contemporary feminists are not the first to have attacked as fascist and chauvinist. Through the early convergence of

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their ideas and their later differences Rowbotham identifies feminist gains and losses before and after World War I. For those who still believe that the vote, together with the sexual freedoms of the postwar era, came near to bringing women their long-sought equality, a deeper study of Carpenter and Lawrence might discourage the easy equation of political with feminist advance. As Rowbotham says of the postwar mood: "Instead of political opposition to feminism as a movement, the new defenders of patriarchy told women that their sexual needs could only be met by a man who humiliated them" (p. 126). More than ever, women faced a no-win future.

The history that precedes the modern era goes far toward explaining feminism's habitually slow progress. The competing demands of home and family often blocked efforts toward large-scale organization of women. Another obstacle was the classic uncertainty felt by critics of the prevailing system as to whether the capitalist structure ought to be toppled or reformed. If the former, monogamy might be questioned; if the latter, women's role within the nuclear family could not risk being overhauled. Furthermore, the fragmentation of feminism that characterized the American movement in the 1920s following suffrage was typical of the British feminist scene of the 1930s following full suffrage there. It seemed that the moment women gained the vote they either sank into apathy or emulated men in their jockeying for power within the system.

Rowbotham's history is, like her previous works, an ingenuous outpouring of selected facts and impassioned conclusions. Its relentless attention to the relationship between feminist sentiment and political action is impressive but in part deceptive. With all its historical insight it begs the question of whether political and economic equality, however liberating for women, can ensure that sexual needs and social needs will (or should) function in perfect unison.

ANNETTE K. BAXTER
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Suffragists and Liberals: The Politics of Woman Suffrage in England *by David Morgan. Totowa, N. J., Rowman and Littlefield, 1975.—vii, 184 pp. $12.50.*

The first political breakthrough by women in modern times is an especially appropriate focus for a book published during the year designated by the United Nations as the International Year of Women. Because England was years ahead of other nations in enfranchising its women, a dissection of the conditions leading to this event is especially interesting.

British historian David Morgan rises admirably to his task of examining the reasoning of the Liberal cabinet immediately prior to their granting the

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franchise to women in Great Britain. Readers with only passing interests in woman's politics will appreciate his balanced interpretation of the suffragists' role in the intricate and interconnecting politics of the period. Feminist readers, advanced in their interests and reading, will appreciate the clear prose presenting a wealth of new detail on the birth of modern feminism.

The increasingly favorable climate for women's suffrage in England at the turn of the century has generally been well-documented elsewhere. With women constituting over one-third of the work force in England and with status jobs increasingly filled by women, the argument for including women in the expanding franchise seemed reasonable. With the coming to power in 1905 of a Liberal government, lead by a cabinet with a majority favorable to women's issues, the inclusion of women to the enfranchised public seemed imminent. Yet it took thirteen more years for the most basic of rights, voting, to be granted to women by a party claiming to represent an ideology based on equality of opportunity. Morgan addresses himself to the political reasons for the long delay and sympathetically evaluates the several groups of women engaging in guerrilla militancy.

The usual problems faced by groups attempting to achieve nationwide change were faced by suffragists in England. They were unable to sustain a solid front, and split into competing groups based on ideology and technique. Members of the cabinet favorable to suffrage sacrificed women's issues for general party unity during days of national divisiveness. Women's issues were intricately linked to other electoral reform problems, plural voting, and the continuing Irish question. Finally, the structural characteristics of the Parliamentary system demanded that the party in power focus on consensus issues rather than potentially divisive issues as the woman's vote was certain to be.

The distinctive contribution of Morgan's book is his description of the obstructionist role played by Prime Minister Asquith in delaying voting on the suffrage issue. As the key person controlling government action on the issue, he allowed an unexpected technical ruling of the Common's speaker to defer voting on the Suffrage Bill. Asquith stood against bringing the issue in a government bill, advising that the issue could be handled in a private member's bill, generally considered to be much less effective after passage. He allowed the plural voting bill, which was bound to be defeated, to include woman's suffrage despite his earlier pledge to allow Parliament to rule separately on suffrage. Asquith reasoned, "Voting . . . was a duty and a privilege, not a right. Democracy had no quarrel with 'distinctions which nature has created . . .' only when a majority of women wanted the vote, and Parliament neglected the interests of women, could Suffrage be 'practical politics' " (p. 124).

Why Asquith perceived the national sentiment to be contrary to the general feeling expressed by his cabinet, by Commons, and by dozens of women's groups is, unfortunately, never adequately explained by the author. Nor is As-

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quith's final conversion to the principle of suffrage linked to personality, expediency, or politics despite the author's heavy reliance upon memoires for detail. " 'Asquith's failure to see either the necessity or the urgency of this [woman's suffrage] is the most serious criticism that can be made of his leadership . . .' due to the blindness of Asquith to the needs of the party and the opportunity it had to exploit electoral appointments" (p. 157).

Because of Asquith, the Liberal party delayed passage of the Suffrage Act and lost the opportunity to make a peaceful change in the franchise by adhering to its own ideology. Only the external pressures of World War I forced the party in 1918 to accede to the demands of its women. And thus the cycle, repeated several times since, began: nationwide demands by women for political rights, neglected by government, resulting in frustrated hostilities, culminating in advancements due to the exigency of war. The incongruity of political advancements for women being made during time of war, while women are actively campaigning against the war, becomes first evident to the world.

PATRICIA A. KYLE
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The Politics of Women's Liberation: A Case Study of an Emerging Social Movement and Its Relation to the Policy Process *by Jo Freeman. New York, David McKay Company, Inc., 1975.—xvi, 268 pp. $8.95.*

This book will make a significant contribution to the literature of the women's liberation movement. At the outset, the author states that "this is a book about social movements, public policy and feminism" (p. vii). Although the term "politics" is never explicitly defined and thus somewhat belies the book's title, other terms, assumptions, and hypotheses are specifically examined and developed. Freeman assumes that there is a mutual relationship between social movements and public policy, and on this theoretical base she examines the women's liberation movement. Developing the language and literature of social movements, interest groups, political organizations, and social change, the author draws her analysis from the basic economic and social conditions which created the "roots of revolt" to the present-day policy impact of the movement.

After setting the social and economic stage of revolt, Freeman attempts to explain why the first and second waves of the feminist movement were generally led by white middle-class women, particularly women in the professions, by using the concept of "relative deprivation." Freeman goes on to discuss the origins of the women's liberation movement in the general terms of social-movement theories. She develops three major propositions upon which her analysis rests. One, that a preexisting communications network was needed; two, that this network had to be cooptable [*sic*] to the new ideas of the in-

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cipient movement; and three, that a situation of strain was required. She couples these elements with a fourth, organizing effort, which together contributed to the emergence of the women's liberation movement in the mid-1960s. Within these propositions, Freeman gives theoretical shape to the movement's development. The author then evamines the two "branches" of the women's liberation movement with the caveat that "structure and style rather than ideology more accurately differentiate the two branches . . ." (p. 51). Since "ideology" is another term that has not been explicitly defined, this argument is somewhat diluted. The process of growth of the "branches," however, is effectively analyzed as the result of values and norms of the originators, internal dynamics of the organization, and environmental effects. Thus two such unlikely groups as NOW and the New York Radical Feminists can be validly discussed within one theoretical framework. Freeman ends her book with a careful analysis of the movement's impact on policy and attempts also to examine the impact of policy on the movement.

The author has succeeded in taking the potentially unwieldly topic of the women's liberation movement and has firmly grounded it in social-movement theory. To this extent the book goes well beyond much of the literature in this area. When necessary, Freeman develops and reshapes the theory emanating from the literature to fit the reality of the movement. For example, mass-society theory suggests that those most likely to join a mass movement are those most atomized and isolated; however, Freeman points out that those women most atomized—the housewives—are least likely to join a feminist group (p. 65).

The author initially states her methodology as being based primarily on participant observation and suggests the advantages of this method. It would have been useful, particularly to the student, if she also indicated some of the concomitant disadvantages of this approach.

A more detailed discussion of Congresswoman Griffiths' discharge petition of the Equal Rights Amendment would have been desirable, as well as an examination of the paradox between the enormous constituency pressure for ERA which aided its passage through Congress and the fact that the amendment, after a quick start, is now limping through the ratification process of the states. The value in Freeman's book is that she suggests a theory within which these and other problems of the women's liberation movement can be addressed.

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The Problem of Party Government *by Richard Rose. New York, The Free Press, 1975.—ix, 502 pp. $14.95.*

Pressure Groups in Britain *edited by Richard Kimber and J. J. Richardson. Totowa, N. J., Rowman and Littlefield, 1974.—iii, 304 pp. $11.50.*

For Professor Rose "the problem" in his title is that "political parties are a necessary, important" but "imperfect feature of British Government today" (p. 1). Parties are imperfect in that "the men placed in office lack the ability to realize their intentions: they are best at justifying whatever is formally done in their name" (p. 1).

These men—the ministers—do not come on stage until Part Three. Part One comprises "Elections and Popular Preferences," including chapters on social structure and party differences (as revealed, essentially, in voting but also in the occupational background of members of Parliament); the theory and practice of campaigning; and the significance of elections. Part Two ("Parties as Organizations") includes chapters on the several components of parties (in Parliament; the machine; and in the country); the party "bureaucrats" themselves; the views of party activists; and party finance.

The book could well be read, especially by students, for these two parts alone. The first really has nothing new but the familiar material is brought up to date and skillfully employed, as one would expect of one of the two or three most accomplished empirical political scientists now operating within the British Isles.

Part Two does contain original material, especially on the party machines and bureaucrats. Anyone who has beaten a path to Smith Square (headquarters of both major parties) and later walked on to Old Queen Street (location of the Conservative Research Department) knows that Rose has few rivals as a guide to that neck of the woods. The question arising here is of balance and proportion. The "party in Parliament" is dispatched in little more than four pages; the "party in Smith Square" in about nine. As the complementary chapter on the party bureaucrats extends over thirty-one pages, the concentration on one component of parties to the neglect of the Parliamentary component is obvious and may be excessive even if party as such is one's chosen subject. It surely is excessive if, as here, one's declared goal is to persuade the reader that party government in Britain is "imperfect."

As to that thesis, Part One reaches a kind of climax in Chapter V, where the issue is whether the two-party system in Britain offers "enough choice to the electorate" (p. 111). The conclusion, never stated in so many words, is that it does not. Similarly, Part Two comes to a head in Chapter X with its plea for greater popular political involvement and a sketch of how that could be accomplished. Part Three crowns all. As a source of government policy, party is found to be of limited value. "The making of a Cabinet minister tends to

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foreclose greatly his influence upon policy-making" (p. 378), restricting him to mere salesmanship or administration. This part of the discussion culminates in Chapter XV, "Obstacles to Party Government," an original statement of the necessary and sufficient conditions of party influence on government policy. These are then used as standards by which performance may be judged, and when the comparison is made, party government is found wanting. Proposals follow for strengthening party government, since the "greatest flaw in the present system of British government is that the parties, when occupying the seats of power, are incapable of meeting all the expectations that they raise" (p. 427).

That brings the reader full circle. Is the central argument convincing? It would take more than a single reading of this complex book, with its elusive "story line" extending over 480 pages, to be sure of oneself, but one has doubts. Some of the links in this very long chain of argument seem to be weak. For example, Rose's use of the 1964 Labour Party Manifesto as a test of party influence on government policy is hardly adequate in that it pursues some of the undertakings in that twenty-four page document while neglecting others. Rose mentions the omissions and is defensive about them (pp. 409 and 410) but not to the extent of being deterred from using the results as grist to his mill. Even with the items pursued, one wonders about the standards of success that he chooses to apply in that context. He plainly regards Labour's one-third and the Conservatives' one-half "achievement score" as unacceptably low (p. 410), but some might judge it quite commendable, all things considered. In any case the standards and their derivation surely need to be explicitly discussed and then applied over a long period, scarcely less than a generation. In this connection Rose's view that the United States has the edge on Britain because the president brings to the executive "several thousand" (p. 435) partisans recruited for "relevant skills" (mainly the ability to run large-scale organizations) is rather puzzling. In 1969 the total was more like 2000 than several, most of whom could *not* be equated with ministers in Britain. Less than a third were drawn from business, probably the main training ground for the relevant skills. As to partisanship, little more than half were Republicans; 10–11 percent were even Democrats (the remainder were independents or undeclared). The American practice may be a good one but should it be commended for strengthening the influence of party on policy, which is what Rose wants to see in Britain and to some extent by that very method?

All in all, this is perhaps one of those books whose parts are better than the whole, but every specialist in British politics and in the comparative study of parties will want to make his or her own assessment. Certainly the parts are valuable and will be drawn on by scholars for a considerable time to come. But a later edition should remove the "typos," of which there are at least a dozen. These include "Aneurin Bevin" (p. 327, enough to make both Nye (Bevan)

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and Ernie (Bevin) cry out from beyond the grave), "Sir Antony" Eden (p. 365), and "not workable" in subheading 2 on page 381 where the sense requires "not unworkable" as on page 384.

The Kimber and Richardson book is a reader using the case-study approach. It is a deplorable example of the genre. About a third of the pieces rely on material garnered in the 1940s and 1950s. Who now needs to know, for the study of pressure groups, the district voting for members of the national executive of the National Union of Teachers between 1945 and 1954? In any case, all but three of the fifteen pieces are readily accessible in any decent library. Of that three, Martin Harrison's fourteen pages on trade unions and the Labour party are useful but make little sense unless one has read his important book of long ago (1960). The editors' (and S. K. Brookes's) piece on the National Parks Campaign is interesting to the specialist but merely descriptive. The editors' "Some Aspects of the T. U. C. and C. B. I. as Pressure Groups" turns out to be just a list of committees on which these "peaks' 'are represented, which is about as directly useful an addition to political knowledge as the entries in the London Telephone Directory.

GRAHAM WOOTTON
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Elites and Power in British Society *edited by Philip Stanworth and Anthony Giddens. New York, Cambridge University Press, 1974.—xiii, 261 pp. Cloth, $17.50; paper, $6.95.*

Elites in Western Democracy: British Political Sociology Yearbook, Vol. 1 *edited by Ivor Crewe. New York, Halsted Press, 1974.—360 pp. $15.95.*

While much has changed in Britain in the last decade, the method of studying elites by analyzing their social background continues along traditional lines laid down by Harold J. Laski in an article in the *American Political Science Review* XXII: 1 (1928), although in the present two volumes there are signs of doubt. Stanworth and Giddens note in passing (p. 81) that one must study the role conception of a company chairman's job as well as his social background—and then proceed to concentrate on the latter. The *Sociology Yearbook* presents evidence demonstrating that social background is not a good predictor of attitudes, but then it develops exceptions based on a polyglot pool of data.

There are several new ideas and evidence raised in the course of the twenty-three chapters spread almost evenly across these two volumes. In the Stanworth and Giddens volume, Christopher J. Hewitt present an imaginative essay designed to meet Edward Shils's plea for studies of what elites do when they are "eliting." Twenty-four major British government decisions in the period 1944–1964 are studied, and participants in each noted. Hewitt demonstrates that the

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involvement of particular organizations providing elites with ex-officio prominence was limited, and none was consistently successful. Moreover, he marshals data from public opinion surveys to note that the government of the day usually acted in accord with clearly expressed popular preferences.

R. E. Pahl and J. T. Winkler's study of company directors in the same volume reinforces the importance of examining what elites *do* (or do *not* do). In many conventional elite studies, pluralist nonexecutive directors, sitting on many different company boards, are hypothesized to be the most important individuals. But empirical analysis indicates that they are the "easiest of all directors to manipulate because they generally know less about the industries of the boards on which they sit" (p. 111). The emphasis given to expertise and to continuing involvement in the affairs of a particular organization or industry suggests that power may be more likely exercised by specialized, achievement-based, and fragmented groups of people—as pluralists suggest—rather than centralized along lines conventionally argued in British sociology.

The most interesting study in the *Political Sociology Yearbook* also departs from conventional approaches. In "The Ideology of a Managerial Elite" Colin Crouch uses published reports of the National Board for Prices and Incomes, 1965–1970, to elucidate the political values and ideals of a heterogeneous body of men who shared one thing in common: the confidence of a Labour government and of Whitehall civil servants that they were "sensible chaps." Crouch does not ask how such men were recruited, but rather, where they see society going. The picture that he draws is not of a socialist or free market economy, but rather of a hierarchical society with a large number of finely graded distinctions based on income and occupation; this society is labeled "an administered bureaucracy." Leaving elite theory even further behind, Crouch then goes on to comment interestingly upon the "managerial corporatism" that provides a structure for such a society.

Each of the volumes has an introduction providing a setting for the disparate chapters that follow. Giddens contributes a typology of elite formations and power holding, based upon differences in recruitment (open versus closed); structure (high or low social and moral integration) and power (diffused or centralized). While the clarification of concepts is always useful, it is unfortunate that the chapters that follow do not show us how (or whether) the classification schema can be sustained in empirical research. Crewe's introduction is a less pretentious review and critique of existing elite studies.

The student of British society will probably find the Stanworth and Giddens volume more useful, because its chapters add to our knowledge of the social background of top people. The more behaviorally oriented political scientist will probably reach first for Crewe's volume, since it concentrates less attention upon British society and more upon methodological studies.

RICHARD ROSE
University of Strathclyde

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Nonconformity in Modern British Politics *by Stephen Koss. Hamden, Conn., Archon Books, 1975.—263 pp. $14.50.*

The failure of social philosophies shaped by systems of values, rather than by the complexity of modern domestic and international circumstances, to effectively confront that complexity is one of the most disturbing facts of life in the mid-twentieth century. In sprightly fashion, Stephen Koss chronicles one of the most poignant of these failures.

The Protestant Nonconformist Churches of Victorian Britain had helped many men—ranging from provincial industrialists to Welsh and North Country miners—to find the moral order they craved in a too rapidly changing society, to fight for a place in the sun, and to bring their moral sensitivities to bear upon national politics generally. In its political guise as "militant dissent,'" Nonconformity won for its adherents all but the ceremonial trappings of religious equality. It provided one of the three battalions which won victory for the Liberal party in the general election of 1868. It stimulated and lent popular power to Gladstone's Bulgarian and Midlothian campaigns, the high watermark of moral concern as a force in the debate on British foreign policy.

Koss' story begins at the turn of the century. The religious and moral power of Nonconformity had begun to wane, but it was temporarily reinvigorated by revivalist missions in England and Wales and it was mobilized better than ever for political action by the creation in 1896 of the National Council of Evangelical Free Churches and by the gratuitous offence which Balfour gave to its interests through the Education Act of 1902. Nonconformists' organization and outrage did much to make the general election of 1906 the devastating Liberal landslide that it was. That election raised their Parliamentary representation to a height not matched since Cromwell's day. But the accomplishment began to disintegrate within months; and, after another generation, it disappeared almost without trace. It was annihilated by long-term trends—the supercession of religious by class sensitivities as the determinant of political choice, and the consequent destruction of Nonconformity's political cohesion; the particularly insistent refusal of all of the Labour party's leaders, however impeccable their individual Nonconformist credentials, to allow religious loyalties even equality with, let alone precedence over, secular ones; the absence of a new, interwar generation of Nonconformist ministerial leaders comparable in talent to their Victorian predecessors; through all, Nonconformity's "fatal inability to devise a strategy consonant with past principles and present needs" (p. 179) —and by shorter, sharper blows, particularly World War I.

These were the same trends and blows that undermined Nonconformity's traditional political partner, the Liberal party. The two descended into oblivion hand in hand. Liberals' debilitating division over the issue of military conscription in World War I, for example, was mirrored among Nonconformists. So was the unedifying Liberal spectacle in the interwar years of squabbling

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leaders. More and more, as time passed, the Liberal hand which politically self-conscious Nonconformity clasped was the soiled one of Lloyd George. Koss traces the morally ambiguous, mutually misleading return of the Welsh wizard to the partnership through which he had entered politics with a particularly fine touch.

Because the story is of a lost cause, until now it has gone largely forgotten and untold. Lost causes can safely be forgotten only if they have been replaced by successful ones. Nonconformity was not superceded by successful rivals. The same social complexity that overwhelmed it also enervated its religious and moral rivals. Koss' book needs to be read, not only because it reflects a great deal of original research and is engagingly written, but, much more, because it brings this void hauntingly to mind.

PETER MARSH
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French Politics in Transition: The Years After DeGaulle *by Roy C. Macridis. Cambridge, Mass., Winthrop Publishers Inc., 1975.—ix, 165 pp. Cloth, $7.95; paper $3.95.*

Academic books on recent politics are indispensable but difficult to write. Without them students have no clue to that dark age of the day before yesterday; yet inevitably they have to be composed without perspective. Anyone who has attempted the task will sympathize with the author's predicament and understand his tendency to concentrate on specific and quantifiable events. The core of Professor Macridis' book is a detailed account of two elections, for the National Assembly in March 1973 and for the presidency of the Republic in May 1974, which together take nearly half his space. They are preceded by a brief introduction on DeGaulle's (mainly institutional) legacy, and by thirty pages on Pompidou's presidency; and followed by a short conclusion speculating about future trends. These three chapters all deal with the working of institutions, the main lines of foreign and domestic policy, social change and popular participation—a lot of ground to cover in limited space. Pompidou's chapter is the most useful, for DeGaulle's is inevitably both sketchy and familiar, and it is too soon to do more than outline the problems facing the new president. About these, Macridis is a cautious optimist. He hardly hints at the seamy side of the Fifth Republic—the authoritarian tendencies in the police and information services and among some Gaullist camp-followers, and the repeated scandals in finance and property development. He contends that the rapid postwar economic developments—for which he gives too little credit to the previous regime—have created a new bourgeoisie with a modern outlook, which is fast making obsolete the old divisions between Left and Right, and

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offering a base for the pragmatic reformer he expects President Giscard d'Estaing to become.

The two electoral chapters are quite different from the others. They go into detail about the campaigns, party programs, voting figures, transfers between ballots, and social and geographical distribution of the electorate. The author's sympathies are clearly, even blatantly, with the winner, and his theme is the importance of the old Center vote, fragmented in 1973 but, he claims, reunited behind Giscard a year later. Given his extended treatment there are some surprising omissions: the intense Gaullist bitterness against Giscard (who was blamed for forcing the general to retire); the promotion to the premiership of the then Gaullist minister of the interior, who had maneuvered incessantly to undermine his own party's candidate Chaban-Delmas; the well-publicized character defects which may well have cost Chaban his early lead over Giscard; the extent of favorite-son voting, far more marked than in the United States today. The author does point out that the geographical distribution of the second-ballot vote in 1974 closely resembled the Left-Right split in 1936 and 1946, and that its social distribution "seemed to revive again the traditional class vote even more than . . . 1973" (p. 121). He explains, however, that though Left and Right may survive in popular consciousness—or subconsciousness—they have clearly changed their character. Certainly the division is less ideological than it once was, and turns more on rival policies for dealing with the grievances of specific groups, though he seems to underestimate the importance of similar differences in the past. His case that French parties are converging is made easier since he believes that "a commitment to a growing social and economic equality . . . [is] in essence the 'program' of the Gaullists and their allies" (p. 69); and fully accepts the reforming credentials of Giscard, who for eleven years as minister of finance helped block the changes he now advocates, while casting doubt on those of Chaban-Delmas. His thesis was also easier to maintain before the Communist party, alarmed at being overtaken by the rapid growth of the Socialists, reverted to intransigent criticism of their partners to the detriment of Left unity and the advantage of the present government—a typical hazard for instant commentators which Macridis had, however, the prescience to foresee as a possibilty.

In general this is a useful work which makes many excellent points, especially about likely institutional developments, and emphasizes some genuine trends. But as a confessed past skeptic about the survival prospects of the regime, the author shows some of the zeal of the convert: he is so impressed by the miracle that he overlooks too many past flaws and future weaknesses.

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The Soviet Union: Yesterday, Today, Tomorrow; A Colloquy of American Long Timers in Moscow *edited by Foy D. Kohler and Mose L. Harvey. Miami, Fla., Center for Advanced International Studies, University of Miami, 1975.—xiii, 220 pp. Cloth, $9.95; paper, $6.95.*

This superb volume is a remarkably successful example of the conference report, a literary genre normally intoxicating the reader with justifiable boredom. The book is full of conversational insights into the nature of the Soviet political system and serves up some informed speculation concerning the future evolution of the Soviet Union. Although some students of comparative politics may regret the absence of scholarly paraphernalia, this will be an immensely stimulating book for those concerned with policy making and the imponderables of Soviet conduct at home and in world affairs.

The obvious reason for this volume's success lies in the distinction of the conferees, who include, *inter alia*, George Kennan, Foy Kohler, Jacob Beam (all former ambassadors to the USSR), Frederick Barghoorn, long-time Moscow correspondent Harry Shapiro, and Thomas P. Whitney, Solzhenitsyn's translator. The less obvious reason for success lies with the editors, who shrewdly decided to preserve the original substance and sequence of remarks at the conference (held in February 1975) even when such a procedure reveals that the emperor has no clothes. The resulting occasional error is more than compensated for by admirable candor and spirited riposte.

The volume ranges widely from compelling reminiscence to probing analysis of such possible "determinants of Soviet behavior" as ideology, the Russian peasant heritage, the democratic movement, and Russian sentiments of inferiority and superiority toward the West. In addition, the conferees discuss detente, multipolarity, the international communist movement(s), prospective leadership changes in the Soviet Union, nationalities problems, and the role of foreign broadcasting into the Soviet Union. Mercifully, the origins of the cold war are not replayed at length. For the harried reader the editors have included "Highlights of Conference Views" in an opening chapter. While useful in summarizing selective aspects of the conference proceedings, it necessarily lacks the color and nuance of the verbatim remarks of the participants.

One of the book's chief virtues is in underscoring the extent to which even experts disagree about key elements of the Soviet political system. The formidable array of experienced Westerners represented in this book cannot agree even on such fundamental questions as the role of ideology in motivating Soviet policy and basic Soviet foreign policy objectives. While such disagreement is hardly novel, it nevertheless points up the degree to which estimates of Soviet external behavior still rest in the eye of the beholder. As it happens, most of the beholding in this volume is done by "ultra-hards," and "hards," in William Welch's useful if not entirely satisfactory scheme of classification.

In the ne plus ultra category, Elbridge Durbrow, U.S. Ambassador to South

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Vietnam from 1957 to 1961 and counselor of the U.S. Embassy in Moscow from 1946 to 1948, delivers what he apparently believes is a withering dismissal of detente: "You mean we're all going to be girls together and we're all going to get along fine, no matter what the Kremlin does?" (p. 141). In case any of the (real) men missed the point, he says later: "Now we're all girls together and it's working very well for Moscow as we bask under the euphoric opiate of detente" (p. 190). While this is strong medicine, Durbrow is gentler on other matters. In an extended aside on Vietnam (pp. 172–174), he is at pains to absolve Presidents Diem and Thieu of the "unfair" allegations concocted by the American media that they were "ruthless dictators."

A few such digressions should not be allowed to obscure the fact, however, that this is a fascinating and valuable volume. As we are reminded by the deaths in recent years of such figures as Charles Bohlen, Llewellyn Thompson, Philip Mosely, Merle Fainsod, and Henry Roberts, every opportunity should be taken to draw on the unparalleled experience and, in many cases, wisdom of these "old' Soviet hands." We are in debt to the editors for performing that service with foresight and imagination.

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East Central Europe between the Two World Wars *by Joseph Rothschild. Seattle, University of Washington Press, 1974.—xvii, 420 pp. Cloth, $14.95; paper, $7.95.*

Professor Rothschild has written an outstanding book on a subject of great complexity. His definition of "East Central Europe" embraces all the independent states between Germany and the USSR with the exception of Greece and Austria (in omitting Greece the author seems to be at variance with the editors of the series "A History of East Central Europe," of which this volume is a part). This is a region of tremendous and often bewildering ethnic, religious, social, and political variety. The author successfully imposes order by pointing, in a masterful introduction, to certain common themes. These include economic and social backwardness; political instability with a progression from the sham democracy of an intellectual and bureaucratic elite to authoritarian, though not totalitarian, rule; the presence of insoluable national minorities' problems and strident irredentism; and the vulnerability to pressures from without, especially from Nazi Germany. The introduction is followed by chapters each devoted to a particular country (the three Baltic states are treated together). Here Rothschild generally avoids comparison, preferring the case-study ap-

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proach: "Bulgaria functions as my paradigm for the economics of peasant agriculture, Hungary for the impact of the depression on a transitional economy, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia for political problems rising from multiethnicity, and Poland for the structure and program of a 'government party' " (p. xii). Certain problems, such as the rise of facism, the prevalence of anti-Semitism, and the national minorities, are treated in detail only with regard to particular countries. On the whole, political analysis is emphasized but economics is by no means neglected and statistical data are used with considerable skill. The book concludes with a brief summary of cultural trends, which is helpful on education but rather hurried on the arts. There is a valuable bibliographical essay but virtually no footnotes.

No single scholar can be expected to master the tools needed for a first-hand acquaintance with the histories of all the peoples of Eastern Europe. It follows that specialists will find things with which to disagree. This reviewer cannot fully agree with the assumption (p. 38) that Zionist strength in Poland was a function of anti-Semitism, or that in the late 1930s Zionism was growing stronger among Polish Jews (p. 71). In fact, after 1936 socialism and communism appeared more attractive to many Polish Jews than did Zionism, which was undergoing a severe crisis. Nor, from the Jewish point of view at least, was the minorities bloc established in Poland a particularly "cohesive" one during the 1920s (p. 33). But these are minor points, and on balance the author's handling of the "Jewish question" is excellent. Rothschild's general historical judgments, moreover, are always judicious and convincing. His analysis bears out the point that "The interwar decades were simply too late (and perhaps too early) for multinational states in East Central Europe" (p. 134). His treatment of the nationalities problem is interesting and informative, though he does not answer the perhaps unanswerable question regarding the extent to which nationalism was a genuine sentiment and the extent to which it was manipulated by interested parties.

Rothschild naturally prefers traditional conservative leaders like Horthy to the radical rightists who emerged in the 1930s, but his critique of the egotistical and short-sighted political elites in general—of which his analysis is of particular interest—is especially sharp. The story he has to tell is a melancholy one of decline and fall, of leaders ill prepared and often uninterested in solving the economic and social problems of their largely peasant lands. Yet his summation of the period is not entirely negative. In his view the creation of the new nation-states in the wake of World War I was in every way justified, and their efforts during the interwar period made it certain that their sovereignty would be respected, if limited, after World War II. He is surely correct in pointing out that Pilsudsky, for all his faults, has much to do with the fact that we cannot conceive of Europe today without an independent Poland. And his re-

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jection of the nostalgic view of the old multinational empires is also justified though for some ethnic groups the Hapsburg empire was certainly preferable to the successor states.

Several outstanding works have appeared in English on East Central Europe (one thinks immediately of those by Roberts and Macartney) but Rothschild's book is now the best single volume available on the region as a whole.

EZRA MENDELSOHN
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Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy *by Michael Brecher. New Haven, Conn., Yale University Press, 1975.—xiv, 639 pp. $25.00.*

The gap between traditional scholarship on foreign policy and theoretical analysis has been particularly difficult to bridge. Michael Brecher has devoted fifteen years of research, both alone and in collaboration with others, in efforts to develop an overarching theory of foreign policy and to test it empirically. *Decisions in Israel's Foreign Policy* represents a culmination of his work to date. It is a rich set of theoretical case studies, which uniformly applies his theoretical model to seven major episodes that, since they also include the most significant problems in Israel's foreign policy before the Yom Kippur war, provide a useful survey of the society's external relationships.

Brecher's study is rich not only in terms of the vast empirical research which it organizes and presents, but also because the author boldly engages in some of the most critical issues in current research on foreign policy. If Brecher opens himself to criticism in the process, he and his colleagues also deserve praise for the determination with which this project has been implemented and for the scale of their undertaking.

The organization of the study is straightforward for the first eight chapters, but the ninth and final one ("Theory-Building and Research Findings") seems strangely out of place. The brief introductory chapter appropriately summarizes the theoretical structure which informs the seven case studies, each of which is presented in separate chapters. The theoretical framework is familiar to those who have followed its development in Brecher's previously published essays. The last chapter tests an inventory of hypotheses culled from the theoretical literature on foreign policy with empirical material presented in this study. The insertion of the last chapter appears to be an afterthought and provides an example of how empirically theorizing ought not to be handled.

First, the propositional inventory bears no relationship whatsoever to the book's theoretical design. If it had been incorporated directly in the study to test major extant hypotheses, the theoretical structure could have been greatly strengthened. Second, no effort was made to ascertain whether or when the

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study of Israeli decision making belonged to the universes of cases for which the hypotheses were designed. Indeed, most of the hypotheses were postulated for case studies on United States foreign policy and rarely, in their original form, fit into any explicit universe of cases. Third, Brecher used no explicit measures to test these hypotheses. When the hypotheses are weak to begin with ("the greater x . . . the greater y") or, "there is a tendency for a . . . when b . . .") a single instance provides no test whatsoever for what should loosely be based on a statistical probability. Fourth, almost none of the hypotheses indicated either boundary or initial conditions, the provisions of which are minimal requisites to sensible hypothesizing and testing.

Similar misunderstandings about the nature of the empirical method pervade Brecher's own research design. The design is more a "pretheoretical" checklist of factors which might be important. It provides no means of knowing which factors are most important under specific circumstances. Moreover, the case studies which walk a reader through the theoretical framework simply highlight the factors which appear to be most significant in that instance and no effort is made at systematic generalization or the generation of hypotheses.

Brecher's study, in the last analysis, does not close the gap between traditional narrative scholarship on the one hand and theoretical analysis on the other hand. In fact, the research design presents a cumbersome obstacle to the fluidity of the otherwise fascinating case studies. Readers must continually refer back to the research design to discover the meaning of Brecher's shorthand initials and terminology. While there is little doubt that the lengthy study is a fundamental contribution to scholarship on Israeli foreign policy, the author seems to need a radical change in his theoretical framework if he is to succeed in his efforts to develop significant and highly generalized propositions about foreign policy decision making.

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Council on Foreign Relations, Inc.

The Foreign Relations of Iran: A Developing State in a Zone of Great-Power Conflict *by Shahram Chubin and Sepehr Zabih. Berkeley, University of California Press, 1974.—xiii, 362 pp. $17.50.*

Although considered as a small power in its relations with the West, Iran tries to play the role of a great power in its relations with the countries of the region in which it occupies an important strategic position. This attempt is the legacy of history when Persia (Iran) was a great power in antiquity. After Iran became part of the Islamic empire, Islamic lands became the battleground for the rivalry between Ottoman and Persian dynasts from the sixteenth to the nine-

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teenth century. Persia and Turkey were great powers before they were dwarfed by the rise of the greater powers in Europe.

After the beginning of the nineteenth century, Persia was no longer a great power, even in its own region. Surrounded by the Russian empire to the north and the British empire to the south, Persia's foreign policy objectives were reduced merely to protecting its territory from foreign interventions. Since Russia and Britain were rival powers in central Asia, Persia was able to escape domination or partition by playing off one neighbor against another (only twice did it suffer joint occupation, during World Wars I and II when Britain and Russian fought together against a common enemy).

To enhance its position against rival neighbors, Persia sought the friendship of a third great power—Germany—and received German diplomatic support in international councils, though this friendship proved dangerous during war as it gave Britain and Russia an excuse to jointly occupy Persian territory for military reasons.

After World War II, the United States was drawn into great powers' rivalry and Iran's security became an objective of American foreign policy. First the United States played the role of a third power in its relations with Iran. With the Korean war and the intensification of the cold war, the United States stepped in to fill the place of Britain, which no longer could protect the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf. American policy toward Iran combined the objectives of British policy as well as the role of a third power.

Few books have dealt with Iran's foreign policy after the war, though many studies have been devoted to earlier periods. *The Foreign Relations of Iran* by Dr. Shahram Chubin and Dr. Sepehr Zabih is essentially an analysis of the foreign policy of Iran during the last decade and not really a systematic study of Iran's foreign relations in the broad sense. The authors' aims are to define the objectives of Iran's foreign policy with the Soviet Union and the United States and to explain how the shah, the principal formulator of Iran's foreign policy, conducted his country's relations with these two great powers. However, only one-third of the book is devoted to these subjects.

The shah, becoming strong economically and militarily, has turned his attention in the past five years toward the region in which Iran occupies an important position. Today the shah's principal objective is not merely to protect his country from foreign threat but to obtain weapons in order to play the role of a great power in the Persian Gulf region. Chubin and Zabih discuss in detail the shah's foreign policy objectives in the Persian Gulf and his relations with the major Middle Eastern countries. In pursuing these objectives, the shah is indeed conscious of Iran's historical legacy and is determined to restore to Iran its historic role by enlarging the national forces on land, in the air, and on the sea beyond the requirements for defense. Since a study of Iran's foreign policy objectives in the Middle East is now very important, the two authors have de-

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voted more than two-thirds of the book to these subjects while only one-third is devoted to Iran's relations with the West and the Soviet Union.

Perhaps they are right in devoting most of the book to Iran's relations with the Middle East because there are more studies dealing with Iran's relations with the West and the Soviet Union and the sources are more abundant. But in spite of their attempts to keep up with current events, the book is already dated on such questions as the Irano-Iraqi conflict in Shatt al-'Arab and on Iran's support for the Kurds against Iraq. Iran's rapprochement with Arab countries has altered Iran's attitude toward Israel. Having stated these caveats, the author's study of Iran's foreign relations in the past decade is commendable and deserves its place in the increasing number of scholarly works on the Middle East.

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Post-War Southeast Asia: Independence Problems *by John Cady. Athens, Ohio, Ohio University Press, 1974.—xxii, 720 pp. Cloth, $15.00; paper, $8.50.*

John Cady has written the most objective and careful history of postwar Southeast Asia this reviewer has yet seen. To be sure, it is intellectually conservative; it is carefully documented, rigorously understated in tone, and it eschews sophisticated paradigms. Where he speculates, he says so; where has has evidence, he cites it. This precision is refreshing.

For the author, the principal intellectual categories are familiar—the post-independence "state," its governmental leaders, their sources of support and weakness; the factionalism that plagues all the governments of Southeast Asia, and the way outside influences, whether from near neighbors or the major powers, have played upon their affairs for good or ill.

His first chapter reviews, country-by-country, the impact of World War II, the Japanese occupation of much of the area, the French response to it and the legacy in Indochina, and the nationalist upsurge in Indonesia. He draws a distinction between those countries where underlying political changes were minimal and those, such as Burma, Indonesia, and Vietnam, where the internal locus of power changed radically as a result of the war. Problems of their independence are discussed in Chapter II.

The series of near-simultaneous—and aborted—communist uprisings of 1948–1951 are discussed in Chapter III, which begins with a characteristically balanced opening: "The rash of revolutions that characterized the history of Southeast Asia from 1948 to 1951 were probably more than coincidental. They

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all owed something to policy decisions made by the Soviet-dominated Cominform, even though local factors were everywhere relevant" (p. 59). And he deals with both sources of eruption lucidly and carefully.

Chapters IV, V, and VI discuss postwar Thailand, the Philippines, and Malaysia and Singapore respectively—four states where the fundamental local power structure was not profoundly shaken by the war. His detailed discussion stresses how few other parallels can be deduced from the record of these four very diverse states. His pace is suggested by the fact that he devotes sixty pages to Malaysia and Singapore from 1954 to 1969.

Burma's largely failed search for economic modernization and political order to 1962 is explored in Chapter VII, with cool analysis of the enormously overoptimistic projections of American advisory teams. There is little new in the discussion of Indonesia, unduly compressed. But in seventy-five pages he neatly captures the issues, personalities, factions, disappointments, achievements, and atmosphere of the pre-Sukarno, Sukarno, and Suharto regimes. His discussion of the "September Coup" and its aftermath is sensible.

Nearly one-half the book is devoted to Indochina, three-fourths of that being discussion of Vietnam. With an understatement that is impressive, he relentlessly details the factionalism, jealousies, incompetence, and lack of clear political direction shown by successive post-Geneva South Vietnamese leaders. There is less detailed but nevertheless useful description of how many of these same difficulties were coped with in North Vietnam under superior leadership (and with less direct foreign engagement). He is equally calm but cumulatively devastating in his recapitulation of the American involvement—American official misjudgments (with the notable though not invariable exception of the CIA); contradictory endeavors, overinvolvement. The unstated conclusion is that ignorance in high places of the forces at work in Vietnam and an unwillingness to see developments clearly and not wishfully were up against a dynamic leadership based in North Vietnam and a people geared for enormous and sustained sacrifice, in part made possible by organizational ingenuity and an ability to touch wellsprings of popular nationalist sentiment. The events leading to the debacle in South Vietnam and in Laos and Cambodia are also quietly recounted.

The confirmation of military rule in Burma and its revival in Thailand completes the picture.

With such a range, it is impossible to give an equally authoritative discussion of all aspects of Southeast Asia. Cady's discussion of Burma, Thailand, and Indochina is more knowledgeable than his work on Indonesia or Malaysia. He makes good use of a wide-ranging bibliography; it is a pity the short bibliography he provides his readers is not critically annotated, for he must know the slant, the strengths, and limitations of that literature better than most. And one lays the book down with a sense of anticlimax, not so much because many of

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the postwar world's hopes for Southeast Asia are seen in retrospect as having been all too often highly wishful. Rather, after so much careful review of materials and meticulous reconstruction of events, there must be countless generalizations to be attempted, hypotheses to be defined and tested, and comparisons to be drawn to provoke readers to return to Southeast Asian studies with greater drive and penetration.

HOWARD WRIGGINS
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The Political Economy of Agrarian Change: An Essay on the Green Revolution *by Keith Griffin. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1974.—xv, 264 pp. $11.00.*

The development of highly fertilizer-responsive food grain seeds that has resulted in the so-called green revolution is widely believed to have had significant impact both on levels of food grain production and on the distribution of agricultural wealth in key areas of the Third World. Those concerned primarily with economic growth see this revolution making important contributions to the economic growth of poor countries and to meeting the increasing world demand for food grains. For those primarily concerned with distributive equity, however, the revolution has powerful negative implications because it seems to strengthen and enrich already prosperous farmers and landowners, leaving the plight of poor peasants and landless laborers unrelieved and, in fact, contributing to the deterioration of their positions relative to those of their more prosperous neighbors.

Keith Griffin's new book presents an economist's argument against the green revolution as it has been implemented in most of the less developed world. Debates over the relative importance of growth and distributive equity, and the extent to which those two goals can effectively be pursued simultaneously, are fundamental ones. As the world enters an era of multiple resource scarcities, these arguments—especially as they relate to the less developed world—are almost certain to become more intense, more acrimonious, and fraught with implications for the selection of more extreme policy options in the developed world. Hence the value of a book such as this one that generalizes the argument in favor of greater equity and against reliance on technological green revolutions as the basis for agricultural development in the Third World.

From the outset of his essay, Griffin focuses attention on distributive issues by presenting evidence that the green revolution has not produced acceleration of either world or regional food production growth rates. He then proceeds to

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argue, in the two most interesting chapters, that families owning extensive agricultural land have, relative to nonlandowners, significant price advantages with respect to the cost of land, wage rates, and interest rates on capital investments. Inequities in these factor markets give these large landowners disproportionate opportunity to take advantage of the green revolution, thereby increasing—both absolutely and relatively—income disparities between rich and poor. Peasant farmers are further squeezed, Griffin suggests, by governments of the less developed nations which, in response to their urban political constituencies, extract marketable surpluses at low rates to help finance industrial development. He foresees further deterioration of the peasant's position as food grain prices begin a secular downturn in the wake of expanding world production.

Seeing land ownership as the key to agricultural wealth, Griffin advocates radical land reform and redistribution as the keystone of effective agricultural policy. In support of this position he cites per-acre production figures for different size farms as evidence that large holdings are consistently less productive—and thus less efficient—than smaller ones. His value preferences, analysis of agrarian economic dynamics, presentation of policy options, and conviction that most non-Communist governments are responsive only to the interests of the well-to-do, all seem to lead Griffin logically to advocacy of radical agrarian revolution, but he seems strangely reluctant to follow his argument to its logical conclusion.

The author's use of statistical evidence is frequently unpersuasive. His data relating farm size to output, for example, are not controlled for quality of land, which is generally correlated inversely with farm size and thus likely to invalidate the causal relationship he infers. More disturbing is his development of directly contradictory positions to support different parts of his argument. His initial assertion that "there has been no 'green revolution' in rice," based on his finding of no acceleration in aggregate regional rice production growth rates (p. 9) is later contradicted in a country-by-country study that concludes that significant declines in rice production in Vietnam, Thailand, and Burma had been largely offset by production gains elsewhere resulting from the green revolution. His subsequent projections of agricultural price levels are predicated "on the (clearly optimistic) assumption of fairly rapid growth in agricultural output and income in underdeveloped countries, *i.e., on the continuation of the 'green revolution'* " (p. 156, italics added). Similarly, he argues that developing countries generally manipulate the terms of trade both against the agricultural sector to promote indistrial development (Chapter 5) and in favor of the agricultural sector to promote the green revolution and thus the interests of wealthy landowners (p. 211).

Inconsistencies and organizational deficiencies notwithstanding, this book deserves attention because the argument it presents is certain to gain in im-

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portance and sophistication. Future research on agricultural development will have to be responsive to its challenge, and future policy options will be weighed in light of its assertions.

STANLEY J. HEGINBOTHAM
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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